[PRWC Party Documents] GENERAL REVIEW OF IMPORTANT EVENTS AND DECISIONS<br>(1980 TO 1991), November 1992

GENERAL REVIEW OF IMPORTANT EVENTS AND DECISIONS
(1980 TO 1991)

II. 1980-1983:

Basahin sa Pilipino

Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines
Finalized by
Executive Committee

November 1992

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1980s, the economy declined and further intensified the people's deprivations. Protests and mass struggles in the countryside and the cities became widespread. The weaknesses of the fascist camp became exposed and the support it enjoyed from the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class weakened. The US- Marcos fascist dictatorship became more vulnerable to challenges and attacks from various flanks.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary movement had been well positioned for a big advance. Under the guidance of "Our Urgent Tasks" (OUT), there was a clear understanding of the correct antifascist, antifeudal and anti- imperialist line against the U.S.-Marcos fascist dictatorship as well as of the tasks of building guerrilla fronts and guerrilla units, and of the policy of advancing step by step, comprehensively and continuously. By relying on the masses and on itself, the Party had succeeded in setting up the organizations of the Party, the people's army and the mass movement in the various regions and these had been vigorously growing in strength. Tactical offensives of the people's army had increased and become widespread all over the archipelago.

During the 8th CC plenum in 1980, the experiences in building the first guerrilla fronts were summed up and the stress was laid on continuing to expand boldly while preparing the requisites for intensifying guerrilla warfare. The Party was able to grasp the exceedingly favorable conditions and the importance of seizing the political initiative. It focused the hardest blows on the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship in order to hit US imperialism and its principal puppet directly.

The guerrilla fronts vigorously expanded and grew in strength and many more were built rapidly. The advanced guerrilla fronts served to mother many more by becoming the source of advanced experiences and of seed elements and arms and by assisting in the setting up and strengthening of other fronts. Up to 1981, significant numbers of cadres and mass activists went to the countryside from the cities. In addition, there was direct legal organizing in the countryside undertaken by selected city-based units.

From 1980 to 1982, the number of barrios covered had yearly increases of more than 1,200 and the mass organizations' membership, of more than 50,000. Hundreds of thousands of peasants were mobilized and benefited from the open and underground implementation of the minimum program of the agrarian revolution whose level of implementation reached up to district or interdistrict levels. The open peasant mass actions against fascist abuse and in connection with agricultural issues such as the coconut monopoly and the land disputes in Sta. Isabel and San Antonio increased. In 1982 and 1983, guerrilla fronts effectively covered almost entire provinces and big chunks of regions in all parts of the country. The guerrilla fronts in Mindanao, Samar, Negros and Bicol covered from two- thirds to three-fourths of the total land area and number of barrios. The guerrilla fronts extended to well populated areas, including environs of town centers, along highways, seashore and plains. These provided the guerrilla forces with wide areas in which to swim, with numerous lines of communications and supply, and more importantly, strengthened our direct political work and influence in entire municipalities and provinces.

The guerrilla fronts achieved a certain level of consolidation and strength through step-by-step organizing, implementation of the minimum program of land reform, political education, the building of basic Party units, the building of the people's militia units, mass mobilizations to support the army and the launching of various types of mass campaigns. Organs of democratic power and popular control could cover three to five contiguous barrios and, in some places, the area covered by entire sections. Party organizations and structures were built at the front, district and section levels.

In 1981, we correctly made the call for an intensification of the guerrilla warfare through more widespread and more frequent tactical offensives. It was appropriate to the general political situation and to the extent and strength of the guerrilla fronts. Tactical offensives were launched in more guerrilla fronts and at a more frequent rate in each guerrilla front.

Guerrilla units increasingly focused on military work were formed. From 1982 guerrilla platoons were formed in the most advanced fronts and soon reached the number of 34 for the entire country. The squads, which numbered more than 200, were definitely more numerous and widespread. The training of guerrilla units was systematized and improved.

Mass work had been the main emphasis of the army, but some 800 to 900 high powered rifles were confiscated from the enemy every year by the squads and the platoons which simultaneously attended to both mass work and military work. Small ambushes and arms confiscations were conducted extensively and from time to time big ambushes and raids were also conducted by bringing together separate units.

IN THE CITIES, the democratic mass movement further expanded; the protest movement grew and became more militant. Spurred by the upsurge of the mass movement in Manila-Rizal and the formation or strengthening of Party units in the cities, open and underground mass organizations, sectoral and multisectoral alliances were organized and grew almost from scratch in the major cities of the different regions. We had overcome our earlier satisfaction with having only narrow secret cells and contacts in many major cities and we boldly expanded the open mass movement.

