Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines
Finalized by
Executive Committee

November 1992

THE PEAK IN THE ANTIFASCIST STRUGGLE was reached in the aftermath of the Aquino assassination up to the fall of the dictatorship. The ruling Marcos clique lost the political initiative to the antidictatorship forces. The entire country was rocked by gigantic mass protests. The support for the Marcos fascist clique dwindled and became limited to the comprador big bourgeoisie and the big-landlord class. US imperialism made preparations to boot Marcos out in order to avoid bigger damage. A political polarization occurred and a situation leading to a decisive confrontation between the fascist dictatorship and the antifascsit forces developed.

The Party and revolutionary movement put itself at the center of the huge antifascist struggles, touching and mobilizing millions and millions of people. Many progressive mass organizations were set up; various types of antifascist organizations from various sectors in society proliferated. The multisectoral alliances became centers of political struggles of the broad masses at different levels and scope.

All-out effort was exerted to heighten the struggles in the countryside and the cities. Urban-centered and nationally-coordinated mass campaigns were repeatedly launched. From 1984 coordinated workers' strikes were launched, and in Mindanao and in other regions, people's strikes were launched in coordination with big rallies and marches in the streets of Manila-Rizal and other cities. The role of the workers in the open political actions was outstanding and so was their strikes in heightening the struggle.

The armed revolution in the countryside continued to expand and strengthen itself rapidly. More or less 1000 rifles were confiscated from the enemy every year. Big and concentrated guerrilla operations in various parts of the country accelerated. And as a result, the people's seized high-powered weapons such as machine guns and mortars, annihilated bigger numbers of enemy troops, killed or captured high- ranking officers and inflicted powerful blows on the fascist dictatorship. The use of radio communications and explosives in tactical offensives begun and was developed.

The rapid and huge advances of the movement in Mindanao resounded during these years. From 1981 Mindanao led in boldly expanding and intensifying the guerrilla warfare. Also notable were its contributions to advancing the urban mass movement and the protest movement. The movement in the island advanced even more after the Aquino assassination. Up to the early part of 1985 a big bulk of the total number of high powered rifles, Party members and members of the rural and urban secret and open mass organizations were to be found in Mindanao.

These advances and victories in the island were based on the broad spread of the revolutionary forces in the countryside and the cities. Island-wide and interregional planning, coordination and cooperation; bold tasking and promotion of cadres; the experiences summed up in the implementation of "Our Urgent Tasks" and support from cadres from outside were effectively used in Mindanao in order to rapidly expand and achieve the majority of the targets in terms of provinces and towns. The exceedingly favorable conditions in the country and in the island, such as relative weakness of the local reactionary groups, the concentration of the AFP on the Moro areas, intense socioeconomic crisis and favorable terrain, were effectively exploited.

In 1983 on the basis of the analysis that in the main the task of expanding and positioning our forces on the strategic parts of the island had been accomplished and in accord with the Politburo decision, the companies were formed and increased rapidly (five companies were immediately formed in 1983, increased to 13 by 1984 and to 15 by 1985). The intensification of the armed struggle by raising the level of war was started. The companies repeatedly launched tactical offensives, inflicting hard blows on the surprised enemy.

In November 1983 the Mindanao Commission reached the conclusion that a "revolutionary high tide" existed in the island and in the country and they decided to redirect their work towards preparations for an anticipated antifascist uprising. The overall relation and direction of the main lines of the struggle were radically changed according to the wish of seizing upon a rare opportunity. The supposition -- and the impression given to the forces -- was that these were merely improvements or refinements on the line of people's war, although these were in fact deviations from it.

The disposition and coordination of the tasks and struggle in the island based on the new orientation was set and systematized according to the Red area-White area schema focusing on creating the conditions for an explosion into a general insurrection. In this connection, the cadres were encouraged to earnestly study and adopt insurrection as a form of struggle.

The "three strategic coordinations" was made into "three strategic combinations" and central to this is the "politico-military combination or struggle" concept. From the former view of its being a method of organizing, the "politico-military combination" came to be regarded as a form of struggle to be applied not only in the urban areas (the people's strikes-armed partisan combination), but also in the entire conduct of the war in the island (Red area/military struggle - White area/political struggle/insurrection).

