Correspondence Reports
Overcoming conservatism and advancing the armed struggle in Central Visayas

Basahin ang artikulong ito sa Pilipino

Last year, AB reported the raid conducted last June 27 by the New People�s Army (NPA) on the municipal hall of Batuan, Bohol and the successful punitive operation last October 1998 against Chief Insp. Ruel Lagala, a notorious official of the Philippine National Police in Tagbilaran, Bohol. These highlighted the various forms of guerrilla actions undertaken by the NPA in the region to implement the laws and policies of the people�s democratic government and advance guerrilla warfare. On each occasion, there was a conscious effort to attain political and military objectives and broaden the support and sympathy enjoyed by the revolutionary movement in the region.

These tactical offensives and other military actions conducted successfully were the result of the thoroughgoing rectification of past errors and deviations, painstaking mass work and the assiduous advance of mass campaigns in the countryside. These were also the fruits of having effectively heeded lessons that were drawn from initial experiences in waging the rectification movement in the region. In particular, this refers to the Party and NPA�s rectification of and the lessons they learned regarding, conservatism in advancing the armed struggle.

Conservatism in launching tactical offensives

When the Second Great Rectification Movement was launched in the region, the revolutionary movement correctly stressed mass work to rectify its gross negligence of the latter during the heyday of �regularization� and militarism.

But there arose a tendency to one-sidedly underscore mass work and completely abandon for a relatively long period the task of launching tactical offensives. There was failure to grasp correctly the proper relationship between building the mass base and waging tactical offensives that could be won, along with other secondary but important and in fact, essential tasks in the current stage of people�s war.

For three years (1993-96), the NPA in the region avoided conducting tactical offensives, including those that could be won on the basis of the people�s army�s capabilities and the readiness of the mass base. An erroneous idea spread among the ranks of the revolutionary forces that �our mass base would be destroyed if we launch tactical offensives�. Many opportunities were thus wasted.

The erroneous analysis of certain significant events that took place when armed struggle was first initiated in the region as well as when serious disorientation and setbacks prevailed in the mid- and late �80s had a major influence on those who held such views. One particular experience involved the destruction of the district Party organization as a result of intense enemy attacks that came on the heels of a tactical offensive conducted in Carmen, Bohol in 1985.

In the first years of waging the rectification movement, there arose a growing tendency to underestimate the capability of the revolutionary movement and overestimate that of the enemy. The serious contraction of the Party, people�s army and mass base was considered one-sidedly. Thus, there were comrades who developed strong doubts on whether the revolutionary movement could advance anew and restrengthen itself stepby- step.

There were vacillations regarding the movement�s capability to develop democratic political power and enforce the latter�s policies within the guerrilla zones�on relatively minor issues with limited scope at first and eventually, on major issues on a widening scale�while weakening and causing the enemy to retreat in stages.

Despite the NPA�s avoidance of battles, however, the AFP and PNP did not cease conducting military operations. The reactionary military and police continuously and repeatedly assaulted both stable guerrilla fronts and recovery areas. Armed propaganda units bore the brunt of many of these attacks. Several Red fighters lost their lives. Expansion of the mass base proceeded at a snail�s pace; the mass base even declined in 1996.

The revolutionary forces confronted many problems and obstacles in advancing the rectification movement that year, including the issue of correctly putting into context, the conduct of tactical offensives that could be won.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary movement was making apparent and significant advances nationwide. The NPA was gradually restrengthening, and even the enemy could not help but notice the change in the people�s army�s direction and mode of operation. Tactical offensives were being vigorously waged in certain regions and overall, the bases for intensifying guerrilla warfare were being strengthened.

Lessons on guerrilla tactics

The Second Regional Conference of the Party in Central Visayas correctly criticized conservatism and clarified the importance of and need for tactical offensives as the most important content of the strategic defensive.