The Party-led trade unions were determinedly expanded, a progressive union center was formed and the strike movement gained momentum until the fall of the dictatorship and even after. By persevering in revolutionary propaganda and organizing and in resolute struggle, we broke through the cloud of fascist terror and the long-standing dominance of the yellow trade union movement.

The students repeatedly launched boycotts and protest actions against tuition fee increases and for democratic reforms. In 1981, these peaked in the form of nationally coordinated campaigns. Increasing numbers from the urban petty-bourgeois sectors were aroused and mobilized in sectoral organizations and struggles, in political protests, and in supporting the struggle of the working classes and the political prisoners.

Up to 1982, what stood out in the urban mass movement were the sectoral and economic struggles of the workers and the students. Nevertheless, a few coordinated multisectoral campaigns had already started such as the campaign during the Pope's visit and the 1981 presidential election boycott. The revolutionary forces led the massive open political mobilizations with the participation of a broad range of antifascist forces, including peasants from the countryside.

FROM 1981, ALLIANCE AND RELATIONS WORK with different progressive and antifascist political forces was further expanded. The main priority was given to the setting up of the National Democratic Front, the broad legal alliances, the sectoral alliances, and the issue-based alliances and tactical cooperation with the broadest range of antifascist forces.

By attending to the different levels of alliances and contacts, the basic revolutionary forces (Party, army, revolutionary mass organizations) continuously expanded and grew in strength, together with the rapid expansion of our political leadership and influence over the people in general and our active exploitation of the factional strife among the reactionaries. The Party's links with all the sectors at various levels -- municipal, provincial, regional and national -- expanded.

There were efforts to build the NDF provisional standing committee, with the participation of some allies. The NDF secretariat was formed. It strengthened propaganda work and broadened direct and secret contacts and discussions with various political forces and personalities.

Work among the national minorities expanded and developed. The struggle of the minorities against the Chico Dam became stronger and this accelerated the growth and consolidation of the revolutionary movement in the Cordilleras. The Cordillera Peoples Democratic Front (CPDF) was built as the revolutionary united front organization of the people in the Cordilleras. In Mindanao, the orientation of independent political work in combination with alliance work was expounded.

Overseas, the role of the NDF spokesperson, who was designated in 1976, and the Party units were strengthened in order to expand the work of propaganda, relating with potential friends and organizing overseas Filipinos.

WITH THE RAPID ADVANCE in the different fields and areas of work, the Party organization developed and expanded throughout the country. The Party went beyond being a cadre party and assumed a broad mass character. From 1980 to 1983, Party membership expanded at an annual average of almost 4,000. The basic Party units in many barrios, factories, schools and communities were set up.

The Party machinery was able to cover the whole country more effectively. The regional Party organizations acquired substance: committees of the Party were set up at different territorial levels -- front, district and section -- as well as within the army. The national Party organs were strengthened through the promotion of cadres from the regions and the setting up of staff organs.

Within the general framework of advancing the people's war, leading Party committees strove to deepen and enrich their understanding of the particular direction of advancing the revolutionary struggle. Various summings-up were conducted at different levels under the guidance of the policies enunciated in "Our Urgent Tasks" and researches into the conditions and social investigations at the level of the regions were undertaken.

A campaign to study the basic Party course was undertaken. This provided a comprehensive and systematic, albeit initial, comprehension of the basic principles of the Party and the history of Philippine society and revolution.

ON THE OTHER HAND, in the face of the exceedingly favorable conditions and the rapid advance of the revolution, the tendency towards haphazardness and haste grew strong. Ideas that promoted overreaching and concepts giving way to sharp deviations from the line of protracted people's war and to grievous tactical errors in later years at the height of the antifascist struggle arose.

The problems of remedying gaps and weaknesses, as well as of gaining the skills to handle new and more complicated tasks in building the Party, the army and the mass base that had been identified in 1980 were not given sufficient and consistent attention. In succeeding years, these were increasingly neglected and the problems worsened. In Party work, there were deficiencies in education and training, building and consolidating the basic units, consistent expansion and all-round consolidation ideologically, politically and organizationally. In mass work, there were the longstanding problems of the extremely small number of the masses being organized relative to the extent of our influence, the tendency to stagnate at a low level of mass organizing, the haphazard education and propaganda work, and the deficiencies in sustaining mass campaigns. In army building, there were the problems of ideological, political and organizational consolidation in addition to those of logistics, finance, medical work and technique. The 1981 Politburo meeting asserted that there had been a turn in the antidictatorship struggle during the year. The Politburo asserted that what stood out to characterize such a turn was the extreme isolation of the fascist dictatorship, when the armed struggle entered the advanced substage of the strategic defensive and the revolutionary movement attained general leadership of the antidictatorship struggle although a sizeable block of the anti-Marcos reactionaries still existed. In line with such an assertion, the three-year program drawn up by the 8th CC Plenum was revised.

