Amado Guerrero

July 30, 1970

It is with great pride that the International Association of Filipino Patriots offers this third edition of Amado Guerrero's Philippine Society and Revolution and the first edition of his Specific Characteristics of Our People's War. Without doubt, these are two towering theoretical works to emerge from the current revolutionary struggle in the Philippines.

Since the significance of these two works may not be immediately evident to the reader it would be worthwhile to situate them in the political and intellectual history of the ongoing national-democratic movement. Hopefully, these introductory notes will serve this purpose.

The last decade has witnessed the swift transformation of the Philippine political arena. On the one side, U.S. imperialism and the local ruling class, in response to sharpening social contradictions, have banished any pretense of democratic rule and foisted direct fascist control on the restive masses in the form of the Marcos martial-law dictatorship. On the other side, a national democratic people's movement has rapidly and steadily grown in strength, so that today, at the very height of the Filipino people's oppression by U.S.-backed repression, they are also closer to national liberation than at any other point in their recent history.

The contemporary national-democratic movement is successfully mobilizing the latent revolutionary energy of the Filipino masses, and a major part of the explanation is undoubtedly that it rests on a firm foundation of theory. Thus, while the movement arose on the material basis of class exploitation, of the masses' spontaneously felt experiences of oppression, it was also guided from the beginning by the conviction that in order to succeed, it had to get beyond spontaneity. For Philippine history is marked by hundreds of spontaneous revolts against oppressive classes and authorities by uprisings of the people against foreign invaders, peasants against landlords, workers against capitalists. But no matter how heroic, these insurrections often ended tragically, in bloody massacres by vengeful imperialists and counterrevolutionaries.

The first break with spontaneity came with the founding of the Communist Party of the Philippines in 1930. But it was neither complete nor thoroughgoing. For the old Party proved incapable of charting the strategic direction of the Philippine Revolution. This poverty of theory reduced the mass movement to making merely tactical responses to the strategic counterrevolutionary moves of the imperialists and the local ruling class.

"Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement." This Leninist dictum was the painful lesson absorbed by the leaders of the present day national-democratic movement who grew up literally groping for a revolutionary alternative in the fifties and early sixties -- the dark age of the Philippine Left, when a combination of strategic confusion, organizational degeneration, and counterrevolutionary repression had practically dismantled the people's movement. The fundamental strategic line of fighting for national democracy as the first stage in the longer-term struggle for socialism had still to be firmly grasped by the Philippine Left, almost fifteen years after the 1949 victory of the Chinese Revolution led by Mao had overwhelmingly reaffirmed the universal validity of Lenin's revolutionary strategy for semicolonial, semifeudal societies.

The forging of the strategic line in the mid-sixties was not accomplished in an academic setting but in the thick of day-to-day political struggle, not only against the reactionary classes and the U.S. Embassy but also opportunists of every shape and color -- reformist, Christian Socialist, Social Democratic, and, of course, revisionist -- who were scrambling to exploit the irrepressible mass discontent cracking the McCarthyite political and cultural superstructure in the early sixties. Political and theoretical contention was, moreover, accompanied by mass organizing. With the founding of Kabataang Makabayan (KM, or Nationalist Youth) in November 1964 by Jose Maria Sison, national democracy began for the first time to be translated into a material, organized force. Launching a wide range of agitational activities, from university teach-ins to militant demonstrations at the presidential palace and U.S. Embassy, KM spearheaded the radicalization of thousands of students and youth in the mid-sixties and provided a fertile training ground for people who would later be the mature leading cadres of the National Democratic Front and the anti-fascist resistance.

Struggle for National Democracy

The first major theoretical document to issue from the national-democratic movement, Jose Maria Sison's Struggle for National Democracy (1967), belonged to this phase of the revolutionary movement -- the period of mass struggle to forge the fundamental political line of the Philippine Revolution.

Sison, a young revolutionary intellectual, led its struggle for political clarification. He brought to the task a firm grasp of class analysis, an appreciation of the lessons of the Chinese Revolution, a deep sense of the particularities of the Philippine historical development, and an unshakeable faith in the ability of the Filipino masses to take hold of and shape their history.