The Conference explained that tactical offensives were needed in a protracted people�s war to seize local initiative from the enemy and weaken his strategic initiative step-by-step. Through victories accumulated from tactical offensives, the enemy�s weaknesses are exposed and aggravated, and his strength gradually diminished until he is eventually vanquished in the strategic offensive phase of the revolution. It is also necessary to launch tactical offensives not only to preserve but to build up the strength of the revolutionary forces, so that they could overcome in stages their weaker position vis a vis that of the enemy and in time achieve superiority over the enemy on more occasions, in more places and for longer periods until such superiority becomes absolute.

With every tactical offensive launched, it is important for the NPA to pinpoint the enemy�s weaknesses, or to push the enemy to commit mistakes so as to expose his weak points. Through a series of study sessions and clarifications, the cadres and fighters in the region rectified the onesided view that led to conservatism, which in turn resulted in the unbalanced implementation of revolutionary tasks and an erroneous analysis of the war situation.

The need to grasp the dialectical relationship between primary and secondary tasks was reaffirmed. The basic requisites for launching tactical offensives based on an ever-expanding and ever-deepening mass base and the need to raise the fighting will of the army and the people were stressed once again.

The pessimistic view that �the mass base would be destroyed if we launch tactical offensives� was rectified. A distinction was made between the present stage and that which prevailed when armed struggle was still being initiated in the region and when serious disorientation and setbacks predominated. The Conference explained that on the whole, the revolutionary movement had already reached a different stage and is now on the correct path guided by the Second Great Rectification Movement.

The specific experience in Carmen, Bohol in 1985 was reviewed. The Conference clarified that the setbacks suffered by the revolutionary movement then were not simply the result of enemy attacks. Internal weaknesses were cited, weaknesses that gradually undermined the mass base and district Party organization. In fact, the enemy�s military operations against the district had already begun even before the tactical offensive was launched.

To further clarify the importance of launching tactical offensives, the Conference emphasized the need to analyze their specific war situation in relation to the whole and correctly appraise and confront enemy campaigns.

The need for the revolutionary forces to undergo retraining in the �art of war� was reaffirmed. Also reaffirmed was the need for all Red commanders on the front and regional levels to study and to develop expertise in the correct appraisal of ever-changing conditions, in countering and defeating enemy operations and campaigns and in coordinatedly advancing political, military and economic struggles.

The need to systematize and develop the knowledge and capability of the revolutionary forces to struggle against and defeat enemy operations and campaigns was stressed along with the need to continuously expand and build strength while confronting enemy campaigns and operations.

In accordance with the current stage of strategic defensive, the guerrilla tactics of concentration, dispersal and shifting were once more advanced, as were tactics on how to break out of enemy encirclements, the correct balance of expansion and consolidation and the maximization of exposing and struggling against the enemy politically when being pursued by an enemy bigger and stronger than the revolutionary forces.

Thus, the enemy is made to �strike his fists in the air� while NPA units launch tactical offensives that they are capable of winning based on their condition and capacity.

Principal tasks

In his statement issued on the NPA�s 30th anniversary, Comrade Armando Liwanag, chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines declared: �The principal function of the NPA is to fight and defeat the enemy. It carries out only those battles it can win. Over a protracted period of time, it launches battles of quick decision to seize weapons from the enemy, accumulate strength in the countryside and goes through stages and phases of development, until it becomes capable of seizing power in the cities and on a nationwide scale.�

�But,� he said, �the fighting function cannot be successfully carried out if it were not based on the widespread and deep support of the people. The NPA is the main organization for destroying the enemy but also for organizing, arousing and mobilizing the masses. Through mass work, it draws support from the people as the inexhaustible source of strength.� The NPA launches tactical offensives in accordance with advancing extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare based on an ever-expanding and ever-deepening mass base. Increasing the number of tactical offensives is linked to the expansion and consolidation of the mass base within the guerrilla zone, within the guerrilla front, within the region and on a nationwide scale. The gradual intensification of tactical offensives compels the enemy to recognize the NPA�s growing strength not only in the Central Visayas region but in the entire country. It repeatedly belies enemy claims that the revolutionary movement is becoming extinct or disintegrating.

Comrade Mao also teaches us that �war is politics with bloodshed and exacts a price�. It is also the reason why defense must be accompanied by attack and should not be defense pure and simple.�

04 March 1999
English Edition

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