Some lessons from Nur Misuari�s errors and failure
Failure lay at the end of the long series of errors and opportunism in Nur Misuari�s leadership over the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). His leadership was marked by capitulationist and fruitless agreements with the government, indulgence in the corruption of the reactionary political system and, after being pushed into a corner, a resort to desperate and futile action.
After being isolated within the MNLF itself and from the Moro people, Misuari attempted to stage a comeback at the last minute by ordering an assault on the camp of the AFP�s 104th Brigade in Jolo, Sulu on November 20. This desperate plan to forestall the elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which ended his governorship, met with defeat.
The MNLF forces, who should have been withdrawn early on in an orderly manner to seriously resume the armed struggle and repudiate the anti-Moro agreement, were merely dissipated as they engaged in adventurist attacks. The AFP was able to prepare for the attack and thus sustained minimum losses. The incident was a huge blow to the Misuari-led MNLF forces especially since most of the estimated 150 casualties from the fighting came from their ranks. Attacks on the AFP by other MNLF forces left behind by Misuari in Zamboanga and Maguindanao when he fled to Malaysia, likewise failed.
Other MNLF forces in Cotabato City were taken by surprise and disarmed. They also earned the people�s ire because of their disregard for the safety of civilians, as they took more than 160 people hostage when they escaped.
The series of failures that befell the MNLF under Misuari�s leadership (and which had now resulted in total defeat), are the result of the historic deception and oppression that the reactionary regime has infl icted since the Marcos dictatorship up to the present in the process of negotiations and the granting of supposed concessions to the Moro people fighting the government. They are likewise the result of Misuari�s capitulationist and opportunist policy and attitude in entering into agreements with and eventually joining the reactionary government in the form of a sham autonomous regional government.
Because of all this, Misuari was roundly criticized by the revolutionary forces. When Misuari played the fool during the Marcos dictatorship in drafting the Tripoli Agreement, MNLF forces that wanted to continue waging the Bangsamoro revolution broke away and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. After Misuari once again allowed himself to be deceived under the Ramos regime in 1996, most of the MNLF forces that remained true to the cause transferred to the MILF.As time passes, other MNLF forces and the Moro people are realizing that the agreements entered into by the MNLF with the government do not present any advantage to them and their struggle against national oppression and for self-determination. They are able to have a clearer understanding of the failures that have befallen the MNLF struggle under Misuari�s leadership.
Many of those who persisted with the MNLF were not able to take the anomalies and corruption that they witnessed in Misuari. In April 2001, the Council of 15 (or Executive Committee) of the MNLF ousted Misuari as chairperson by "retiring" him and appointing him "chairman emeritus". The decision was affirmed by the MNLF Central Committee. In a resolution, the Council of 15 said that it had lost confidence in Misuari. It cited his "dictatorial, arrogant and divisive style of leadership". The resolution stated that "Since the signing of the peace agreement between the GRP and the MNLF on September 2, 1996 and Misuari�s assumption of his post as governor of the ARMM and chairperson of the SPCPD, on the whole, he achieved nothing for the welfare of the MNLF and the Bangsamoro people."
The new MNLF leadership has entered into a tactical alliance with the MILF. They have come up with a Unity Pact, which opens the possibility for power-sharing between the MILF and MNLF in the context of a new arrangement for Bangsamoro autonomy that may be set up.
Misuari attempted to regain credibility even as his power and prestige dwindled. He convened the 4th Bangsamoro People�s Conference in Zamboanga City on April 29-30. In this forum, he declared that the MNLF was returning to its original objective of establishing a separate Bangsamoro Republic. He paid tribute to the continuing struggle of the MILF and its adherence to the line of independence and made it appear that MILF forces participated in the conference. He warned that the MNLF would resume the armed struggle if the Philippine government continued in its failure to implement the Tripoli Agreement.
Misuari hoped that, as it was during the Ramos and Estrada regimes, he would be able to continue putting off the conduct of new ARMM elections by threatening the government into allowing him to remain governor of the region. But the Macapagal-Arroyo regime had already taken advantage of his ouster as MNLF chairperson, the fact that his personal base had dwindled and his loss of power and prestige. Macapagal-Arroyo is now more intrested in using the ARMM to gather support for her reelection in 2004.
The regime used various means to limit Misuari�s capacity to maneuver anew. The police raided the house of one of his wives and seized a stash of PNP weapons. The PNP also accused Misuari of keeping a firearms stockpile in Marawi and planning to foment disorder in Zamboanga and Lanao del Sur. The AFP and PNP repeatedly harassed MNLF forces under his leadership to challenge them to fight. Misuari indeed fell into the trap as he charged head on to launch an adventurist attack, with large forces of the MNLF suffering major losses in Jolo and in succeeding battles. He has lost the support of Malaysia and is unsure of continued support from the OIC. On November 24, he was arrested by Malaysian authorities in Jampiras, near Sabah, and is now detained in Malaysia.
In the face of the long series of errors, failures and opportunism that had befallen the MNLF under Misuari�s leadership, the prestige of the MILF has risen further and shone brighter as the standard bearer of the Bangsamoro struggle against national oppression and for selfdetermination. This is the result of the MILF�s continued and strict advocacy of the fundamental interests of the Moro people and their right to self-determination, its firm advance of armed struggle and its refusal to be deceived in the peace negotiating table or surrender in the face of the government�s all-out attacks. Misuari leaves behind a significant number of forces within his faction in the MNLF. Like their former comrades who had joined the MILF, many of them remain desirous of continuing the struggle against national oppression and for self-determination. Should they pursue that direction now in the face of the failures they had met due to Misuari�s bankrupt, opportunist and failed leadership, it would be a welcome development.
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