The struggle for national democracy, Sison asserted, is the fight to achieve "a necessary stage in the struggle of our people for social justice, whereby the freedom of the entire nation is first secured so that the nation-state that has been secured would allow within its framework the masses of the Filipino people to enjoy the democratic rights to achieve their social emancipation."1

In Sison's view, the principal fetters on national freedom and development are the domination over the entire country exercised by U.S. imperialism and the semifeudal control of the countryside by the landlord class. Departing from this basic contradiction, one of the key elements in the strategy of the revolutionary movement must be the creation of a broad national alliance drawing together all classes and strata with an objective interest in overthrowing the reactionary alliance of imperialists and landlords.

This had not been grasped by the old Communist Party, and its failure to base its political strategy on this fundamental contradiction had seriously limited the breadth of the popular movement in the thirties and forties and rendered the revolutionary forces confused: disunited on a number of occasions to the maneuvers of imperialism and the reactionary state. "The [old] leadership was well-versed in the contradiction between the proletariat and the capitalist class in general," Sison noted,

"but it failed all the time to stress the fact that the main contradiction within Philippine society then was between U.S. imperialism and feudalism, on the one hand, and the Filipino people, mainly workers and peasants, on the other. While all workers, Marxist or not, demanded Philippine independence from U.S. imperialism, the matter of national liberation was obscured by the slogans of class struggle between the capitalist class and the working class.2

Being a semifeudal country where 70 per cent of the people belong to the peasantry, the key to revolutionary victory is the mobilization of the vast masses of Filipino peasants. Agrarian revolution, aimed at satisfying the peasant demand for land, is therefore the main content of the national-democratic revolution. The Filipino peasantry, oppressed by centuries of feudal and semifeudal exploitation and driven by land hunger, is the force which will tip the social balance in favor of the revolution.

As a struggle for national sovereignty, the present national-democratic struggle continues the Revolution of 1896, the war for independence against Spain which was brutally aborted by the guns of a rising imperialist power, the United States. Yet the present struggle, in Sison's view, is also "a new type of national-democratic revolution, a continuation of the Philippine Revolution of 1896 and yet a renewal of strength in a more advanced way. "3 For unlike the 1896 Revolution, which was led and ultimately betrayed by the ilustrados, the Filipino liberal bourgeoisie, the present movement for national democracy must be led by the most advanced class in the era of imperialist and capitalist decline, the Filipino working class. "Only the working class can win the most conscious, the most dedicated, and most lasting support of the peasant masses for the national-democratic struggle."4 This class leadership, in turn, could only be effectively won through the agency of a proletarian party which "must have the firm and single objective of developing and acquiring political power for the masses."5 Sison concluded: "Without a proletarian party to provide leadership, the struggle for national democracy cannot be won."6

Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party

Though less visible and public, the effort to build a proletarian revolutionary party was unfolding side by side with the mass struggles of the sixties. The need to reestablish a revolutionary vanguard had become critical by the mid-sixties. For not only had the entrenched leadership of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (Communist Party of the Philippines) failed for more than 30 years to provide strategic theoretical and political guidance, it had degenerated as a revolutionary party. This was marked by its sharp swing to the right after its disastrous failure to seize power in a swift armed uprising in the late forties. In 1955, the Party begun to preach "the parliamentary road to socialism."

This abandonment of fundamental Leninist principles on the inevitability of violence in the destruction of the bourgeois state machine by the leadership of Jesus Lava was paralleled organizationally by the degeneration of democratic centralism in Party ranks and the disintegration of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan or Huks, the former people's army, into a number of roving rebel bands specializing in extortion and protection rackets in the red-light districts surrounding U.S. military bases in Luzon. Seldom in the history of Marxist-Leninist parties had a revolutionary organization decayed so rapidly and completely.

Rectification was initially launched as a struggle within the Party. However, the process became antagonistic as the entrenched leadership a tight nepotistic clique of Lava kinsmen and close friends systematically tried to kill democratic discussion of its shortcomings. By 1968, there remained no other way to assert the revolutionary alternative than by forging a new Party. This process culminated on Dec. 26, 1968, the anniversary of the birth of Mao Tsetung, when the revolutionary wing headed by Amado Guerrero reestablished the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

Serving as the foundation stone of the reestablished Party was a detailed summation document, Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party, which could now be considered the second major work to spring from the national-democratic movement. By all counts, Rectify is a remarkable document. It synthesizes a process which, though protracted and bitter, thoroughly and systematically examined the 38-year experience of the Communist Party of the purpose of recementing its weakening proletarian foundations. Representing one of the few successful attempts to retrieve a proletarian party by means of a thoroughgoing ideological rectification in the history of communist movements, Rectify dwells on the ideological, political and organizational dimensions of Party degeneration, draws out their interrelationships, and traces them to their roots.

