[PRWC Party Documents] Pomeroy's Portrait: Revisionist Renegade, April 22, 1972

Pomeroy's Portrait: Revisionist Renegade

Apologia for U.S. Imperialism

I. On The Seizure And Retention Of The Philippines As A U.S. Colony

Basahin sa Pilipino

Amado Guerrero

April 22, 1972

Revolutionary School of Mao Tse Tung Thought, Communist Party of the Philippines

In giving the briefest possible definition of imperialism, the great Lenin called it the monopoly stage of capitalism. What he considered as most important in such a definition is on the hand that finance capital is the bank capital of a few very big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist combines of industrialists; and, on the other hand, that the division of the world is the transition from a colony policy which has extended without hindrance to territories unseized by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world which has been completely divided up.

The development of pre-monopoly capitalism, in which free competion was predominant, reached its limits in the 1860s and 1870s. After this period, the tremendous "boom" in colonial conquests began and the struggle for the territorial division of the world became necessary for the imperialist powers. Lenin pointed out:

There was inevitably ushered in the era of monopoly possession of colonies and, consequently, of particularly intense struggle for the division and redivision of the world....

The Spanish-American War of 1898 was the first imperialist war with the objective of redividing the world. The seizure of the Philippines as a colony was part and parcel of the drive of rapidly developing imperialist power to expand its economic territory. The revisionists of Pomeroy's type peddle today the false idea that U.S. imperialism basically does not want colonies. But Lenin pointed out a long time ago that imperialism does not shirk from seizing colonies. It is an incontrovertible fact of history that the Philippines was seized as a colony together with others by U.S. imperialism. He said:

To the numerous "old" motives of colonial policy, finance capital has added the struggle for the sources of raw materials, for the export of capital, for spheres of influence, i.e., for spheres for profitable deals,concessions, monopoly profits and so, economic territory in general.

But Pomeroy denies in a roundabout way the purposes of U.S. imperialism. He snidely describes "the contention that the home market and the home investments field within the United States were becoming saturated and that the only outlet for American products and accumulated capital lay overseas" as "one of the main arguments of the apologists for the imperialist expansion".Here he considers as one and the same in intention a Marxist-Leninist contention and the monopoly capitalist's own statement of interest. However, the two may coincide with respect to reflecting the objective reality of imperialism.

He seeks to repudiate the Marxist-Leninist contention that the capitalist crisis of overproduction has resulted in imperialist expansionism by the monopolies by simply calling it as "one of the main arguments of the apologists for imperialist expansion". He argues that U.S. imperialism at the turn of the country could have even foregone actions that brought it out of its homegrounds, especially such an action as the conquest and retention of the Philippines as a colony. He insists that the U.S.monopolies were capable of unlimited internal expansion inasmuch as, according to him, the U.S. home market and investment fields prospered and expanded as time passed, due to advances in technology and opening new fields of production as well as due to "structural reforms" in the capitalist system, particularly the "anti-trust" measures and the use of a high tarriff policy. He blabbers.

Its [U.S. capitalism] internal market and investment field, capable of great expansion, tempered its drive into foreign markets; the use of a high tariff wall to protect that home market played a more saliant role than the acquisition of colonies, colonial markets and resources.

Lenin pointed out:

Bourgeois scholars and publicists usually come out in defense of imperialism in a somewhat veiled form; they obscure its complete domination and its deep-going roots, strive to push specific and secondary details into the forefront and do their very best to distract attention from essentials by means of absolutely ridiculous schemes for "reform", such as police supervision of the trust or banks, etc.

Pomeroy takes after Kautsky in arguing that "reforms" took place to counteract monopoly practices and to "increase the consuming capacity of the people". What a fond apology for U.S.imperialism!

It is instructive to recall that Pomeroy's knight in shining armor, the sham anti-imperialist Andrew Carnegie, moved out of the Anti-Imperialist League because of his compelling interests in the U.S. Steel Corporation, a giant trust. This trust used its accumulated capital for drawing a high rate of profit at home and also a still higher rate of profit abroad, especially in colonies and semi-colonies. Profit is the rule and the logic of trusts and the imperialist state. And the U.S. imperialist will always try to be where they can make higher profits. Advances in technology, opening new fields of production and "structural reforms" are to the imperialists mere conditions for further exploiting and oppressing the people at home and abraod, than for restraining imperialist greed and violence. It is silly of Pomeroy to think otherwise.

