Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines
Finalized by
Executive Committee

November 1992

When Marcos fell, the broad antifascist front fell into disarray and the alignment of political forces changed. The vacillations of the middle forces increased; they were easily swayed by reformist promises and potential of the Aquino regime. And as it should have been anticipated, there was a relative cooling off of political struggles and a relative ebb in mass participation in protest actions. The euphoria over the downfall of the Marcos fascist dictatorship quickly turned into anxiety over the unresolved basic national and social problems and the continued worsening of the socioeconomic crisis. There was a short-lived surge in trade and commerce due to the injection of new foreign loans and a big amount of dollars earned by overseas workers, and also due to the loosening of IMF-WB controls on imports and government spending. But only a small number of the comprador big bourgeoisie, big landlords and big bureaucrats who took power profited from these; only a small number among the petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie received fleeting trickles of relief from the intense lashes of the crisis.

While still consolidating its hold on power, the newly-installed Aquino regime implemented a few meaningful democratic reforms and measures, made use of the advantage of Aquino's personal popularity, encouraged reformist illusions and pushed for a ceasefire. Simultaneously, the fascist military and bureaucratic machinery were maintained and proposals for essential changes in the economic, military, political and foreign policy, which continued to be in effect even after the fall of the dictatorship, were blocked. Behind the bourgeois constitutional processes, militarization was intensified and the fascist repression of the basic masses and the progressive forces continued to be widespread. The reactionary ruling system was able to overcome its lack of initiative and the other problems brought about by the extreme isolation of the former ruling dictatorial regime. However, the divisions and the rifts among the reactionary political and military factions further deepened and heightened.

Although preoccupied with internal reorganization, the AFP General Command continued to prepare for renewed big offensives against the revolutionary movement. More combat batallions were formed and deployed in NPA guerrillas fronts, apart from those redeployed from the MNLF and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) areas and from Metro Manila. Territorial commands were reorganized and the divisions and brigades were redeployed. U.S. military support was increased. Additional units of the CHDF, anticommunist vigilantes and religious fanatics were formed.

In Northeast and Western Mindanao, brigade-size operations which started as early as 1984 continued. Brigade-size operations also started in Negros and Cagayan-Apayao and in many other regions in 1987. In urban areas, militarization was intensified in Davao and Cebu. From the second half of 1986, assassination of progressive leaders and the "salvaging" (extrajudicial execution), abduction and threats to progressive forces started and would become more widespread and heighten in 1987.

Under the new situation, the Party held on to the national democratic line. The emphasis was put on advancing the struggle for basic national and social interests, pursuing the armed revolution, continuing to strengthen the basic revolutionary forces while striving to maintain the broadest link and cooperation with other progressive and democratic forces. The legal progressive movement in the cities remained as a powerful force for promoting the national democratic struggle. The progressive workers' movement further expanded; its leadership and initiatives in the trade union movement grew stronger. The open peasant movement became the main partner of the workers' movement in the legal struggle on issues affecting the basic masses and fundamental changes in the country and society. The progressive movement of indigenous peoples, women, teachers and, from almost nothing, the government employees, advanced vigorously. From the second half of 1985, the revolutionary movement in Mindanao declined suddenly when the setbacks caused by enemy attacks were aggravated several times over by the ravages of the Ahos Campaign hysteria. In 1986 only two of the 15 companies in 1985 could be maintained at company strength; the number would rise to five in 1987. The others dwindled as a result of attrition or were dismantled and redeployed by decision of the responsible regional committees to give priority to the work in the localities. Tactical offensives and the weapons seized from the enemy dwindled; incidents of units hit by enemy operations increased; and the total number of high-powered rifles declined. Worse, big chunks of the guerrilla fronts and mass base were lost.

Nevertheless, the intensity of the tactical offensives in Luzon and the Visayas continued; in these areas, this was still the period of impetus for the company formations and operations. The use of radio for communications, the use of explosives and advanced military training became widespread. After the ceasefire in 1987, there was the coordinated intensification of big and small military actions, of annihilation and attrition throughout the country. Despite a slight decrease, a sizeable number of high-powered rifles continued to be seized from the enemy.