Such was the form taken by the systematization of the idea of hastening victory, betting on an exaggerated expectation of a great upsurge arising from the urban mass struggles and the intense political crisis of the reactionaries.

In the "politico-military struggle" scheme, the importance of people's strikes was emphasized. These were regarded as "a process leading to popular uprisings" and were supposed to hasten political polarization, to expose the ineffectuality of the government, to train the masses and to bring about an explosion of the whole situation. All- out partisan warfare was combined directly with "general paralyzing actions" and the combination was viewed as a way of quickly bringing about the ripening of the insurrectionary situation.

The line of rapid regularization of the people's army and intensification of the war by raising its level was also incorporated into the Red area-White area framework. The Commission in the island decided to concentrate at the regional level all the guerrilla combat units, which then held half of all the high powered rifles. The intention was to maximize the strike forces in the intensification of the war, commit them fulltime to fighting, separate them from work in the localities and ensure their maximum flexibility in military work. The guerrilla units in the guerrilla districts and fronts were concentrated and integrated into the main regional guerrilla units (MRGU) and the subregional guerrilla units (SRGU), although some SRGUs were put under the command of the guerrilla front committees because they could not be handled at the region level.

Initially, the fascist dictatorship and the AFP were caught by surprise and suffered the full impact of our blows. The military successes, the intensification of the mass struggle and expansion of the revolutionary movement's influence throughout the island were unprecedented.

But it did not take long (1984) before the big bulk of the AFP combat troops were poured into the guerrilla fronts and urban areas of Mindanao, brigade-size military operations were intensified, and fascist paramilitary units and fanatic sects were set up in great numbers. In urban areas, the armed partisan bases in the communities were militarized, known leaders and allies were killed one after the other, and the legal mass organizations and alliances were suppressed.

Immediately, the problems with regard to the overextension and attrition of the forces and the limitations and difficulties of sustaining the new level of the war were felt and aggravated. The guerrilla fronts became extremely vulnerable because the political and military capabilities of the local units were extremely limited. It was only in 1984 and 1985 that there were efforts to catch up in the setting up the section committees and that there was a recognition of the need to improve the arms and military capability of local forces. While the intensification of struggle and the advance towards the decisive battle was being pushed, the problems of stabilizing the Party leadership at island and regional levels, of the depletion of the cadres in the countryside, and of the worsening security situation in the urban underground also continued to intensify. The movement in the urban and the rural areas suffered increasing setbacks, which eventually led to widespread destruction and paralyzation upon the impact of anti- infiltration hysteria (the Ahos Campaign) in 1985-1986. The Ahos Campaign was a widespread anti-infiltration campaign, launched starting July 1985, formalized in the enlarged meeting of the caretaker committee of the Mindanao Commission in September 1985, and stopped by the Mindanao Commission in December 1985 but continued and even ran wild in one region up to March 1986. Hundreds and hundreds of cadres, fighters, activists and ordinary peasants were arrested, interrogated and punished without sufficient and strong basis.

The Ahos Campaign perpetrated grievous violations of the individual rights of the suspects, the standards of due process and the rules of scientific examination and weighing of evidence. The cases were formulated, investigated, judged and concluded through methods and processes that were extremely subjectivist, haphazard, arbitrary and defective. Torture was extensively used on the fallacious ground that the victims were enemy spies, under a situation that the suspects were presumed guilty even if the suspicions usually stood on the flimsiest ground.

The Ahos Campaign was spurred by panic from unproven apprehensions regarding an extensive and longrunning infiltration by the enemy. Such apprehensions were buttressed when worries mounted over growing security problems and losses in the countryside and cities, and at the same time, there had been the previous warning from the central leadership against a wide network of infiltration, there was an enemy campaign of intrigue regarding enemy operatives within the movement and there were reports about so much internal information known to the enemy. The belief hardened that there was an extensive infiltration network and the leadership in the island was seized by panic when the report and the doubt of one former political detainee reinforced the doubts of the leading cadres themselves in the white area of one region, leading to arrests, self-confessions and accusations drawn through torture. The belief finally turned into hysteria when the arrests, torture, confessions and subjectivist judgment led to an ever widening scale and ever rising level, fueled each other, eroded mutual trust, ran over the integrity and the organizational processes of the Party and shook entire organizations of the Party.