The general task set for the advanced substage was the intensification of guerrilla warfare and the preparation of the requisites for advancing into the strategic counteroffensive (SCO), which was identified as the third substage of the strategic defensive. The following essential tasks for the advanced substage were set:

a.Uniting the revolutionary forces; drawing in one section of the reformist bloc;
b.Sufficient preparation for the people to directly participate in the war; the full development of the revolutionary mass organizations and the broad legal organizations; mass actions and growing support for guerrilla warfare;

c.Demoralization of a large part of the enemy troops; neutralization of the police forces; infliction of effective blows on the enemy and active defeat of his military operations;

d.Extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare; formation of many full-time guerrilla units and militia units; expansion of partisan warfare; building of the commands and necessary units; building the mass base and the guerrilla zones; and

e.Development of relations with foreign friends and allies for international recognition and support.

The SCO concept revolved around the coordination of regular warfare, guerrilla warfare, mass uprisings and mass actions, with the objective of achieving a leap in the war from the strategic defensive towards the strategic stalemate, and probably even up to a decisive victory, should U.S. imperialism and the local reactionaries be forced to yield to a political compromise. The essential tasks for the SCO were set as follows:

a. General polarization of the political forces; extreme isolation of the diehards; decisive elimination of the bourgeois reformists as a political force;

b. Actual and active participation of the people in the war. ("The proletarian leadership, through the Party, over the people and the war in the countryside and the cities will become more apparent.");

c. Regular warfare in combination with guerrilla warfare, insurrections and mass actions ("Regular warfare at its height will play the leading role in the decisive battles. The military requirements for building the base areas will be achieved and the enemy will be forced to radically change the disposition of its forces and concentrate these in strategic locations.");

d. Crashing, dismantling or paralyzing the bureaucracy; and e. Frustrating direct U.S. aggression.

The proposal to categorize Philippine society as semicolonial, semifeudal and semicapitalist on the basis of a supposed change in the class structure according to the census of the reactionary government was presented to, but was rejected by, the Political Bureau. The proposition that the strategy of surrounding the cities from the countryside implied having base areas and big regular formations from the start of the people's war and was thus particular only to China and not applicable to the Philippines was similarly rejected. Nevertheless, the impression was created that we had opened the strategic line of people's war to a fundamental review.

Another proposal was also presented regarding the three strategic coordinations as a guiding concept in strategy. According to this concept, the coordination of the cities and the countryside, of the political and the armed struggles and of the domestic and international struggles was central to the strategy. Within the concept of rural- urban coordination were the formula of a 60/40 rural/urban work balance, the concept of the working class-peasantry combination as main force of the revolution, and the concept of political struggle with emphasis on a broad urban-centered political movement.

The proposed idea went against the correct policy of all-round advance and use of various forms of organization and struggle: legal and illegal, open and secret, armed and non-armed. In it was a tendency to exaggerate the weight of, if not altogether focus on, the urban struggle in undertaking the broad political preparation of the people for a higher stage of the war. It encouraged the drift away from the line that it is in the countryside where the main strength of the revolution is accumulated, not only militarily but also politically. Thus, was the door opened to overemphasizing the role of urban struggle as well as to views that pushed for the separation of military work from political work in the countryside. The Politburo set the proposal aside for further study. Albeit, in the clarification of the tasks under the advanced substage and the SCO and even of the revisions on the program, the emphasis on a broad urban- centered political movement and struggle was already incorporated.

Contrary to the decision and without the knowledge of the Politburo, the concept was propagated as a policy in Mindanao. One glaring result, particularly of the concept of urban armed and political struggles, was the development of armed partisan warfare in Davao City. Arms- confiscation operations were accelerated and, in 1981, armed partisans begun to be formed. Armed partisan operation increased and "politico- military organizing" in the communities gained momentum. A large number of rifles were confiscated and many people were recruited into the revolutionary organizations. However, the partisan operations frequently committed the mistake of targeting those who were not supposed to be targeted; there was an overemphasis of military actions in the city and the "partisan bases" thus became open targets for enemy military attacks.