The expansion of guerrilla fronts in the regions of Luzon continued. In the Visayas, the total number of barrios reached was more or less maintained; there were losses in some parts and slight expansion or recovery in others. More importantly, some tens of thousand were added to the membership of the mass organizations in the Visayas.

During the 1986 meeting of the Politburo, the boycott of the snap election was criticized as a major tactical error. But the review made of past practice was fragmented and piecemeal. Other errors and bigger deviations since 1983 from the line of protracted people's war were not examined. The Ahos Campaign was put in the agenda but was neither reported nor discussed. The conspicuous growth inside the Party of the current of populism and compromise and, outside the Party, of the aggressive parliamentarist and reformist currents among legal progressive groups were not identified, criticized nor combated.

The drastic changes in the political situation demanded correct, firm and decisive adjustment in the tasks and priorities of the movement. But internally, the previous weaknesses and shortcomings, the disorientation and the deviation from the line and the strong tendency to overreach continued to plague the vanguard Party and even worsened.

The overall result -- despite the continued impressive military actions, the overall expansion in the countryside, the growth in the total membership of the open and underground mass organizations and the active positioning on national issues -- was an increasing loss of momentum and initiative, the more frequent miscalculations in the tactical offensives, and the worsening imbalances and vulnerability in the disposition of forces and tasks. Under conditions of a relative slowdown of the pace in the advance of the revolution, the obsession with intensifying military actions and bringing about an explosion of the situation caused further complications, difficulties and delays on efforts to recover and increase our initiative for an all-sided and solid advance.

A significant number of cadres and units of the Party in the urban areas and even in some parts of the countryside were confused and misled by illusions regarding the new regime. There were those who held the view that the Aquino regime was a centrist, if not a progressive, government because of the erroneous assumption that those who were regarded as "liberal democrats" and "Left bourgeois reformists" constituted a strong block and could prevail within the government. Initially, even the Politburo had vacillated on this so much so that in determining the principal target, the U.S. and the ultra-Right, i.e., the "Enrile-Ramos faction" and the remnants of Marcos fascist faction, were the ones identified. The Politburo recognized the essentially reactionary character of the Aquino regime. It was clarified that the regime neither had the will nor the capability to solve the fundamental national and social problems. But in the analysis some conjuncturalist influence and views were also accepted. Among them was the speculation that as a result of the EDSA uprising, the people got a share of state power, so that the reactionary state itself had also become an arena of struggle for power between reaction and the people.

Among the tasks set by the Politburo was "Expand the reach of people's power inside and outside the government. Combine political and armed struggles in order to develop the organs of political power (from armed up to non-armed prototypes)." The confusion over distinguishing real friends from enemies under the new situation was exploited by a few factionalist and defeatist elements in Negros in order to peddle class collaboration, parliamentarism and splittism inside the Party. In the Cordillera, the same was used as additional ammunition by the Conrado Balweg faction to push its splittist campaign when the Party rejected the faction's narrow localist line and vigorously asserted the national democratic line and the correct application of the line of national self-determination.

At the 1987 meeting of the Politburo, the internal debate regarding the reactionary, puppet and antipeople character of the Aquino regime was firmly resolved. The conjuncturalist approach with regard to the question of the state, the one-sided and excessive emphasis on the particularities of Aquino's personality as projected by the bourgeois mass media, and the notion that the puppet state had become fragmented as a result of the EDSA uprising were all criticized.

In utter disregard of actual conditions, the rhetorics of big political struggles, of rapidly reaching the majority of the people, and of anticipating and preparing for a new gigantic explosion prevailed within the Party. Thus, the rhetorics continued to encourage the previous overestimation and insurrectionist speculations and illusions. The insurrectionism carried by the SCO program, which the central leadership maintained, combined with the confusion over the character of the new regime, the insurrectionist misinterpretation of the EDSA uprising and the constantly changing concept of "seizing the opportunity".

