Marking the renewed advance of anti-feudal struggles in Southern Tagalog
Initial gains in eliminating resikada

Basahin ang artikulong ito sa Pilipino

In North Quezon, �resikada� refers to a percentage of the weight of copra that is subtracted by big copra buyers because of the moisture content that is allegedly lost while the copra is stored before it is brought to market. This is one of the leading sources of the huge profits amassed by local merchants.

There are lessons to be learned about the step-bystep advance of agrarian revolution from the initial gains achieved by peasants in eliminating resikada in a number of towns in North Quezon.

Four copra buyers, including Jolito Abellaneda Gucilatar or �Jag�, the most despotic local merchant in North Quezon, have been shaken by the force of hundreds of united peasants. Thus, they were compelled to sign a document eliminating the 15% resikada they subtracted from the copra they bought from coconut farmers. This has been a victory highlighting the undeniable strength wielded by a united peasantry.

Nonetheless, Gucilatar�s refusal to honor the document, the stonewalling of other local merchants in the face of the peasants� just demands and the various maneuvers of merchants and usurers as they continued to take advantage of the peasants indicate the need to further advance along the path of agrarian revolution.

The campaign to eliminate resikada is a struggle of all peasants�from the most basic sectors to middle and rich peasants who sell copra to a handful of rich merchants.

Within the framework of the minimum program of agrarian revolution, this is a step towards raising the prices of coconut products, which should benefit foremost the small peasants who work in, and maintain, coconut plantations.

The New People�s Army (NPA) began operating in North Quezon in 1984 amid an intensifying economic crisis that severely afflicted the livelihood of peasants in the area. But due to the disorientation that had also begun to September-October 1999 ANG BAYAN grow widespread at the time, the NPA and the peasant masses were unable to address the issue of resikada.

It was in 1990-91 when the organized peasants first addressed the issue. In a mass action that marked the depth of their anger at the resikada system, about 400 peasants rallied to confront the local merchants and demand an end to the unjust practice.

Nonetheless, there was a blending of the correct and erroneous lines in advancing this struggle.

The peasants� demand for all merchants, big and small, to completely eliminate the 15% resikada was one that the peasants could not fight for sustainedly. When the merchants refused, the peasants discontinued their collective actions and hard struggle. Eventually, due to the absence of a strong organization, the peasants approached the merchants individually and compromised with them.

There were instances when smaller merchants agreed to a 7% reduction in resikada. Eventually, this only led to the loss of face of small merchants who could not afford to buy the big volume of copra that suddenly poured in as a result.

Other peasants became drawn to trading and to entering into business deals with funding agencies and rich peasants, instead of relying on the unity of the poor and the collective struggle to advance their livelihood. The mass movement continued to decline.

When the Second Great Rectification Movement was launched, the tight coordination between the peasant masses and the NPA was restored. Under the Party�s guidance, stress was given to arousing, organizing and mobilizing the peasant masses for the agrarian revolution within the framework of the people�s democratic revolution.

Thus, in the midst of an intensifying crisis in the people�s livelihood, the minimum program of agrarian revolution was once more advanced in North Quezon.

The peasant masses developed various forms and methods of struggle. This was in the face of widespread speculation and landgrabbing of public lands by the few who were wealthy, such as the creeping commercialization of areas near the shores of Real, Infanta and Nakar that further impoverished poor peasants and deprived them of land.

It was in this context that the issue of resikada once more gained prominence. On May 3, 1998, the united peasants again confronted the merchants who were conniving to take advantage of the farmers. Through the militant and concerted action of about 800 peasants, the five local merchants were forced to agree to a 5% reduction in resikada.

The greedy merchants, however, did not evenly implement what the peasants won. This fuelled the peasants� resolve to strengthen their ranks. The peasants persisted in struggling for the complete elimination of resikada as a step towards the overall advance of agrarian revolution.

In July 1999, around 200 peasants�most of whom were coconut farmworkers�successfully compelled the big merchants, among them Glo, Capili, Relativo and Gucilatar�to completely do away with resikada.

First to negotiate with the merchants were 10 peasant leaders. At first, it was only Glo who agreed to reduce the resikada (by 6%) while the others stubbornly refused, arguing that the copra was of poor quality and that enforcing resikada was a policy of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA).

The peasants considered the merchants� possible moves before confronting them in a �people�s camp� held in front of each merchant�s house on July 24. The peasants agreed on a 10% fallback in their demand in negotiating with each merchant. The farmers marched around Infanta to dramatize their resistance and their other demands. It was then that the PCA was forced to admit that there was never any legal basis for the practice of resikada.

The merchants ran out of rationalizations. Although there were protracted negotiations particularly with Capili and with the despotic Gucilatar, the big merchants were forced to agree to abolish the 15% resikada.

This is another victory in advancing the protracted struggle against the exploitation of peasants at the hands of landlords, merchants and usurers. The peasants of North Quezon have proven that they could cause the retreat of those who strut around like kings in the face of the solid unity of �small folk� like the magkakawit (coconut pickers), magtatapas (coconut husk peelers), magkokopras (copra makers) and middle to rich peasants.

The merchants� continued intransigence in doing away with resikada�and Gucilatar�s wiliness in concurrently reducing the price of copra�are a reminder of the class-based cunning of big merchants, the continued existence of a system dominated by the exploitative classes and the need to further expand, deepen and strengthen the ranks of the revolutionary people to overthrow the ruling system.

00 September 1999
English Edition

	Editoryal: The workers� militant struggle is gaining breadth and strength
	Ang Bayan, online
	Rallies and strikes on November 16: Intensifying struggle for a P125 wage increase
	Deregulation of the oil industry Collusion between the imperialists, the oil cartels and the reactionary government
	A Letter From The Ilocos-Cordillera Region
	On the issue of secession and the Moro people�s right to self-determination
	On the 50th anniversary of the victory of China�s democratic revolution
	On the 50th year anniversary of victory of China�s democratic revolution The enslavement of workers in China
	On the 50th year anniversary of victory of China�s democratic revolution The socialist transformation of the countryside and its reversal
	Filipino people congratulate the East Timor people and condemn attacks on them by Indonesian fascists
	Marking the renewed advance of anti-feudal struggles in Southern Tagalog Initial gains in eliminating resikada
	Tactical offensives continue in Bicol
	News