THE 1981 POLITBURO MEETING NURTURED THE ILLUSION of an anticipated decisive victory of the revolution in the immediate future and drew up the corresponding tactics. The anti-Marcos reactionaries were renamed "bourgeois reformists" which were to be dismantled as a political block by drawing to our side the "Left wing" and isolating the Right wing. Thus, we hoped to stop the emergence of the Third Force and to create the general political polarization between the revolution, including the democratic forces, on one side, and the U.S.-Marcos fascist dictatorship, including the diehard reactionaries, on the other.

With the belief that the basic alliance was already strong while work among the middle forces and on the broad united front was lagging very much behind, city-centered alliance work and political movement were made the priority. The central leadership based itself in the city, focused on the city-centered political movement and alliance work, and built and strengthened the city-based staff organs.

The building of the NDF was programmed within the frame of the struggle for the decisive victory of the revolution against the U.S.- Marcos dictatorship and carried a program for a broad revolutionary coalition designed to attract even the legal progressive forces and the "Left wing" of the anti-Marcos reactionaries and to neutralize, in the event, the threat of U.S. imperialist aggression and attack.

A new draft was made of the program of the NDF, with the intention of renaming it Katipunan, upon the suggestion of an ally. The draft was withdrawn due to widespread objections of Party units and cadres to the proposed compromises on the maximum program. Nonetheless, the door was opened to the view that there was a need to restrict or conceal the leadership of the Party if the intention were to build and strengthen the NDF as a broad coalition. THE MULTIPLICATION OF DRAFT DOCUMENTS on strategy, policies and orientations, whose contents though not finalized were broadcast through various means, started to emerge as a problem during these years. It also became widespread for leading territorial and regional Party committees -- on their own and without central guidance -- to "particularize" the revolutionary strategy and tactics for their own areas of responsibility. Outside of the Party, parallel to the surge of different political forces and groups, various theories and lines opposed to Marxism- Leninism and the line of protracted people's war -- such as dependent capitalism, Eurocommunism, social democracy, and various types of the line of insurrection or urban terrorism-- also proliferated. These theories and lines were not promptly examined and criticized but were instead allowed to gain influence and cause confusion even inside the Party.

The Education and Propaganda Commission and the National Instructions Bureau were dismantled in 1982. Education work at the basic and intermediate levels was passed on to the territorial commissions and the regional committees while the Executive Committee of the Central Committee assumed that of the advanced course and the publication of a theoretical journal.

However, due to the weakening of what was then only a rudimentary machinery for Party education, the task of drawing up additional regular and special courses as well as that of translating and publishing the numerous materials needed by Party cadres and members were neglected. Worse, the impetus to study the basic course waned and attention on the finished translations was interrupted.

The machinery for education was weakened at a time that more active ideological work became highly necessary. Outside of the Party, the theoretical challenges to the Party's principles and line became stronger. Inside the Party, the need for more education and training became greater. There was the large-scale promotion of cadres necessitated by the extensive building or strengthening of the Party committees at the regional, front and district levels as well as of the staff organs at various levels. Thus, from then on, the gap increased between the need for and the attention given to education and training.

At the 1983 Politburo meeting, the discovery and destruction of a wide network of infiltrators in one part of the guerrilla front around Bicol-Quezon boundary was reported. After the short report and without further examination of important details and data of the event, the conclusions of the report were approved; and other regions were alerted to the danger of a massive enemy infiltration.

By 1983 the tasks for the nationwide expansion of the guerrilla warfare had in the main been accomplished. In all the regions, with the exception of Manila-Rizal, the regional Party and army organizations were already in place. The majority of the regions had two to three big and relatively stable guerrilla fronts. The tactical offensives in various parts of the archipelago echoed each other and the mass campaigns and struggles in the countryside and the cities were vigorously advancing.

The rapid expansion and advance of the people's army pushed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in 1981 and 1982 to start the massive redeployment of their forces from areas of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to our own areas. Units of the civilian home defense forces (CHDF) and anticommunist vigilantes were extensively organized. Population-control operations in the countryside as well as kidnapping and extrajudicial killing ("salvaging") operations in the cities were intensified .

Furthermore, the AFP started to review and discard the pattern of its counterrevolutionary war centering on "search and destroy" operations. More comprehensive counterguerrilla operations such as "Cadena de Amor" in Northern Luzon were tested. At the same time, the CIA increased intelligence operations all over the country. And the AFP started its largescale and longterm intelligence operations focusing on strategic analysis of the revolutionary movement and the identification of leaders, cadres and mass activists at various levels and areas.