With regard to the tasks approved by the Politburo, the direct adoption of an insurrectionary line was again rejected, but other insurrectionist views were allowed. There was the formulation that it is necessary "to recognize the probability that the urban political struggle would bring about an insurrection", which clearly indicated something more than an EDSA-type upheaval. Thus, while people's war was being advanced in the countryside, it was stressed that we should also "take cognizance of the possibility of urban insurrection". Another formulation stated was that it is necessary "to consider insurrection as a practical possibility and consciously to develop the requisites for it". The Southern Luzon Commission formally presented a proposal to the central leadership ( which was immediately rejected and criticized) regarding a "fast track/slow track" plan to achieve victory in a few years through insurrection. In the Southern Tagalog region, the Party organization in the urban areas was dismantled and reorganized according to the three machineries (legal, partisan and territory) such as in Mindanao. Armed organizing teams were formed to establish partisan bases and fronts, using the "politico-military method" of organizing in the plains and alongside highways in the provinces near Metro Manila. As a result, the mass movement was neglected and weakened and the links between the Party and the masses further narrowed. The armed organizing teams became highly vulnerable to exposure and destruction and most of their time were spent making arrangements for their security, basing and maneuver. In Metro Manila and other cities, the wish for a "second round" of uprising spread. Thus, the possibility of a new and higher form of uprising and the sociopolitical and historic significance of the EDSA uprising were exaggerated. The illusion prevailed that a new polarization and the conditions for an uprising could be rapidly induced.

In 1986 the more conspicuous result of such illusion was the idea which grossly inflated the potential of the democratic space and the work within the government and its processes in order to bring about a renewed intensification of mass protests on the basic national and social issues, rapidly draw entire sections of the middle forces towards the revolution, and split the new regime between the progressives (possibly including Aquino) and the reactionaries.

In the following years however, what predominated was the rush to heat up the situation, bring about an explosion of general paralyzations and intensify partisan warfare. In 1987, the Politburo set the task of developing the capacity for general paralyzations and of expanding partisan warfare in the cities.

The decision to enter into a ceasefire was finalized towards the end of 1986 despite the absence of an agreement or of any meaningful advance or hope for talks on the major issues, the arrest of a member of the Executive Committee, the Olalia assassination and the big enemy military operations in different regions. And finally, the assertion of NDF status of belligerency, revolutionary power in the guerrilla bases and zones, and the right of the NPA to bear arms, was dropped altogether.

What prevailed was the desire for a grand demonstration of goodwill giving in to what was merely a perceived strong sentiment for peace among the people, specifically of some sections of the middle forces, even if it meant having to undermine the political framework of the armed struggle and having to present the reactionaries with a big advantage and allowance.

As soon as the Aquino regime got the ceasefire it lost interest in continuing the talks on the major issues. Making public announcements became the major activity of the panel and spokesperson of the NDF, something that the government propagandists took head on by getting a far greater space and time in the bourgeois mass media. The AFP took advantage of the ceasefire to prepare their general offensives against the revolutionary forces. During the period, the AFP boosted their intelligence stock of information on the revolutionary movement, formed anticommunist vigilante groups and fanatic sects and intensified operations in the plains and the vicinity of major transportation lines and population centers. Some NPA units were disarmed by the AFP. Had the ceasefire period been prolonged, the Aquino regime and the AFP would have wrought greater damage and confusion by taking advantage of the fundamental defects of the ceasefire agreement and the monitoring system which they controlled. After the ceasefire, during the graduation of the PMA in February 1987, Aquino drew the "sword of war" and declared her total war to finish off the armed revolution within her term.

Based on the lessons derived from the boycott error, the Party agreed to the creation of an electoral party of legal progressive forces and their participation in the 1987 elections. While continuously clarifying to the masses the line of armed struggle in order to resolve the fundamental problems of the country, we also demonstrate to them the correctness of legal progressive forces participating in elections in order to develop further links with a broader number of the people and use the electoral arena to strengthen ourselves and allow us to maneuver against attacks by the reactionaries.

Nonetheless, because of widespread terrorism and cheating by the reactionaries, shortcomings in coalition tactics, weaknesses in maintaining maximum flexibility in handling local issues and in projecting the progressive platform, and lack of knowledge and experience in mobilizing the masses to cast their votes, the benefits gained from participating in the elections were limited. The original target was beyond our capacity and fell far short of the potential.

During the first plebiscite on the Aquino constitution in 1987, an intense struggle still developed in some parts of the Party organization and in some legal alliances primarily as a sequel to the struggle on boycott in 1986 and the strong illusions about the Aquino regime. The issue was not boycott or participation but support or rejection of the 1987 constitution and therefore, of the Aquino regime.

