Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Philippines

March 3, 1972

Tanging Palathala

In reestablishing the Party, we started practically from scratch. The Lava revisionist renegades had for decades done great damage to the organization of the old merger party and had tried might and main to prevent the advance of the revolutionary mass movement and of a genuine proletarian revolutionary party. Despite our limited number, it is basically our correct ideological and political line that has made it possible for our Party to rebuild itself and continue to lead the revolutionary mass movement. We have been able to consolidate the small yet fresh ranks of proletarian revolutionaries to isolate the stale and far smaller number of Lava revisionist renegades and as a result we have been able to march forward at the vanguard of the revolutionary masses.

Since December 26, 1968, we have grown into an organization of at least 2,000 members and candidate-members. If only a few scores of Party members in 1969 and a few hundreds in 1970 and 1971 could lead great mass struggles in the countryside and cities, we can be optimistic that as we grow into several thousands more this year and the next we will be able to exert greater revolutionary efforts and achieve greater revolutionary victories. What makes our Party distinctive today is that majority of its members have cadre quality and are in leading positions in the New People's Army and in various mass organizations (urban and rural) whose membership is relatively large.

Based on the last count at the beginning of this year, about 55 per cent of our membership are in the countryside and about 45 per cent are in the Manila-Rizal region and other urban ares all over the archipelago. About 53 per cent of the Party membership are of peasant origin, about 4 per cent of worker origin and about 43 per cent are of petty-bourgeois origin. Only recently, there has been some considerable increase in the membership of peasant origin. And we expect that soon we can draw even more Party members from the ranks of the toiling masses as we intensify the revolutionary armed struggle in the countryside and build up the revolutionary workers' movement in factories and workers' communities. In the Manila-Rizal region, where the working class is most concentrated in our country, only 20 per cent of the regional Party membership are of worker origin; this fact proves that we have plenty of work to do in order to draw Party members from the ranks of workers.

If we recall the Party Congress of Re-Establishment, there were three delegates of worker origin and nine of urban petty-bourgeois origin. In its First Plenum, the Central Committee was able to add to its ranks eight members of worker-peasant origin who could open wider the field for building the Party in the countryside.

It is to the great credit of the Party that it was able to establish in three months' time on March 29, 1969, the New People's Army and at the same time repudiate and isolate the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique. The First Plenum of the Central Committee in May 1969 ratified the establishment of the New People's Army as the main form of organization and filled up the Party central organs with more personnel. But in this plenum, those who assumed posts in the Party central organs were not as yet very clear about the particular tasks that they had to carry out and also about the methods by which to carry these out.

What may be considered thde most serious error incurred within the Party during the last three years is sectarianism, which greatly hampered the organizational building of the Party. Though the revolutionary mass movement had advanced rapidly during the whole of 1970, it was not until the September 1970 meeting of the Political Bureau and then the Second Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1971 that it became clear to all, especially among leading cadres, that thousands of advanced elements could be chosen and recruited into the Party within a short period of time from the revolutionary mass movement in both countryside and cities. In the previous years, a considerable number of cadres, including leading organs, seemed satisfied with our small membership and the slow rate of recruitment. Yet we had taken up the gigantic tasks of the revolution which call for large masses of Party members. And indeed, there were so many possible Party members accumulating rapidly in the ranks of the revolutionary masses. Sectarianism aggravated and complicated such difficulties as lack of experience, limited size of membership and scarcity of resources that were peculiar to a Party starting from scratch.

Though Party members in the Manila-Rizal region had the headstart over those in the countryside in recruiting Party members, they persisted in a "small group" mentality, complicated the methods of increasing their membership and failed to recruit several hundreds of mass activists into the Party. They failed to relate the organizational growth of the Party to the revolutionary mass movement. They failed to recruit more Party members from the ranks of the workers and even from the ranks of the revolutionary youth. The result was that Party cadres could be sent to the countryside in mere trickles. In the New People's Army, the demand for political officers could not be met from early 1969 to the late part of 1970. Without a strong Party organization at its core, the New People's Army is weak and cannot do well its work of all-around consolidation in the barrios that it reaches. It then becomes easy for such erroneous trends as the purely military viewpoint, roving rebel ideology, commandism and conservatism to merge. Because the Party leadership is not asserted and reinforced, the people's army would tend to rely only on the thin existence of the barrio organizing committees. Before the Party could provide cadres and before the work of all-around consolidation could be done well in our first guerilla zone in Tarlac, the enemy stepped up its campaign of bloody suppression and consequently we had to suffer grave difficulties there.

The September 1970 meeting of the Political Bureau in Isabela clarified how the Party and the New People's Army could establish barrio revolutionary committees as organs of political power and mass organizations at the barrio level. In this regard, the necessity and possibility of hastening the organizational building of the Party in the countryside were stressed.

It was, however, in the Second Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1971 that we were able to discuss more extensively and approve the comprehensive Organizational Guide and Report Outlines. This guide shows how the Party organization can be built in the New People's Army, the mass organizations and localities. In the New People's Army, the Party branches are to be based temporarily on the regular platoons because regular companies are still to arise. Party groups at the squad level are to be consolidated and they are to engage in Party building in the localities. Party groups are to be created from the advanced elements in barrio organizing committees and in the mass organizations (for peasants, workers, youth, women and cultural activists) and in local guerilla and militia units. These Party groups can be subsequently consolidated into a local Party branch. The local Party branch will then be in a position to lead and participate in the barrio revolutionary committee.