The Ahos Campaign occurred under conditions of intense life-and- death struggle with the reactionary enemy. It was undertaken under the mistaken belief of defending the Party and the revolution against enemy infiltrators.

We have principles and rules that should guide us in running after and eliminating informers and infiltrators and we have exerted efforts to remind Party units not to violate these. However, these were not sufficiently studied, disseminated and impressed in thought and practice; there has been a history of carelessness and immaturity in the handling of the matter within the Party.

The damage created by the Ahos Campaign is extensive and sizeable. Many Party and army cadres up to the regional and front levels were arrested and punished. Many more left or fled because they came under suspicion, became confused or demoralized. Demoralization, confusion and mutual suspicion spread among the forces at all levels. Organs assigned to white area work, united front and the NDF were paralyzed or fell apart. NPA units collapsed or contracted; NPA personnel were sent home. Mass actions and tactical offensives almost disappeared or stopped. The enemy took advantage of the confusion to sow intrigues, encourage splits and attack wide areas of the guerrilla fronts that had fallen into disarray or had been left unattended by Party or army units.

Meanwhile within the central leadership, the view emerged that the political crisis was rapidly ripening into a revolutionary crisis. Furthermore, the crisis was imagined as most probably leading to the decisive victory of the revolution within a few years through the leap to the strategic counteroffensive, regular mobile warfare combined with guerrilla warfare and extensive people's uprisings.

In the 1984 National Military Conference and the 9th CC Plenum in 1985, the central leadership rejected the Red area-White area schema of the Mindanao Commission. But the SCO framework upheld by the central leadership also advocated a rush to shift to regular mobile warfare and the notion of toying with insurrection. There was a strong tendency to set tasks and objectives beyond the actual capacity and level of development of the revolution.

The Mindanao insurrectionist frame was criticized but its key elements, such as the rapid increase of the companies, raising the level of the war, all-out urban partisan warfare, and wishing for widespread and general uprisings, were approved and endorsed. These factors were incorporated into the program and struggle for the SCO which prevailed until 1990.

Before the 1984 Military Conference and according to the 1983 Politburo decision, the formation of companies in the Visayas proceeded. After the conference, the formation of companies in Luzon followed.

The 9th CC Plenum recognized the gravity of the problem of the reactionaries in connection with the socioeconomic crisis, the extreme isolation of the fascist dictatorship, the serious splits and rifts among the reactionaries, and the rapid advance of the revolution. But there was an underestimation of the capacity of reactionary armed strength to increase and of the U.S. and local reactionaries to maneuver politically.

There was a strong tendency to overestimate the capacity of the Party and the revolution. There was the view that we had gone beyond the stage of deploying our forces all over the country, that we had built a strong force, and that the most important issue was the maximization of the forces in the extraordinary situation in order to achieve an advance equivalent to a decisive victory or something close to it. Because of the unusual extent of spontaneous mass participation in the urban political mobilizations, there was a strong tendency also to overestimate the level of the people's consciousness.

The problems and limitations of the revolutionary movement, the gaps and deficiencies in amplitude, solidity and capability of the Party, the army and the mass base for an accelerated and more intense battles in the countryside, and especially for leaping to a higher stage of the war, were underestimated. The attention of the Plenum was focused on the issue of more intense struggles, wider sweep of revolutionary influence, the wish immediately to achieve general leadership over the people, and the polarization of the situation between the revolutionary forces and the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship.

The view prevailed that the line of protracted people's war should be upheld and that the building of the people's army and the mass base in the countryside should be pursued. This played a significant role in preventing the insurrectionist influence to grow much stronger in the following years. But the view upheld by the Plenum, included a strong desire to hasten the leap to a higher stage of the war: extremely high targets were set for different areas of work, with the assumption that these could be accomplished simultaneously.