The fundamental cause of the Party's many serious errors, according to the document, was the subjectivist, non-materialist and non-dialectical philosophical outlook of the unremolded petty-bourgeois cadres who had established themselves in Party leadership in the late thirties and forties. Subjectivism had two principal ideological manifestations: empiricism and dogmatism. Dogmatism, the rigid application of the general theories of Marxism-Leninism without specifying them to concrete conditions, led to "Left" opportunist political policies in the period 1948-55 when the Party overestimated the strength of the people's forces and then threw them into a foolhardy attempt to seize political power through a swift, armed uprising. However by far the more dominant subjectivist trend in the Party was empiricism, or the tendency to separate political practice from theoretical guidance. In the concrete, the documents states,

"Empiricism grows on static underestimation of the people's democratic forces and on a static overestimation of the enemy strength.... Party work becomes dictated by the actions of the enemy instead of by a dialectical comprehension of the situation and balance of forces. Revolutionary initiative becomes lost because of a static, one-sided fragmented and narrow view of the requirements of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-fascist struggle." 7

Right opportunist and revisionist political lines took firm control of the Party's practice. It manifested itself in a reliance on parliamentary work as the principal form of struggle, overconcentration on urban political work, and underestimation of the importance of mass work in the countryside, resulted in the loss of strategic initiative and a reduction of Left "strategy" into a series of tactical shifts to meet the strategic initiatives of imperialism and the local ruling class.

Such practice characterized the Party in its first two decades of existence (1930-48) and reemerged again in the period 1955-68, when it was reinforced by the revisionist line on the priority of the parliamentary struggle adopted by the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. To this day, the Soviet Party and state extend support to the by now thoroughly isolated Lava clique, which has for all intents and purposes, become the Soviet Union's "hot line" to the Marcos regime.

The experience of the old Party further revealed that empiricism and dogmatism were, however, only superficially ideological opposites. In reality, they were "two sides of the same petty-bourgeois coin." 8 In a masterful example of dialectical analysis, the document goes on:

"Reversals from empiricism to dogmatism and from dogmatism to empiricism are peculiarly common to those who still retain the petty-bourgeois world outlook. Nevertheless, when one is the principal aspect of a subjectivist stand, the other is bound to be the principal at another moment. That is the dialectical relationship of empiricism and dogmatism... Comrades should not wonder why a leadership with the same petty-bourgeois orientation should swing from empiricism to dogmatism and back to empiricism, and so on and so forth. All subjectivists fail to grasp the laws of dialectical development and so they are volatile and erratic."9

After this all-sided criticism of the practice of the old Party, Rectify sets out the three strategic tasks of the reestablished Party: building the Party, initiating armed struggle, and forging the national united front.

Building the Party consisted of the manifold task of setting the Party securely on the revolutionary heritage of the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tsetung, sinking Party roots deep among the Filipino masses, and spreading them throughout the country. "The ultimate test," states the document, lies in the revolutionary practice and further revolutionary practice... Our cadres must go deep among the masses of workers and peasants. They must be well-distributed on a national scale in order to build up a nationwide party." 10

Forging the national united front meant gathering together all patriotic classes and strata with an objective interest in overthrowing imperialism and feudalism into a powerful social and political force. In contrast to the old Party, whose handling of class alliances was so confused and erratic that it failed to tap the anti-imperialist energies of the peasantry, national bourgeoisie, and petty bourgeoisie, and ended up dangerously isolating the working-class vanguard, the Party's special task was to "win over the middle forces and elements in order to isolate the die-hards."11 To this end, class analysis and the policy of class alliances had to continually match shifting political conditions:

".... the Party must make clear and repeated class analysis which can distinguish the middle forces and elements from the diehard reactionaries, the principal enemies from the secondary enemies, the enemies of today from the enemies of tomorrow, and among friends, the reliable from the unreliable."12

The united front was one of the key weapons of the national-democratic movement; the other, and principal weapon, was the armed struggle. Unlike the PKP's adventurist strategy of attempting to seize power in the period 1948-55 by means of a swift armed uprising carried out by no more than 3,000 Red fighters, Rectify established protracted people's war as the strategic form of struggle in a semicolonial, semifeudal country like the Philippines. And in opposition to the urban military focus of the PKP, the countryside would be the center of gravity of the armed struggle, with popular power being steadily built up through the creation of rural base areas by armed fighters winning over the peasantry with measures of revolutionary land reform. From such bases, the revolutionary movement would advance "wave upon wave," encircling the urban centers like Manila, which constituted the bastions of bourgeois state power.