To avoid divisions and focus attention on more important struggles then, such as the ceasefire, formal peace talks and the mass campaigns on basic issues, the Party correctly launched political activities beyond the plebiscite issue on which progressive forces could cooperate despite their differences with regard to the plebiscite. On the plebiscite issue itself, the most important was the propaganda and education campaign to clarify the real character of the constitution and the Aquino regime.

In 1987 partisan warfare was intensified in Manila-Rizal. Normal and special partisan operations in Manila-Rizal were accelerated and drummed up. Because the targets had been arbitrary and the operations heightened at a time that there were strong reformist illusions about the Aquino regime, the partisan operations generated a strong backlash of criticism from the middle forces, further added to the difficulties of the legal progressive forces in political positioning and maneuvering, and provoked intense police retaliation on the communities. It would only be in 1988 that there would be an order to stop the so- called normal operations and a strict control even on special operations.

For the first time, a general transport strike was launched in Manila-Rizal in August 1987 and, afterwards, a general workers' strike in October. The Aquino regime was surprised by these two broad coordinated strikes. It was caught unprepared to stop and sabotage these strikes and was forced to respond to the demands of the workers. The workers also gained the broad support of other sectors.

However, as a result of these experiences, the obsession for "general paralyzing actions" grew stronger. There was a tendency to make a threat of a general paralyzation or a call for it on every big issue even when the masses were not sufficiently prepared. In the succeeding people's strikes and general strikes, the Aquino regime would no longer be surprised and would be able to use carrot and stick measures and diversionary and dividing tactics. Because the organized strength of the workers and the people was not yet sufficient, such reactionary tactics were relatively successful. There was also a big failure in gathering and mobilizing the workers in street demonstrations, which should have been seen as important in mobilizing the worker masses in activities beyond work stoppages in factories and more effectively impress upon the public consciousness the breadth and strength of the workers' organized struggle. But the struggle had been excessively focused on "paralyzation" and in the end, the Aquino regime would use doctored statistics, mass media manipulation and the image of normalcy in prominent places to make it appear that the "paralyzations" were failures. The program for "regularization" and intensification of the war towards the SCO formulated by the 9th CC Plenum was continued. The 1987 Politburo meeting emphasized the formation of more companies and the development of the annihilative capability of the people's army. Simultaneous to this was the identification of peasant uprisings as a goal for advancing the peasant movement within a two-year program.

After the 1987 ceasefire, tactical offensives were intensified throughout the archipelago. It was followed by a coordinated campaign against the "low intensity conflict" scheme in July - September 1987 as part of a special project. In July and August, more than 600 big and small guerrillas operations were launched by the NPA nationwide.

But with the intensification of guerrilla warfare through coordinated campaigns, the regional forces with limited logistics became overextended at a time that the enemy was gearing itself for a general offensive. The national military staff was compelled to provide huge amounts for subsidizing the military operations in the regions. Frictions arose in the relations between the army commands and the territorial Party committees because of the direct top-to-bottom flow of the army command.

We discovered that the capability of our guerrilla army and its system of communication and command were still extremely inadequate for supervising, coordinating and commanding a national military campaign. We did not yet have the capability at the national level to quickly know, concentrate, process, make decisions and act on the information about drastic changes in the situation below; and neither to quickly dispatch tactical decisions and orders to the appropriate territories, levels and units.

Even when there had been a decision to stop the campaign, a member of the Executive Committee and the national military staff issued an order -- beyond his authority -- for a continuation of the military campaign when a coup attempt materialized in August 1987 supposedly in order to "seize the opportunity". Some succeeding military actions in response to the order were unnecessary, inappropriate to the prevailing situation in their area of occurrence, extremely overdue and further caused big political problems. Because of the primitive condition of our communication system, succeeding actions could not be stopped, despite the loud public outcry on previous actions. Worse, no formal directive was ever issued to stop the campaign. However, in the assessment of the anti-LIC campaign made by the Military Commission towards the end of 1987 and of the Politburo in 1988, there was a one-sided emphasis on intensification of the tactical offensives and the supposed achievement of a higher level of coordination. The assessment claims that coordinated military campaigns at the national, territorial and regional levels were an important factor for raising the level and sustaining the advance of the war. Greater coordination and campaigns at a higher level became a rationale for the transformation of the national military staff into the General Command of the NPA.

