Lessons of the NPA's military campaign in Panay
Mass support was the key to the NPA's successful assault on the Tubungan, Iloilo municipal hall and police station on June 15. According to Julian Paisano, spokesperson of the Coronacion "Waling-Waling" Chiva Command of the NPA in Panay, the broad masses of peasants and other sectors supported the Red fighters during the entire process of preparing for the tactical offensive. During the operation itself, they concealed the advancing people's army as it neared its target. They rendered the enemy deaf and blind, thus ensuring the raid's success.
Precision, organization, discipline. Many were amazed at the precision, organization and discipline of the NPA in disarming the police, in ensuring that no civilian would get hurt, and in effecting the orderly retreat of its forces. The operation was concluded swiftly within a span of 35 minutes, with the retreating Red fighters carting off the firearms, ammunition and other military equipment they had seized. It took several more hours before enemy reinforcements could move in because of their great fear of being ambushed by NPA units.
It was around 1 p.m. when the NPA entered the municipality. Blocking forces immediately took control of the three routes in and out of the town square. The policemen, municipal employees and CVO elements attending a seminar all thought that Philippine Army troops had arrived.
The policemen, who were intently watching on television the close counting of votes for president and vice-president and news on destabilization threats, had no inkling of what was going on. They were caught by surprise when the Red fighters showed up to disarm them. Squad "Abe" was able to control the staff house (which also served as the guard house where the firearms and base radio were located), while Squad "Kaloy" simultaneously controlled the front, first and second storeys of the municipal hall. The policemen and the municipal employees were made to lie face down. At the same time, Squad "Baking" assaulted and immediately took control of the police station.
The NPA's original plan was to carry out the operation without having to fire a single shot. But when the police chief chose to entrench himself in his office and fire his M16, the NPA was forced to return fire. While exchanging fire, the NPA and the other policemen called on the police chief to surrender and assured him that he would not be harmed. The exchange of fire lasted half an hour. Towards the end, the chief was able to reach the second storey and use the civilians as human shields. Under these conditions, the NPA command decided to order a retreat to avoid civilian casualties. The NPA medic administered first aid to an employee who was hurt because of broken glass. All in all, the tactical offensive lasted an hour from the time it was launched, to the assault, disarming of the enemy and retreat of all the NPA forces.
NPA regulations. The Red fighters effectively showed the policemen and municipal employees who were held captive their high level of discipline and firm compliance with the revolutionary movement's policies and the Geneva conventions and protocols with respect to human rights and the humane treatment of hors de combat. While the disarmed policemen were being tied up, the NPA told them that they were only after their weapons.
The Red fighters also distributed several copies of Ang Bayan and leaflets from the Napoleon Tumagtang Command (the NPA command in the guerrilla front where the raid was executed) to the policemen and employees, all the while explaining about advancing the people's revolutionary aspirations. They planted two Communist Party flags in front of the Tubungan municipal hall before retreating. The entire process, from the assault to the retreat was also photographed and documented on film and audio tape.
Prior to this, the NPA raided the E.C. de Luna Construction in Barangay Partition, Guimbal, Iloilo. An undersized NPA platoon assaulted the company compound at around 10 p.m. on the night of the election. The company was meted punishment for its failure to pay revolutionary taxes. Two shotguns were also confiscated from the company guards.
Military hardware seized. The NPA confiscated 17 firearms from the two-month military campaign in the guerrilla front. Fifteen of them came from the Tubungan raid: eight M16s, an M14, three 9 mm pistols, a Super .38, a pistolized shotgun and a 12- gauge shotgun. Various magazines, bullets, three rifle grenades, a base radio, two VHF handsets and other military equipment were also seized. Meanwhile, a shotgun and a .38 revolver were confiscated from De Luna Construction.
Lessons. Aside from the effective use of superior force and the element of surprise, an important part of the preparations for the Tubungan assault was the series of trainings that the officers and fighters who joined the raid underwent. They went through the Basic Politico-Military Course (BPMC), with the military cadres and officers also attending an intelligence and operations study conference. Before launching the military campaign, they practiced map-reading, launched dry runs and watched videos on tactics and techniques in raids. For the Red fighters, the raid on the E.C. de Luna Construction served as a dry run for the even bigger and more successful assault on the Tubungan Police Station.
The Red fighters also made detailed study of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), especially on the issue of the proper treatment of civilians and captured enemy combatants.
Before and after the Tubungan raid, the NPA launched a political and cultural campaign to raise the morale and fighting spirit of the NPA and the masses in the area.
The NPA also effectively took advantage of the infighting among reactionary politicians and their cronies in the military and police. AFP and PNP officers and units were busy monitoring the destabilization threats in the cities and capitals and preoccupied with their role as instruments of their respective favored politicians in scheming against rival candidates.
Above all, the key to the victory of the recently concluded military campaign was the strong and widespread support of the masses for the revolutionary armed struggle. The peasant masses and other folk tirelessly attended to and ensured the security of the large number of NPA forces that had gathered for the long period of training and study from April until the tactical offensives were actually launched.
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