Reports from Correspondents:
Operations of the Force Recon Battalion of the Philippine Marines

Basahin ang artikulong ito sa Pilipino

On January 2, 2001 in Sitio Nangkaan, Barangay Mataas na Pulo, Nasugbu, Batangas, a unit of the New People�s Army encountered a Philippine Marine team that was carrying out a test mission for Operation Force Recon. The five-man team was slowly crawling through the canefields towards the NPA�s post. But due to meticulous vigilance, swift movements and an excellent grasp of military work, the NPA was able to shoot first and immediately seize the initiative. The encounter lasted 15 minutes. Two enemy forces were killed, including the team leader. Another two were wounded. There were no casualties on the side of the NPA.

The NPA confiscated an M14, an ammunition belt, bullets, magazines and a pack. Inside the pack were found documents detailing the orientation of the Force Recon Team (FRT), the enemy unit that the NPA encountered. The documents included a description of the unit�s tactics, a transcript of radio exchanges with their leaders and the team�s schedule and itinerary. Also detailed were the unit�s equipment and those issued to each team member, as well as the size of the entire formation to which the team belonged.

Information about the movements of the FRT was also provided by some peasants who were able to observe them. From these, the Southern Tagalog Regional Party Committee came out with a study document on the movements of a unit of the Philippine Marines of the Philippine Navy (PM/PN) called the Force Recon Battalion (FRBn). The following is a synopsis of the analysis and lessons contained in the study document. The region has called for the propagation of the document to all NPA mass work units as well as forces in temporary or long-term encampments. It is important to study the experiences described so that others who encounter the same situation can undertake the neccesary measures.

The Force Recon Battalion is a unit within the Philippine Marines that focuses on counterguerrilla operations and intelligence. Its name was culled from the US Marines' elite special forces, the Force Recon Regiment. The elements of the FRBn are specialized and trained to closely and directly monitor units and areas of operation of the people's army. They started training only in the latter part of 1998, with the implementation of Oplan Makabayan. Each batch, comprising an undersized company, trains for six months.

Sub-units of the FRBn which are called Force Recon Teams (FRT) are distinctly small and extremely cautious in their movements. The FRBn has six FRTs with each FRT having four to five men each. Each FRT is independent. The teams are dispersed over a wide area, which may be equivalent to the size of a guerrilla front or a cluster of towns. There may be one or more towns (or a distance that may be covered in one or two days' hike) separating each team. The FRTs' separate movements are coordinated over a wide area. It may take weeks before they return to their mother units or concentrate and report back to their tactical command post.

The FRT operates with a high level of secrecy to achieve its objective of penetrating the consolidated and expansion barrios of guerrilla zones and fronts without being detected. The FRT never makes itself visible to, nor does it establish links with the masses. In contrast with ordinary military units of the enemy, it does not rely on the barrio intelligence network (BIN) for information. Instead, it directly investigates the target area of operation. In these operations, it maintains a high level of discipline to be able to maneuver from the outskirts towards guerrilla zone and guerrilla front heartlands.

Before entering an area of operation, FRT elements familiarize themselves with the terrain and conduct a thorough study of signs of NPA movements in the area. They always move at night and never use flashlights. From the small footprints they leave behind, it is evident that they walk on tiptoe in areas where their shoes can easily leave marks. If there are dogs in the areas they pass through, they go without bathing for a week. And before carrying out an operation, they smear mud on their bodies to prevent dogs from picking up their scent and also prevent other people from seeing them. As they conceal themselves behind thick foliage, they bring along cans of biscuits and viands, making it unnecessary for them to cook food or leave for several days.

They constantly look out for, observe and study signs of NPA presence in their areas of investigation: (1) footprints on roads; (2) smoke in mountains and forests; (3) flashlight beams and light from fires along roads, meadows, mountains and forests; (4) sounds made by humans from inside the forests; (5) the scent of soap and a bluish tint in the waters of streams and rivers; (6) an unusual flow of people in an area; and others.

Through close surveillance, the FRBn directly comes to know of the size and firepower of the NPA unit, the terrain it operates in, the NPA's links with the masses, its source of supplies, patterns of movement, trails used, places frequented and utilized as posts. The FRBn has sophisticated instruments. Part of their surveillance and communications equipment are night vision goggles, binoculars, global positioning system instruments, cellphones and radio transceivers. Each element puts on a special type of camouflage for commando operations. This is a piece of garment made out of net material and that is put on and sewn over ordinary camouflage uniforms. Depending on the color of the soil, flora and surroundings that they would have to crawl on, they bring with them soil-, leaf- and wood- and other similarly colored thick thread (including fabric threads) which they sew on their camouflage uniforms, the better to blend with the colors and overall appearance of their surroundings. They also have pieces of rope with large metal hooks for crossing rivers and for climbing up and down steep slopes.

The FRBn's tasks are different from those of the Recon Force Team (RFT) of the Philippine Marines. The RFT is tasked with providing security to the main body or to the larger formation they belong to. FRTs are combat and security forces in the main and are always on war footing. The FRT is mainly an intelligence force. Its principal task is to gather clear information on the movements of NPA units and feed this for the use of combat forces of the PNP and AFP. The annihilation of the NPA unit they had put under surveillance is the responsibility of combat forces, that come in only after the FRT has furnished them with unmistakable information. Though the FRT is not, in the main, a combat force, it is also highly trained in close quarter battle for defensive purposes, and in sharpshooting from a 400- to 500-meter distance in order to inflict precise damage on the NPA.

The FRBn's movements are also different from those of commando operations carried out by Scout Rangers and Special Forces of the Philippine Army and Special Action Forces and the Regional Mobile Group of the PNP. These are combat forces trained in small formations. The task of the RFT is to secretly enter NPA bases to carry out strike and combat operations. Nevertheless, there are similarities in the method of operations of these units and those of the FRTs of the FRBn. For instance, there are similarities in the method of intelligence-gathering, such as the use of small units for surveillance.

The use of some FRT tactics has been observed in some defensive encounters of the NPA with different military units of the AFP. Though not as extensive in the PNP, some of the latter's elements have been integrated into the FRT. One example is the integration of elements from the Regional Mobile Group of the PNP in Southern Tagalog with FRT Batch 06.

The FRBn boasts that its name means "force to reckon with". But as shown in the encounter in Nasugbu on January 2, no matter how sophisticated the tactics and instruments of the enemy, it could never defeat the NPA.

The NPA's decisive advantange is its close links to, and the support it enjoys from, the masses. It is on this that the security and the life of the people's army rest, as well as its capacity to defeat the enemy. In fact, the FRBn's absence of links to the masses serves more as a disadvantage rather than an advantage. As long as the masses are on the side of the people's army, the "special forces" of the enemy will be at a gross disadvantage and will likely be defeated.

Along with this, to further ensure the security and peace of mind of the units and forces of the people's army, there is undeniable need for greater caution, iron discipline and meticulous study of, and adaptation to, operational and combat conditions and the character and operations of the enemy. Wherever the FRT and other like forces operate, it is imperative to closely study, give due consideration to and carry out appropriate measures against such types of enemy operations and surveillance.

September 2001
English Edition

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