In Southern Luzon the guerrilla units were almost totally concentrated under the command of the territorial commission during the anti-LIC campaign. For months and months, guerrilla fronts in Southern Tagalog area were deprived of armed forces at a time that the enemy forces in the region had been beefed up, the detachments and CAFGU units were being rapidly set up and the enemy forces were combing the guerrilla fronts. Big and entire chunks of the guerrilla fronts were lost almost without any fight.

In Bicol, the excessive concentration of guerrilla units at the regional command continued for some more years. It resulted in the loss of military capability over wide areas, the preoccupation of the regional command with the problems of administration and logistics, the almost total stop of tactical offensives over a long time, the deterioration of discipline, and the big decline in the political quality and integrity of guerrilla units.

In Northern Luzon the program for the rapid preparation of the requisites for SCO was drawn up in mid-1987 in connection with the analysis that reactionary infighting would intensify and that emergency rule or a civilian-military rule was imminent. The rapid increase of companies and batallions, the preparation of areas for uprisings and the spread of partisan warfare were programmed. The territorial batallion had been formed as early as the end of 1986.

Within the framework of the overall plan of the Northern Luzon Commission and further additions to it, the Nueva Vizcaya Party committee prepared a plan for achieving strategic stalemate in the area under the illusion that the enemy was no longer capable of large redeployments of its forces. Peasant organizations were rapidly established and expanded through mass meetings, the implementation of the maximum program for revolutionary agrarian reform in the province was declared, platoon-sized armed units in the guerrilla front were made to participate in the "insurrectionary actions" of the peasants, raids and confiscation of the properties of landlords were initiated and other "Left" policies in dealing with identified and suspected counter- revolutionaries and bad elements were implemented.

After a few dramatic actions, an AFP batallion was dispatched. It targeted the open mass organizations in the barrios and relentlessly pursued the small armed unit of the people's army. The haphazardly established mass organizations were immediately destroyed. Eventually, a meeting of the guerrilla front's leading cadres was discovered and cornered and all those present were captured. After a series of setbacks, the leadership of the front veered towards a Rightist policy of retreat, limited links with the masses and individual recruitment.

The Visayas is a standout in the level of verticalization achieved by the people's army. The guerrilla units were concentrated in 15 companies which had started to be regularized and commanded at the levels of the region and large guerrilla front. In Samar, the batallion formation was set up after the Military Commission and the Politburo approved the formation of batallions in Northern Luzon. Meanwhile, the local armed forces were very weak; it would only be in 1988 that district guerrilla units and armed propaganda units would again be formed. The Visayas also pioneered in establishing command structures and support staff on the regional level and in stressing the importance of developing the capacity for regional and interregional coordination and for batallion and multicompany operations. Concomitantly, the logistical and financial problems confronted by the people army there were also much more serious than elsewhere.

In Central Luzon the guerrilla zones expanded several times over and in that situation platoon-size guerrilla units were formed and the company started to be built. In the main, the fighting capability and technique of the people's army advanced. The national military staff created in September 1984 made a big contribution by planning, supervising and leading the work. The training of officers and men was systematized, developed and expanded; and so was the use of explosives and radio. Such basic tasks as surveillance at different levels and medical work started to be attended to and organized.

On the other hand, the surge in the building of bigger combat formations concentrating on military work and alienated from mass work brought down the political quality, integrity and capability of the people's army and encouraged wrong ideas and practices within the army. Among the ranks of the officers and Red fighters, the former skills and knowledge in mass work gradually deteriorated, and so did the desirable attitudes that were developed and needed for integrating with the masses. Problems of bad manners, lack of discipline and lumpen habits spread and worsened. Arrogance based on military strength and disregard for political considerations in the planning and handling of military actions grew strong.

In some areas and in some instances, the tendency emerged to depend on the sheer size of the formations and to be haphazard in the work of investigation and planning, the preoccupation with hitting hard enemy positions and with waging prolonged battles which exhausted the forces and the extremely limited logistics.