The resolution on the armed struggle was not to be postponed to the indefinite future. The old Communist Party's military arm, the Huks, had decayed into an incorrigibly lumpen-proletarian gang. Thus, three months after the reestablishment conference, on March 29, 1969, the CPP founded the New People's Army (NPA), incorporating into it honest and uncorrupted peasant guerrilla leaders from the old Huks, like the legendary Commander Dante, as well as "defectors" from the reactionary army like Lt. Victor Corpuz.

Under the guidance of the Party, the NPA immediately went about the task of establishing rural bases in Central and Northern Luzon, from which it was soon launching a number of tactical offensives against a reactionary army.

Though the reactionary state, presided over by Marcos, threw all of its resources at immediately crushing the purified Party, it became the leading subjective factor which unleashed the objective revolutionary potential of the masses, not only in the Philippine countryside but also in the cities. Under Party guidance, the anti-imperialist student movement grew by leaps and bounds, until it finally exploded in what came to be known as the "First Quarter Storm" in early 1970, after Marcos' security forces slaughtered a number of students and youth demonstrating in front of the presidential palace. The student movement, in turn, helped radicalize the struggles of workers and the urban poor. By late 1972, while NPA squads were engaging government troops in battle in a number of provinces, Manila was being constantly rocked by massive demonstrations and strikes, which linked together demands of higher wages, land reform, withdrawal of Philippine and U.S. troops from Vietnam, and an end to all unequal treaties imposed by the United States. "The protest movement breaking out in the cities is starkly unprecedented in the entire national history in terms of significance and magnitude." Sison evaluated the situation in December 1971. "The problem is no longer how to start a revolution. It is how to extend and intensify it."13

Philippine Society and Revolution

Hundreds of thousands of youth were stepping into activist ranks, "turning the whole country," as Sison put it, into one gigantic classroom."14 The overwhelming need of the moment was for an educational tool which would channel this crackling energy into the correct theory and practice of the national-democratic revolution. Philippine Society and Revolution, by Amado Guerrero, Chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines, appeared in July 1970 to fill this need.

PSR, as the book came to be called, was immediately recognized for what it was: a work that culminated the cultural revolution which had been sweeping Philippine society and thinking since the mid-sixties. Though Guerrero cautioned that it was only a first step in the application of historical-materialist analysis to Philippine history, PSR was a bold, brilliant, and sweeping theoretical enterprise which drew out the concrete dynamics of the laws of contradiction in Philippine social and national development from the pre-Hispanic period to the present. Deepening the ideas first presented by Sison's Struggle for National Democracy, Guerrero showed how the laws of autonomous social development had been disrupted and distorted in the Philippines by the intrusion, first of Spanish colonialism, then of U.S. imperialism. The engine of historical motion thus became the contradiction between the people and imperialism and the parasitic domestic classes that constituted its social base. Revolt and rebellion against colonialism and imperialism, Guerrero demonstrated, was a constant in Philippine history. But until the masses appropriated the science of social liberation, Marxism-Leninism, and followed the leadership of the most advanced social class in the era of imperialist and capitalist decline, the working class, no effort at genuine national liberation could succeed. From the perspective of historical materialism, then, the present revolutionary movement is simply the subjective, conscious, and scientific expression of the objective laws of development which were pushing the Filipino nation up to a higher level of social development national democracy.

With its masterful and consistent use of class theory to synthesize a whole range of empirical and historical data, PSR revolutionized Philippine history and social science, field that previously had been dominated by colonial development theories, superficial nationalistic analyses, or bloodless expositions of empirical facts. Academics were forced to take note, and even the Hong Kong-based international business organ, Far Eastern Economic Review, had to pay PSR the backhanded tribute of being a "work of flawed brilliance."15

PSR, however, was not written to be principally an academic work (nor was its circulation confined to the salons frequented by the limousine radicals that Guerrero despised so much). It was, first and foremost, a popular educational tool, a basic primer for national-democratic activists. Mass-distributed in mimeographed form and coming out in both English and Pilipino, PSR immediately became the indispensable workbook of thousands of "dg's" (discussion groups) conducted among students, professionals, workers, peasants, and urban poor in the feverish two years before martial law. As such, its role in recruiting and consolidating thousands of national-democratic activists was immense.