Lenin also pointed out:

Of course, the bourgeois reformists, and among them particularly the present-day adherents of Kautsky, try to belittle the importance of the facts... by arguing that raw materials "could be" obtained in the open market without a "costly and dangerous" colonial policy; and that the supply of raw materials "could be" increased enormously by "simply" improving conditions in agriculture in general. But such arguments become an apology for imperialism, an attempt to paint it in bright colors, because they ignore the principal nature of the latest stage of capitalism: monopolies.

Pomeroy minimizes the actual role of the dominant U.S. monopolies behind the conquest and retention of the Philippines as a colony and constantly maximizes the role of domestic U.S. agricultural interests (especially beet sugar, tobacco and diary) in opposing the acquisition or retention of colonies. He underrates the U.S. monopolies and overrates the domestic U.S. agricultural interests. For instance, he easily reaches the absurd point of making the U.S. sugar beet interests appear more powerful than the U.S. sugar trust that was expansively interested in the Philippine sugar. In the relationship between the industrial monopolies and agricultural interests in general, the latter has been subordinate to the former.

Throughout the book, Pomeroy is preoocupied with creating the illusion that the U.S. imperialists were never totally and firmly interested in seizing and holding on to the Philippines as a colony. He believed that the "distinctive feature" of U.S. imperialism is that it would rather not have colonies. And this regard, he falls into a self-contradicting statement:

The reason why the Philippine was retained for nearly fifty years despite the relatively early rejection of traditional colonialism in theory was the fact of continuing strength and pressure of the colonialist forces.

The root cause of Pomeroy's dilemma is his failure to relate the economics of U.S. imperialism to its politics. He denies the profitability of colonies and thus cannot give full account for the fact of extended colonial domination. In effect, he makes a claim that U.S. imperialism is not what it is. Lenin said of Kaustsky:

The essence of the matter is that Kautsky detaches the politics of imperialism from its economics, speaks of annexations as being a policy "preffered" by finance capital, and opposes to it another bourgeois policy which, he alleges, is possible on this very same basis of finance capital. It follows, then, that monopolies in economics are compatible with non-monopolistic, non-violent, non-annexationist methods in politics. It follows then that the territorial division of the world, which was completed precisely during the epoch of finance capital, and which constitutes the basis of the present peculiar forms of rivalry between the biggest capitalist states, is compatible with a non-imperialist policy. The result is a slurring over and a blunting of the most profound contradictions of the latest stage of capitalism, instead of an exposure of their depth; the result is reformism instead of Marxism.

By sheer prevarcation, Pomeroy praises U.S. imperialism for having risen to be the No. 1 imperialist power through two inter-imperialist world wars "with only a minimum of participation in the outright seizure of colonies" and for "escaping entangling alliances in Europe and Asia". He even states emphatically:

The issue of the American colonial system was settled, and the continuation of the Philippine colony during that time (1916) was anarchronism in American imperialist policy. In the opinion of many, the 20 years* between the passage of the Jones Act and the final grant of independence was an unnecessary period of delay.

Pomeroy deliberately obscures the fact that U.S. capitalism relieved itself of the crisis of overproduction during the early decades of the twentieth century through its expansionist activities. In the familiar fashion of imperialist apologist, he minimizes total U.S. investments abroad then as having been no more than one-tenth of U.S. wealth and U.S. foreign trade as not having exceeded 12 per cent of the U.S. gross national product. To rub in the lie that U.S. imperialism was never so dependent on its overseas investments and trade, he compares these to those of British imperialism at its peak in 1914 when a quarter of its wealth were in foreign investments and its foreign trade approximated a quarter of its gross national product.

To minimize the imperialist role of the United States in Asia, he states that the U.S. monopolies had far more trade and investments in Europe, Canada and Latin America. Finally coming to the Philippines, he dismisses U.S. trade and investments here as nothing but a minor part (about thirty per cent) of those in the whole of Asia, with Japan alone absorbing half of the total.

The twisted logic behind Pomeroy's statistical references is that since U.S. trade and investments in the Philippines comprised a small and "negligible" part of far bigger international totals it followed that U.S. monopolies where not so much of imperialists in the Philippines. Pomeroy is like the landlord who believes that the more tenants he exploits the less he exploits each tenant and that the more methods of exploitation he employs the less exploitative does each method become.