The Organizational Guide and Report Outlines also shows how Party branches can be established in factories, urban communities and schools and Party groups in urban mass organizations. The leading activists or advanced elements in people's organizing committees, trade unions, youth organizations, women's organizations and other mass organizations can be recruited into the Party and these can be deployed to establish local Party branches in town centers and urban areas.

The Second Plenum of the Central Committee decided to implement the policy of expanding the Party boldly and not letting a single undesirable in. It stressed the principles of expanding the Party on the basis of the revolutionary mass movement. Every Party member was expected to recruit six other members before the end of 1971. It was noted that the target for recruitment could be easily overfulfilled because there were so many possible Party members that had already accumulated in the ranks of the revolutionary masses. Indeed the target for recruitment would subsequently be overfulfilled and we would still observe that there was still a considerable number of possible Party members who had been waiting in vain for recruitment.

To make sure that the Party would expand on a national scale, the Second Plenum also pressed for the appointment or election (as the case may be) of regional Party committees to build up regional Party organizations in Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Manila-Rizal, Southern Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. As a result, we now have relatively stable regional Party organizations in all regions except Mindanao where Party cadres are now working hard to form a stable Party organization. Our strongest regional Party organizations are in Northern Luzon, Manila-Rizal, Central Luzon and Southern Luzon which account for 30 per cent, 18 per cent, 16 per cent and 7 per cent of our membership, respectively. Our regional Party organizations in Western Visayas and Eastern Visayas account for 6 per cent and 2.5 per cent of our membership, respectively. Deployed at various points in Mindanao are 2.5 per cent of our membership who are coordinated by a provisional revolutionary secretariat. It may be noted that two regional Party organizations, one for Eastern Visayas and another for Western Visayas, have been established in the Visayas. Because of its large population and land size, Mindanao may also be divided into two or three regions.

The regional Party committees are an effective instrument for observing collective leadership in the various regions of the archipelago. However, there are still tendencies here for one or two cadres to monopolize decisions. Another erroneous tendency that may arise here is bureaucratism, which appears in the form of building bureaus down to the level of the district committee at the expense off the urgent task of establishing Party branches and groups at the base of the regional Party organization. Such a tendency goes against the principle of letting the Party take roots among the masses.

The establishment of the regional Party organizations and their corresponding leading organs will eventually solve the problems of extended period of time between plenums of the Central Committee and also between the meetings of the Political Bureau. Because of the small number of Party cadres, most members of the Central Committee and also of the Political Bureau have had to attend to so many tasks at distantly separated places. In due time, it will be quite easier to convene plenary meetings of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. To carry on collective leadership on a daily basis, the Executive Committee of the Central Committee has been acting in the name of the Party Central Committee and the Military Commission has been supervising the New People's Army and directing the Party organization therein.

Central organs directly under the Party Central Committee and all bureaus under the organization and education departments of the General Secretariat have become better staffed as a result of the efficient recruitment of Party members after the Second Plenum of the Party Central Committee. The Party Central Committee now has adequate apparatuses for performing a wide range of work and can attend to solving problems in a more concentrated way than before when the central staffs and offices were grossly inadequate. The staff members of all offices of the Central Committee, including the Secretariat, absorb 18 per cent of the total Party membership; this is exclusive of the 82 per cent deployed in various regions.

There have been no serious violations of the principle of democratic centralism, except in certain cases which have been properly dealt with. The Central Committee has maintained its overall leadership within the Party. On the whole, leading organs at every level have conducted themselves well. It is to the credit of the Party rank and file that they have exercised their freedom to speak up and make proposals and criticisms and at the same time to accept the discipline required in implementing collective decisions and instructions from leading organs. Most, if not all, infractions of the principle of democratic centralism whether big or small have come under criticism and discussion by Party organs or Party organizations concerned.

Because of its iron discipline and unity, the Party has been able to build its organization severalfold and has been able to defend itself from every attempt of the enemy to subvert or smash it. We have completely frustrated the enemy's vile hope of "nipping it in the bud". In the countryside, we have withstood campaigns of "encirclement and suppression". Even in the cities where we are supposed to be most vulnerable, the Party was able to function smoothly even at the height of the anti-communist white terror following the Plaza Miranda massacre of August 21, 1971. In the countryside or in the city underground, we have effectively foiled many enemy attempts to destroy our organization from within or from without. The most important effect on us of enemy attacks is that we have become tempered and we have learned much. We are confident that all Party cadres and members are determined to face all hardships and sacrifice to win victory.

For this year an organizational plan has been submitted by the Party Secretariat and endorsed by the Executive Committee to the Central Committee. The Executive Committee has also improved on the first edition of the Organizational Guide and Report Outlines on the basis of experience and has put out the second edition to guide overall organizational work. Under the organizational plan, the Party membership is expected to increase sevenfold on the basis of the revolutionary mass movement in the countryside and cities. The regional Party committees and the regional Party organizations are called upon to fulfill this plan conscientiously by establishing more Party branches and Party groups. Adjustments in certain regions may be made on the ground that the general target is too high or too low in different regions. But we are confident that the general target will be overfulfilled. We expect that Party members of workers and peasant origin will increase. We are determined to make such an increase.

To win victory in the Philippine revolution, we need several hundreds of thousands of Party members. Out of these there should be tens of thousands of Party cadres capable of leading tdhe masses in thde rural areas and urban areas. On the basis of the number of barrios in the entire country, we need at least 35,000 cadres to be able to create more powerful tidal waves on a nationwide scale. We do not yet have hundreds of thousands of Party members and tens of thousands of Party cadres. But surely we are going to have them and even now we have become a significant revolutionary force. That is because we have the correct ideological and political line.

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