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One of the principal means currently employed by the enemy in its attempt to crush the New People's Army (NPA) and destroy the revolutionary mass base is to launch operations of the Reengineered Special Operations Teams (RSOT). The RSOT is the third version of the Special Operations Teams (SOT) that the reactionary state unleashed in the 1990s. When the first version of the SOT failed to destroy the revolutionary movement, it was launched once more and dubbed Modified Special Operations Teams or MSOT. When this also failed, it was relaunched and dubbed the "reengineered" or "refashioned" SOT.
RSOT operations are marked by the concentration of a large number of military forces in barrios suspected of being bulwarks of the revolutionary movement. The RSOT focuses on key barrios and adjacent areas, usually using an enlarged platoon or company-strength force which goes on rotation in order to continually carry out operations over an extended period. The RSOT usually stays from six months to a year in the cluster of barrios it concentrates on. While they are in these barrios, they strengthen intelligence operations to identify active guerrillas of the NPA, their lines of communication and support, their mobilizable forces and their arms caches. They also launch civil-military operations (CMO) to deceive and destroy mass organizations and goad the latter's members into turning their backs on the revolution. While the RSOT forces deployed in the barrios launch intelligence operations and CMO, they also have mobile forces that comb the surroundings and launch combat operations against the NPA. The forces assigned for combat operations are far bigger in number than those for RSOT and CMO work. The NPA confronts the SOT in Eastern Visayas. In the latter half of 2003, the Party organization in Eastern Visayas (EV) summed up its rich experience in confronting and frustrating the RSOT. Overall, its assessment shows that resistance against the RSOT in EV has been successful. Particularly in the province of Northern Samar, the revolutionary mass base has remained intact and strong despite the intense deception and cruelty that the enemy has unleashed to destroy it. Instead of the enemy deodorizing itself and becoming close to the people, it has grown more isolated and its fascist character further exposed. The enemy has also been unable to launch any successful attack against the NPA simultaneous with its RSOT operations. On the contrary, it is the enemy that has sustained casualties due to tactical offensives launched by Red fighters. Strong tactical leadership by the Party. The key in frustrating the RSOT in EV is maintaining the active tactical leadership of the Party's territorial committees in areas affected by the RSOT. The Party's leading organs at the provincial, front and section levels cooperate with one another to direct, centralize and coordinate the various plans and actions against the RSOT. In outlining the program to confront the RSOT, the Party first makes a clear analysis of how it has been proceeding. Considering that the RSOT is carried out in guerrilla front level and may spill over to other fronts, the anti-RSOT campaign plan is drafted at the provincial level. The plan is comprehensive and includes the combination of political and military, armed and unarmed, secret and open means, and calls for coordinated action between guerrilla fronts and white areas. Based on the plans outlined by the provinces, corresponding plans are made at the front and section levels.
In instances where the NPA can still operate in militarized areas, the guerrilla units maximize their initiative and flexibility, remain in the areas, and persevere in their tasks with the help of the masses. This way, the guerrilla units are tempered and trained to carry out their tasks in the face of danger. In times of enemy operations, the task of ensuring the security of the guerrilla units becomes more important. Therefore, they strictly adhere to rules on clandestine operations, secure basing and other similar security policies. The NPA must also establish its own intelligence network in the barrios and municipalities and even within enemy detachments to constantly receive precise and updated information on the enemy's plans and actions. The role of local Party branches and mass organizations. Because the RSOT is implemented at the barrio level, a critical part of resisting the RSOT is strengthening the local Party branches and mass organizations. The biggest victories against the RSOT have been achieved and the most minor damage inflicted in areas where Party branches and mass organizations actively operated. In instances where it is necessary to shift the concentration of NPA operations outside the RSOT operations area, it is imperative to avoid overestimating the danger involved and having guerrilla units shift too far away from the original areas of operation, impairing their ability to maintain links with the masses. It is important to guarantee smooth communication and ensure that the local Party branches and mass organizations receive continual guidance. This way, the section committee can still assist the branch and the mass organizations, and gather information about the conduct of the RSOT in the area. Barrio self-defense. After achieving the unity of the branch and mass organizations on how to view and respond to the RSOT, concrete steps are taken at the barrio level to defend the village. Families of fulltime comrades face the biggest risk of being pressured and harassed by the enemy, so they are assisted in preparing for possible enemy investigation and repression. Children are also properly oriented because it is they who are often approached and deceived by the enemy to extract information. The Party branch and mass organizations also elicit the cooperation of barangay leaders and councils in waging action to defend barrio folk victimized by military abuses.
As a result of these measures, the enemy has been unable to pinpoint and destroy the Party branches and mass organizations in the barrio. Comrades and activists targeted by the enemy have been secured. And the enemy was likewise unable to recruit new informers and CAFGU forces. Broad and strong mass movement. An effective weapon against the RSOT is a broad and strong mass movement that employs legal and illegal, open and secret forms of mobilization. It is an important tool for tempering the masses' fighting spirit to defend their rights and interests and advance the revolution. In Eastern Visayas, a successful open campaign involved gathering the signatures of thousands of people from 112 barrios and 14 municipalities for a petition calling for the RSOT's ouster. Delegations and dialogues were also launched and participated in by 100 people's representatives from 75 barrios and 13 municipalities. Press statements were released to the mass media, mass meetings called, complaints and cases filed in court, and campaigns and mass action launched to secure the release of persons abducted by the military. Alliance work further expanded through open and legal mass actions. A large number of people were mobilized not only from the basic masses but also from the ranks of the middle forces, local government officials and other sectors. Broad unity was achieved against intense military abuses, dislocations in livelihood and destruction of property wrought by the RSOT. Tactical offensives and other military actions. Actually, RSOT operations provide the NPA with favorable opportunities to launch military actions. Since it is no longer necessary to venture far to engage the enemy, the masses firmly demand that the people's army deal blows on enemy units already inside revolutionary territory. Aside from the objective of seizing arms, these offensives constitute a strong insult to an enemy that boasts before the masses of having wiped out the NPA. Our attacks on the RSOT help greatly in thwarting the enemy's mobility and pave the way for the early termination of RSOT operations. In Eastern Visayas, special partisan operations have been successfully carried out in coordination with tactical offensives launched on regular units of the enemy during RSOT operations. The punitive action in January 2003 on Maj. Danilo Bilion, the 803rd Brigade operations chief based in Northern Samar and the province's most notorious human rights violator, was an important military measure. Bilion was directly responsible for many cases of torture and murder since the days when he led SOT operations as an officer of the 19th IB in the early 1990s. He was particularly notorious for torturing and raping women during military operations. Bilion's punishment imbued with fervor the masses in the entire province. Some enemy forces were also neutralized and won over as a result. 
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The section committees are the most directly affected, and thus bear the heaviest responsibility for frustrating the RSOT in their respective areas. They must sharply set the correct tasks and deployment of guerrilla units.
The Party branch also mobilizes the people's militia to ensure the safety of comrades and activists in the barrio whose identities have been pinpointed, monitor enemy actions, and provide updated reports and information to the guerrilla unit operating in the area. Comrades closely monitor identified or suspected informers, talk to them, and attempt to neutralize them to prevent them from being used by the enemy. Others are persuaded to leave the area temporarily. 