In 1987, the problem of discipline within the army had already become noticeable and particular attention again started to be focused on the development of political work within the army and the army's participation in mass work and production. The campaign to rectify bad manners and looseness in discipline were initiated in a few regions.

Guerrilla zones continued to expand and membership in mass organizations in the countryside increased. But behind these were the weakening and decline in the quality of the forces deployed in the localities; the prolonged failure to consolidate the mass organizations, sustain antifeudal struggles and other mass campaigns and maintain lively political education and propaganda work; and the growing problem of ensuring the continued presence of the local guerrilla units in the localities given the extremely low level of their military capability in the midst of expanding and intensifying enemy operations.

At the peak of the antifascist struggles, thousands of cadres and peasant activists were recruited in the countryside. They were the main forces attending to the organizations and the tasks in the localities and were the backbone of the mass base. But in more areas, sweeping recruitment of Party members and full-time fighters were not followed up by the necessary education, ideological remoulding, training in political leadership and close attention and guidance. There were serious shortcomings in the ideological, political and organizational consolidation of the local Party committees and branches in the barrios. On top of all these was the gross neglect or inability on the part of the higher Party committees, especially those based in the cities, to provide supervision, guidance and support.

In the countryside, there was a rapid depletion of cadres with high educational level, knowledge of theory and capacity to study theory. The expansion of our areas by several times over, the creation of committees in more territories and levels, and the redeployment of cadres to staff organs at higher levels totally exhausted the limited and constant number of these types of cadres in the countryside. Many leading committees at the guerrilla zone level and a few at the regional level, excluding the districts and sections, did not have or had only a handful of these types of cadres. Under such a situation of a diminishing number of cadres with the capacity to study theory, the redeployment of even only one quality cadre from the work in the localities became a difficult problem and had telling negative effects.

The countryside did not benefit from cadres produced by the powerful surge of the political movement in the cities since 1983. Despite the further expansion and growth of the progressive workers movement, worker cadres and activists deployed to the countryside in the countryside came only in sporadic trickles. Very few cadres and activists from the intelligentsia went to the countryside. As a matter of fact, the reverse happened: cadres in the countryside were redeployed to staff organs based in cities or asked to be redeployed for various reasons to the cities. On top of this, the leading committees whose attention and efforts had been drawn by the issues and work in the cities had less and less time for giving timely attention and guidance to the work in the countryside.

The result aside from the low level and the unconsolidated state of the organizations and the sporadic activation and growth of the mass base, were the emergence and spread of the problems of bureaucratism, commandism, neglect, lack of discipline, abuses, and -- in a few instances -- corruption, which caused the erosion of the confidence of the masses, their lack of interest and alienation from us. It was not only in the army combat units that the problems of discipline worsened in 1986-1987 and even afterwards, but also in the local Party organizations and units for mass work. In order to create a broad, strong and continuing mass base in the countryside, particularly those with a capacity to confront and overcome the systematic and ceaseless attacks of the enemy, there is need for untiring, unceasing and painstaking mass work, continuous strengthening of cadre forces in the localities and unrelenting guidance and care by the central leadership and other higher committees and cadres of the Party.

It was during those years that the growing problems in maintaining our position and continuing our work in the plains, alongside highways, seashores and small islands which came under frequent enemy concentrated operations were already being felt. The enemy started to attack these areas using massive anticommunist propaganda, special operations teams, vigilantes and CAFGUs and took advantage of the political and military errors of the revolutionary forces.

At the end of 1987, the Executive Committee came out with the concept of the terminal crisis of the semicolonial and semifeudal system. Although the term was used in its broad historical meaning, it confused some units and areas which interpreted and applied it tactically.

At the meeting of the Military Commission, the analysis was reached that the AFP had used up their strategic reserves and were already overstretched. Carried away by such an analysis, by an overanticipation of a violent confrontation among the reactionaries after the coup attempt in 1987, and by a one-sided overemphasis on what had been assumed as advanced experience in high-level coordination achieved by the anti-LIC campaign, the conclusion was drawn that conditions existed for "local strategic counteroffensives" that could be undertaken at the district, front, provincial or regional levels.