PSR was written in a period of deepening crisis of the system of bourgeois political control. It in fact warned that sooner or later the ruling class would be forced to shift its class dictatorship from the parliamentary, formal democratic form to the openly repressive fascist type. Two years later, on September 22, 1972, Marcos imposed martial law, with the aim, as he put it, of "saving the Republic from the Communist Rebellion."

While the fascist dictator undoubtedly exaggerated the immediate threat posed by the national-democratic movement to the system of imperialist control, it was nevertheless significant that by 1972, the Left had already reemerged as a principal actor in Philippine politics and was already recognized as the most critical long-term threat to the neocolonial machinery. Led by a party equipped with a correct political line, uncompromising revolutionary commitment and creative methods of organizing, it had taken the Left merely eight years since the founding of Kabataang Makabayan in 1964 to purge itself of revisionist influence and emerge once again a viable alternative for the Filipino masses to rally around.

Martial law proved the correctness of the priority which the national-democratic movement, led by the Party, had assigned to armed struggle and clandestine organization. With the destruction of most forms of legal, bourgeois-democratic opposition, the CPP and the NPA emerged as the only organizations capable of organizing a nationwide resistance to martial law. This was not easy. In the cities, national-democratic mass organizations like KM and the Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP) were in disarray, with thousands of activists either jailed or in hiding. In the countryside, the reactionary army launched fierce encirclement-and-suppression campaigns against NPA bases in the farnorthern Cagayan Valley and in the Bicol region, uprooting some 50,000 peasants in an effort to drain these areas of the masses and convert them into free-fire zones in the Vietnam manner.

Supported by the firm but resilient organizational structures of the Party and the NPA, the movement survived the regime's hammerblows in the period 1972-73. In order to advance, however, political practice needed to be guided by theoretical and political understandings which matched the new conditions of struggle. To this challenge, Amado Guerrero and the leadership of the Party responded swiftly and evolved a bold political and military strategy to propel the national-democratic revolution forward in the context of all-out fascist and imperialist repression. This strategy, the product of deep knowledge of the experience of people's war, was synthesized in Amado Guerrero's Specific Characteristics of Our People's War, which appeared on December 1, 1974.

Specific Characteristics of Our People's War

Specific is a rich, multifaceted document. At the same time that it deepened the process of rooting Marxism-Leninism in the particularities of the Philippines, it offered lessons of revolutionary practice for movements in other archipelagic countries.

Its main contribution lies in its exciting application of the general lessons of protracted people's war to Philippine conditions. On the surface, according to Guerrero, it might seem that because of its fragmented island character and the absence of contiguous borders with friendly countries which might serve as rearguard areas, waging people's war might seem to be an impossible task in the Philippines. However, this fatalistic notion which had been advanced by the old revisionist leadership of the PKP in order to justify its embrace of the "parliamentary route to socialism," could be overcome if the country's island character and other apparent geographical constraints on people's war were turned into its strengths. In masterful dialectical fashion, Guerrero showed that by adopting to, rather than resisting, the archipelagic character of the country and creating a number of guerrilla fronts on major islands, the NPA could force the enemy to disperse its forces and prevent it from concentrating them on one central base area. Moreover, "the mountainous character of the country countervails its archipelagic character from the start." The mountain ranges which crisscrossed the major islands could be turned into a great advantage by converting them into bases from which guerrilla units could maintain political and military influence on a number of provinces bordering its range. Especially when populated by sympathetic mountainfolk, mountainous areas offered singularly difficult fighting terrain for regular enemy troops.

Armed with these and other path-breaking theoretical insights, CPP and NPA cadres have been able to rapidly fan out to nine regions and twenty fighting fronts throughout the country, covering especially the major islands of Luzon, Samar, Panay, Negros, and the key island of Mindanao, where the NPA and the fraternal Bangsa Moro Army of the National Liberation Front have forced the reactionary army to divide its forces in a debilitating two-front war. To overcome the constraints imposed by geographical dispersion, the CPP and the NPA have evolved the organizational principle of "decentralized operations and centralized political leadership." Regional bodies, in other words, are expected to exercise a great deal of self-reliance and local initiative, while subject to general political guidelines issued by the center on Luzon island.

