Points on how MNLF-GRP agreements turned out
Due to pressure exerted by Libya and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Marcos regime and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement at the end of 1976. This instantly confined the MNLF within the framework of "sovereignty and territorial integrity" as defined by the incumbent reactionary government. The MNLF immediately entered into a ceasefi re agreement with the government. Consistent with the dictatorship�s expectations, the agreement alleviated the pressure being applied by Islamic states on the Marcos government and simultaneously weighed down on the MNLF, stopping the momentum of its resistance.
The agreement centered on the establishment of autonomy in 13 provinces and nine cities in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Besides the fact that it was unclear how such an autonomous region was to be established in the defined area, it also remained uncertain how the MNLF was to exercise leadership in areas where the Moro people comprised only a small percentage. In any case, the dictatorship had no plans, and thus did not take any measures, to establish genuine autonomy. In the process of supposedly implementing the agreement, the Marcos regime imposed additional conditions that were absent in the agreement, such as the prior need for a plebiscite to determine which provinces and cities wished to be included in the proposed autonomous region. Marcos established two "special Government-9 in Central Mindanao and Regional Autonomous Government-12 in Sulu), which were under Malaca�ang�s tight control, were "autonomous" only in name and had no budget of their own, not even nominal legislatures. Marcos did not allow the MNLF to play any role in these "special regions", and instead packed them with former MNLF commanders who had surrendered as well as his Muslim politician cronies. Because of this, the MNLF broke away from the ceasefire accord in 1977 and resumed its armed struggle against the government until the dictatorship�s collapse in the first EDSA uprising. But the MNLF was no longer able to regain the momentum of resistance that it had enjoyed prior to the Tripoli Agreement.
There were sporadic talks between the MNLF and the Aquino regime. Upon the instigation of the OIC, the MNLF and GRP entered into another ceasefire agreement in September 1986. In January 1987, the MNLF dropped its call for sovereignty and submitted itself to the government�s program for autonomy. Following a provision in the new government�s 1987 constitution, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was established. But when the plebiscite for the latter�s establishment was held, only four provinces managed to be included in the autonomous government (Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-tawi). Simultaneous with its talks with the MNLF, the Aquino regime waged a relentless campaign to weaken international support for the MNLF. When the regime successfully blocked the MNLF�s entry to the OIC in February 1988, the MNLF officially declared a resumption of armed struggle. Nonetheless, it was no longer able to gain momentum for its resistance.
In 1996, under the Ramos regime and due to pressure from the OIC, the GRP and MNLF entered into an even more watered down version of the Tripoli Agreement. Misuari�s submission to this agreement was a complete and brazen surrender and a betrayal of the Moro people�s struggle for self determination. He accepted leadership over a very limited, and in fact, bogus arrangement for autonomy. He allowed the latter to be limited to the narrow scope of the ARMM, with alleged plans to eventually expand its territory following the results of future plebiscites, until all the 14 provinces (one more had been added due to the division of one of the provinces) and nine cities specified in the Tripoli Agreement shall have been covered. Under the new agreement, the territory was to be called the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). In a plebiscite conducted by the Macapagal-Arroyo regime in August, another province and city were added to the ARMM territory with Basilan and Marawi City agreeing to join the ARMM.
Misuari contented himself with being ARMM governor. He shed off whatever remaining pretenses he had of being a revolutionary and ended up being a traditional politician, stealing from the nation�s coffers, enriching himself, indulging in an extravagant lifestyle and totally neglecting the people�s welfare.
To make it appear that Misuari had power over SZOPAD, Ramos also appointed him chair of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). Misuari was promised a P20-billion budget to make magic tricks with, but only half of this amount was actually given.
Under the Ramos and Estrada regimes, Misuari was repeatedly able to prevent the conduct of elections for the ARMM in order to remain as its chairperson. But the Macapagal-Arroyo regime was decided in conducting the polls to oust Misuari and replace him with Parouk Hussin of the Council of 15 (the MNLF�s new leadership) after booting out Misuari as MNLF chair.
A few weeks after Misuari�s ouster as MNLF chairperson, Malaca�ang relieved him of his chairmanship over the SPCPD. Muslimin Sema, the MNLF Secretary General under the Council of 15 and also the current mayor of Cotabato City, replaced Misuari.
The Macapagal-Arroyo regime coordinates with the Council of 15 through Norberto Gonzales, who chairs the Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PDSP) and is the president�s adviser for "special concerns". The PDSP is a rightist political party that has had a long history of dealing with the MNLF since the Marcos dictatorship.
Macapagal-Arroyo has her own reasons for maneuvering to push Misuari to the wall and ousting him. Foremost among them is her plan to put the ARMM under tight control in preparation for her reelection in 2004. Although the ARMM has a voting population of only a million, the more crucial point is to utilize it as a solid base from which the votes of a large section of the Moro people, even in areas outside the ARMM, could be manipulated. The regime also wants to lure the Moro Islamic Liberation Front into an agreement with the government by accommodating it within the ARMM, along with the new MNLF leadership.
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