The central leadership went along with these wrong analysis and views. In the meeting of the Politburo during the early part of 1988, the decline in mass base was already noticed, but it was still regarded to be within the normal limit; the spread of the guerrilla zones and the mass base was also regarded as sufficient for the continued intensification of the war. It was clarified that we were still at the stage of guerrilla warfare but it was stressed that the further development of its quality was decisive for a sustained general advance. It was also declared that the strategic stalemate was within sight.

The implementation of SCO program was pursued and the line of further verticalization of the army, the coordinated military campaigns, the initiation of the maximum program for land reform in the most advanced guerrilla bases, and peasant uprisings was further pushed. The overall stress was on developing the offensive capability of the people's army, while intending to catch up in strengthening the local guerrilla units.

The formation of the General Command of the army, the commands at the different levels, and their staff, was approved. The General Command, besides being in command of the units of the national military staff, was tasked to act as the command of the campaigns directed by the central leadership, during emergency situations (like coups), and upon assignment to directly handle units and military work in an area. The outcome of Ahos Campaign was reported to the Politburo. The excesses were strongly criticized and the policy on the absolute ban on torture was reiterated. But the facts and bases for what had then been the assessment of Mindanao Commission of having identified and punished a big number deep penetration agents up to the level of the regional leadership were accepted without any investigation.

In keeping with the program of the 9th CC Plenum, the diplomatic offensive was undertaken in order to solicit big financial, military and political support from overseas. This offensive was based on the view that support from overseas is crucial in preventing the threat of U.S. aggression and acquiring military weapons necessary for raising the level of the war.

The Party attempted to open fraternal relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other parties in Eastern Europe. The former stand and the criticism against the revisionist character of the Soviet government and party were disregarded and their total reversal, such as the proposal to regard the Soviet Union as socialist and the CPSU as Marxist-Leninist, was considered. But during those years, the Gorbachov leadership had already gone all out on its line of "new thinking" and on a campaign to dismantle the ruling governments and parties in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Within the Party, the manifestations of ultrademocracy and liberalism worsened. After the boycott error, the tendency to question, to belittle and to disregard the central leadership and its decisions became strong.

Within the ranks of cadres of the national and territorial commissions, the tendency to take positions on their own -- and beyond their own scope -- on national, and strategic and tactical issues became very strong. A few cadres and units developed the habit of disseminating their own views and papers without passing through processes and the committee system of the Party. There was a proposal to make Ang Bayan a forum for debates. Ideas similar to the "freedom of criticism" (freedom not to follow and to openly oppose the analysis, standpoint and decision of the Party) emerged.

Some classified documents and information were spread around and reached even those who should not, including the newspapers and the enemy. Talks about the leadership that could only come from its members were also spread around.

All these were not promptly criticized and rectified until it seemed to have become a part of normal processes.

The urban basing of leading committees, staff organs and cadres on the enemy manhunt list continued and even worsened. Legal offices and institutions maintained for various tasks and needs further proliferated. Cadres drawn from the countryside to the cities further multiplied. The central leadership was rocked by security problems and internal disputes.

In 1986, as a result of a big change in the situation, a comprehensive summing-up of the work of the Party and a deeper review of the content and bases of the current program of action should have been regarded as important. A new plenum of the Central Committee was needed at the very least.

The special course on political leadership which revolves around the writings of Lenin and the issues on boycott and insurrection was draw up and popularized to correct the wrong interpretations and the application of these on the analysis of the EDSA uprising and the situation after. The plan for the course originally included a few writings and the revolutionary experiences in China and Vietnam, but these sections were never finished.

The special course helped in unifying cadres on the correct interpretation and application of Lenin's ideas on theoretical and political issues that emerged after the EDSA uprising. But those studies were overstretched and exceeded the original intention: more a familiarization with the writings for most of those who undertook the study; and it continued to be given long after the intensity of the particular issues focused on by the course had passed. In a few regions, there were attempts to combine the course with the study of the people's war in China and Vietnam within the framework of the concept and program of SCO.

In the study sessions held, the big inadequacy in theoretical education for cadres, including the predominance of questions and differences in the understanding of many issues on line, strategy and experiences, became even more obvious.

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