While emphasizing the priority of armed struggle in the countryside, the "weakest link" of the enemy, Guerrero did not neglect to underline the importance of building up a broad and effective urban resistance movement:

"We should excel in combining legal, illegal, and semilegal activities through a widespread and stable underground. A revolutionary underground developing beneath democratic and legal or semilegal activities should promote the well-rounded growth of revolutionary forces, serve to link otherwise isolated parts of the Party and the people's army at every level and prepare the ground for popular uprisings in the future and for the advance of the people's army."

National-democratic activists swiftly rebounded from the initial blows of martial law and, since 1973, they have led in the effort to forge or strengthen semilegal or illegal human rights monitoring bodies, slumdwellers' protective associations, labor unions, and student organizations. The power of this underground network first surfaced in late 1975, when workers in Manila launched a one-year long wave of over 400 strikes, with the open support of a varied movement of students, religious and urban poor. At the same time, a string of huge demonstrations unfolded in the period 1976-78, hitting the regime every time it tried to launch a major initiative to legitimize its repressive rule and progressively incorporating more and more people in spite of the savage repression-and-dispersal operations mounted by the Marcos security police. When the dictator relaxed martial-law restrictions on the freedom of assembly and called "elections" to the National Assembly on April 7, 1978 in order to touch up his tattered international image, the sight of the 200,000-person rallies that the anti-fascist movement was able to mount threw him into such panic that he totally undermined his propaganda objectives by violently beating down the people and even imprisoning the anti-fascist candidates.

In 1966, Jose Maria Sison asserted that the challenge to his generation was "to have the idea of the national-democratic revolution transformed into a material force." Thirteen years later, the idea of national democracy has become an overwhelming reality. The creative and bold use of revolutionary theory combined with courageous and determined practice has made the National Democratic Front a material force cutting across all progressive social classes and extending from the far northern province of Cagayan to the far southern province of Davao del Sur. The fact that the repression of martial law has spurred the geometric growth of the movement since 1972 assures us that revolutionary theory has indeed become an invincible force rooted in increasing numbers of the Filipino masses.

To conclude, the consistent employment of theory to guide practice and practice to enrich revolutionary theory has been one of the principal strengths of the Philippine Revolution. Perhaps, no documents illustrates this dialectical relationship more clearly than Philippine Society and Revolution and Specific Characteristics of Our People's War. We in the International Association of Filipino Patriots are proud in offering to the international public these two major works from the theoretical arsenal of the Philippine Revolution.

Author's Introduction

Philippine Society and Revolution is an attempt to present in a comprehensive way from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought the main strands of Philippine history, the basic problem of the Filipino people, the prevailing social structure and the strategy and tactics and class logic of the revolutionary solution - which is the people's democratic revolution.

This book serves to explain why the Communist Party of the Philippines has been reestablished to arouse and mobilize the broad masses of the people, chiefly the oppressed and exploited workers and peasants, against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism now regnant in the present semicolonial and semifeudal society.

Philippine Society and Revolution can be used as a primer and can be studied in three consecutive or separate days by those interested in knowing the truth about the Philippines and in fighting for the genuine national and democratic interests of the entire Filipino people. The author offers this book as a starting point for every patriot in the land to make further class analysis and social investigation as the basis for concrete and sustained revolutionary action.

Amado Guerrero
Chairman, Central Committee
Communist Party of the Philippines

July 30, 1970

__________________________

1 Jose Maria Sison, Struggle for National Democracy (Quezon City: Amado Hernandez Memorial Foundation, 1972), p. 8.
2 Op. cit., p. 176.
3 Op cit., p. 111.
4 Op. cit., p. 193.
5 Op. cit., p. 180.
6 Op cit., p. 181.
7 Communist Party of the Philippines, Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party, 1968 (Mimeo.), p. 12.
8 Op. cit., p. 13.
9 Ibid.
10 Op. cit., p. 32.
11 Op. Cit., p. 40.
12 Ibid..
13 Sison, op. cit., p. 44.
14 Ibid.
15 Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 30, 1972, p. 13.

__________________________

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