The Plenum firmed up the decision that the company would be the principal formation of the people's army and military work, already the principal task of the army. The company was identified as the principal vehicle for the tactical offensives and was to absorb a big bulk of the army personnel.

The three-year program that focused on fulfilling the requirements for advancing to the SCO was drawn up. The principal content of the program of "regularization" was the formation of many more companies (regular and guerrilla) and even battalions; the building of the command structure at various levels and areas; and the development of military training and discipline.

The following general conclusions were reached: first, the extent and solidity of the guerrilla fronts were sufficient for a sustained intensification of the war, and second, guerrilla warfare should be intensified by raising its level. Thus, the solution of the problems with regard to the further consolidation and accumulation of strength and the mass base was relegated to a secondary position and the erroneous estimate of having fulfilled the political requisites for accelerated verticalization and regularization was reinforced. While intensifying and raising the level of the war was set as a target, attention to work at the basic level and the localities slackened.

As part of the program for the SCO, the preparation for and launching of people's uprisings up to town centers, except in the national capital region, was set as a task. A wild concept of uprisings and insurrections that was slack on the strategic requirements, muddled in its understanding of the dangers and probable costs, and extremely expansive in lining up the objectives -- from simple trial, training the masses, strengthening the army, weakening the reactionary state or its local branches, up to the actual seizure of power. For the first year of the SCO, the creation of the conditions for an explosion into a general uprising simultaneous to a general offensive of the army was set as a target.

The extensive development of partisan warfare all over the country was programed. The orientation for it was determined as an all-out and special form of warfare, complementary to the guerrilla warfare in the countryside, supportive of the urban mass movement, and a principal requisite in preparing for urban uprisings.

Another general objective in the three-year program was the struggle to achieve a decisive victory of the revolution over the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. The polarization between the revolution and the U.S.- Marcos dictatorship, the seizure of the overall leadership of the antidictatorship front and the transformation of the entire antidictatorship struggle into a full revolutionary struggle targeted.

It was assumed that the revolution had accumulated enough strength for it to be able grow continuously, draw the so-called liberal democrats and destroy the anti-Marcos reactionaries as a bloc. There was an excessive overestimation of the revolutionary potential of the so-called liberal democrats and "Left wing" of the anti-Marcos reactionaries. On the other hand, there was a strong tendency to belittle the capacity of the entire bloc of the anti-Marcos reactionaries to assert their leadership over the antidictatorship struggle.

It was estimated that the grave crisis would lead to a polarization and massive confrontation of the political forces. But, given the strategic balance of the forces and the level of development, the targets desired -- the general polarization between the revolution and the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship and the decisive confrontation with the fascist dictatorship, with one block of the anti-Marcos reactionaries not playing any role -- were unattainable.

By muddling the class character of the anti-Marcos reactionaries, with the use of the term "bourgeois reformists" for them, and their division into blocs of the Right and Left wings, one reactionary bloc was erroneously regarded as belonging to the middle forces between revolution and reaction. The confusion led, on the one hand, to the "Left" tendency to exaggerate the issue of combating reformism within the open antifascist alliance and to the boycott error in the snap elections; and, on the other hand, to the Rightist tendency -- in the building of the NDF -- to make anticipatory compromises on the maximum program and seek the inclusion of those assumed to be liberal democrats but who are still steeped in reformism and parliamentarism and also the so-called "Left bourgeois reformists".

Simultaneous to the attempt at "neutralizing" the anti-Marcos reactionaries, more emphasis was put on the importance of building the NDF and of drawing into it the other revolutionary and progressive forces, on raising the political content of the mass actions and on strengthening the revolutionary leadership over the antifascist front.

The formal establishment of the NDF was pursued. The NDF was to be constituted at the outset by the Party and the forces led by the Party but eventually to be joined by other forces. The NDF was designed according to the framework of the broad national revolutionary united front against the fascist dictatorship and carried the program for the decisive (incomplete) victory of the revolution over the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. Its political program is a coalition program seeking to encompass the liberal democrats and the "Left wing" of the anti-Marcos reactionaries and in the event, neutralize U.S. imperialist counteraction and aggression.