It is foolish to belittle U.S. trade and investments in the Philippines by stating that U.S. imperialism did more "colonizing" in Europe. Such sophistry can only be worthy of a dolt. Within the Philippines, U.S. imperialism raked in superprofits in trade and investments and thoroughly subjected the Filipino people to colonial domination. With regard to U.S. investments in Europe, it is relevant to recall the words of Lenin:

... 1) the fact that the world is already divided up obliges those contemplating a redivision to reach out of every kind of territory, and 2) an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several greaty powers in striving for hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine his hegemony.

Lenin warned against the empiricist method of studying imperialism:

Simply to compare colonies with non-colonies, one imperialism with another imperialism, one semi-colony or colony with all the countries, is to evade and to obscure the very essence of the question.

World War I and World War II all preceded by rapacious maneuverings of the the imperialist powers to get into each other's homegrounds, aside from wrangling over their respective colonial and semi-colonial areas of exploitation and oppression. The two wars occured to redivide the world by force of arms precisely because the imperialist powers could not settle their differences through peaceful methods. As an integral part of the world capitalism, U.S. imperialism always became involved in these wars. After each war, the division of economic territory changed with U.S. imperialism consistently expanding its own economic territory. Lenin said:

The epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations between capitalist combines grow up, based on the economic division of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations grow up between political combines, between states, on the basis of the territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the "struggle for economic territory".

The Philippine had been seized by the United States in order to turn the Pacific Ocean into an "American lake" and to have a base for its late-comer "open-door" policy on China, a policy of trying to have a share of a vast economic territory to which other imperialist powers had prior claims. But Pomeroy denies the strategic value of the Philippines in the U.S. imperialist scheme; he goes as far as to say that the colonial possession of the Philippines was more of a liability than an asset in Asia for U.S. imperialism. He calls it an "aggravation" of a policy of "weakness". He considers the "open-door" policy of "weakness" rather than a convenient shibboleth for a rising imperialist power in its vigorous attempt to cut into China and Asia in general.

Pomeroy depicts U.S. imperialism as a much frustrated weakling that could easily be bullied by Japan even during the first two decades of the twentieth century. He completely obscures the close alliance of British and U.S. imperialism in Asia and the fact that Japan was a debtornation to the United States. It was with the indulgence of U.S. and British imperialism that Japan seized Korea and spheres of influence in China. But Pomeroy insists that even the as early as 1916 U.S. imperialism was already so terrified by the Japanese victory over the Russian in 1905 and also by the Japanese seizure of all the special privileges of Germany in China during the World War I that it was eager to withdraw from its Philippine colony or maintain "unprovocative" presence there. In the entire book, Pomeroy actually gives more weight to the pressure of Japan on the United States than to unceasing demands of the Filipino people for independence as a factor for compelling the United States to pledge sham independence for the Philippines. He states:

As usual, the display of power by Japan had its effect on American attitudes towards the Philippines. It undoubtedly hastened the moves to make a promise of independence to the Philippines, on grounds that it showed unaggressive intent by the United States in Asia, thus removing an excuse for Japan to adopt any hostile posture towards U.S. presence in the Philippines.

Pomeroy states further:

The reason for the failure of American imperialist forces to follow through on their initial plunge into Asia lay in at least two aspects of their situation. One was the unwillingness to mobilize sufficient capital to throw into China to compete with and wrest market and investment areas from the other imperialist powers on the scene; other easier areas of penetration of a less openly colonial nature were available. The other was the fact that the American government and its other was the fact that the American government and its machinery was not yet prepared to serve imperialist aims by contending with powerful rivals in Asia in the sphere of force.

It is preposterous for one to expect U.S. imperialism to export surplus capital evenly and regularly throughout the world and then to claim when it does otherwise that it is not yet prepared to serve imperialist aims. It is in the nature of modern imperialism to make the most uneven and spasmodic kind of development at home and abroad. Lenin said:

The capitalist divide the world, not out of any particular malice, but because the degree of concentration which has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits. And they divide it "in proportion to capital", in "proportion to strength", because there cannot be any other method of division under commodity production and capitalism. But strength varies with the degree of economic and political development. In order to understand what is taking place, it is necessary to know what questions are settled by the changes in strength.

Pomeroy, the revisionist scoundrel, would say anything to whitewash the colonial record of U.S. imperialism in Asia. He tries to muddle up what is already clear history. Only a fool and traitor will write an entire book only to maintain the preposterous thesis that U.S. imperialism was unwilling to seize market and investment areas in the Philippines and China and that its government was not prepared to sevre imperialist aims at the turn of the century.