Proceeding from the target of destroying the bloc of the anti-Marcos reactionaries, there emerged the tendency to counterpose the task of building the national revolutionary united front to that of building the broad antidictatorship front. Within the broad legal antidictatorship front, there was a tendency to exaggerate some issues with regard to slogans and form of struggle (in connection with the struggle against reformism and to prevent the consolidation of the anti-Marcos reactionaries) in a way that limited our relations, influence and maneuvers (Oust/Resign, Boycott/Participation in election).

The same tendency was reflected by the view that from 1983, the level of consciousness of the broad masses had been antifascist and the revolutionary task was to raise it by raising the political content of their struggle.

In 1984, the boycott campaign launched during the elections for the national legislature had a positive effect. The masses in large numbers were mobilized in militant street actions such as the "Lakbayan" or the long march and many legal progressive forces and a sizeable part of the anti-Marcos reactionaries were drawn to our side. However, there was an exaggeration of the contradiction between boycott and participation and also an overemphasis on the election issue. In handling the issue, the task emphasized was that of fighting the elections as an attempt, on the one hand, by the fascist dictatorship to overcome a politically defensive position and, on the other, by the anti-Marcos reactionaries to draw the masses to reformism.

The desire to immediately gain revolutionary leadership over the majority of the people, the middle forces and the legal progressive forces -- the so-called liberal democrats -- disregarded the level of the development of these forces. The desire to draw the "Left wing" of the anti-Marcos reactionaries to the side of the revolution did not only disregard the level of development, but also deviated from the correct analysis of the class character of the anti-Marcos reactionaries.

The call for snap elections in the latter part of 1985 ran counter to the Party's expectations. The central leadership, in line with the tactics of decisive victory, insisted on an active boycott of the snap elections despite the widespread objections of cadres and members and the demand of some Politburo members to decide the issue in a meeting.

During the electoral campaign period, millions and millions of people were drawn to and mobilized in the antifascist struggle; the conditions ripened for a decisive confrontation and for the ousting of the fascist dictatorship. Because of the boycott tactics, the legal progressive forces at such juncture was divided, their links with the broad antifascist struggle of the masses weakened, and the Party's political maneuver limited.

After the elections, the Party rapidly regained initiative by calling for and launching protest actions. Party units and the mass organizations led by the Party actively participated in the EDSA uprising. But U.S. imperialism, the anti-Marcos reactionaries and the petty bourgeois reformist groups took advantage of the Party's boycott error by making it appear that the Party and the revolutionary movement were not at the scene when Marcos was toppled. The need to hold a new Party congress was recognized during the 8th and the 9th CC Plenums. But such important preparations for the congress as the theoretical studies, the review of reports and documents, the correct presentation of important issues in our past and current practice, developing the framework for a correct and comprehensive understanding of the major theoretical and practical issues, and reaching a unified understanding by the Party of such issues were neglected.

The larger part of the time and efforts of the central leadership, including the majority of the leading cadres at the national and regional levels, was devoted to day-to-day administration, leadership over the political struggles or tactical leadership over the people's army.

The Party membership expanded by almost four times from 1980 to 1985. A great number of tried and tested advanced elements arose from the intense struggles in the countryside and the urban centers and the most earnest and dedicated among them were recruited into the Party.

But a large percentage of the old and new recruits were not given adequate ideological and political training and education. Such neglect worsened even more at the height of the antifascist struggle. The studies and tasks undertaken by Party cadres and members revolved around the day-to-day demands of the struggle. They were not sufficiently armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism nor even with the knowledge of the history of the Party and the Philippine revolution. The continuous ideological remoulding of many recruits, particularly from the intelligentsia and the peasantry, was neglected.

The central leadership and many other leading committees were excessively drawn to base themselves and attend to tasks in the city. As the central leadership got immersed in details, including those regarding mass actions in Manila-Rizal, supervision over and prompt attention to such larger and much more complicated matters as army- building, the general course of the war, mass base building and Party- building in the countryside got neglected. An already weak system of reporting was further weakened and written reports came to be substituted by consultations in the city and oral reports made during meetings.

In the desire to expand the leadership role of the Political Bureau, the 9th CC Plenum decided to reduce the power/authority of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee. The Executive Committee was stripped of the power to make policy decisions in between meetings of the Politburo, except in emergency situations. Meanwhile, the territorial and national commissions were given more powers. While the continuous authority of central leadership was weakened, the authority of the staff organs for assisting the central leadership was strengthened. This issue would recur and come to be more controversial in the following years as bureaucratism worsened and the internal struggle on line and tactics heightened.

The city-based staff organs multiplied and grew; legal institutions and programs proliferated. The deployment of cadres and activists to the countryside almost stopped. The number of cadres concentrated in the cities multiplied, particularly because it was there that the political actions were most impressive, and also there that the means and facilities for communications, administration and coordination could be found. The deployment of cadres and activists to the countryside stopped and a reverse current started: the flow to the cities of cadres previously deployed in the countryside.

While attending the 9th CC Plenum, the leading cadres of the Mindanao Commission received a status report on Ahos Campaign and on the unusual extent of the problem. They did not in their turn report it to the Plenum. It was only after the Plenum that they made a report to the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee formed an investigating body. It was easy enough to investigate and decide on abolishing the "joint command" set up by the Manila-Rizal-based organs to arrest "infiltrators" in Manila-Rizal on the basis of "findings" of Ahos Campaign. But gathering the data on the events and the situation in Mindanao proved to be difficult for the Executive Committee and it could not proceed. So this task was passed on to the Mindanao Commission in December. The Mindanao Commission was given the task of continuing the investigation and formulating the necessary guidelines and measures. The examination and analysis of what transpired got overtaken by the tasks and the issues related to the snap elections and the EDSA uprising. However, central authority should have been exercised to immediately order a stop to Ahos Campaign and to exert all necessary efforts to promptly get at the facts and understand them. The central leadership should have given the highest priority to the matter. This should have been the sharper and wiser handling of the issue at the national level.

The Party's leadership, relations with and influence over the workers, peasants, youth and students, women and the other sections of the intelligentsia broadened. The Party took active positions on issues and took the lead in the mass actions on tactical issues. Support for the national democratic program continued. However, the neglect of internal ideological work was reflected in the overall weakening and decline in the quality of propaganda work. Propaganda work weakened on issues involving the theory, strategy and the basic principles of the Party. No active theoretical struggle was undertaken against the various growing petty-bourgeois currents. It reached a point that other political groups surpassed us and took the initiative in presenting and explaining the basic issues from their own point of view, and were able to sow confusion even within the Party.

Although there was a surge in expansion of the mass organizations after the Aquino assassination, the task of following-up, maintaining the connections, raising the political consciousness and organizing a large part of the masses aroused and mobilized in the protest actions was not pursued. One reason was that in the Manila-Rizal region, the Party territorial organization had been dismantled. But the bigger reason was the weak and the low quality of the educational and organizational work at the basic level. The majority of the cadres were excessively drawn by tasks related to day-to-day administration, sweeping propaganda and mobilization in the mass campaigns. From 1984 the Party-led organized forces among the student masses began to dwindle and weaken although the broad influence of the revolutionary movement continued through positions held by activists in student councils, campus publications and inter-school organizations.

Overseas, after a period of being limited to relatively minor non- ruling parties and organizations, our relations expanded at the party-to-party level, so did those of the NDF with other liberation movements and governments, and those of other Party-led organizations at the people-to-people level. The initiatives of the national military staff helped to accomplish this although in the beginning their entry into this arena had been done without the knowledge of the Executive Committee. In organizing overseas Filipinos, not much progress was made; instead, there were some setbacks.

At the 9th CC Plenum, the importance of our efforts to expand and strengthen international support was stressed. The major objectives for targeting such support were to neutralize the threat of U.S. aggression and to acquire heavy weaponry needed for advancing to the SCO. A diplomatic campaign was programmed. A related proposal to regard the Soviet Union as socialist was presented. The Plenum, however, decided to subject the proposal to further study.

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