Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines
Finalized by
Executive Committee

November 1992

By early 1988 the magic of Aquino's popularity had vanished. The surge in commercial activity had been shortlived and had receded into a rapidly worsening crisis. Aquino's economic, military and foreign policies, which were no different or were even worse than those of the Marcos regime, spawned widespread discontent among the masses. The unresolved factional strife among the reactionaries grew deeper and more intense .

However, by 1988, the AFP had completed the reorientation, redeployment and other preparations of their forces and launched a general offensive against the revolutionary movement. As a result of increases in the military budget and in U.S. military assistance, a number of new Philippine Army divisions and the CAFGU (civilian armed forces geographical units), with a membership of several tens of thousands, could be formed; and brigade- and division-size operations and urban surveillance operations could be increased.

The U.S. and the local reactionaries intended to finish the war quickly. In the countryside, big regular military and paramilitary forces were deployed in guerrilla zones identified as primary targets; campaigns of "gradual constriction" or "clear, hold and consolidate" operations, were simultaneously and relentlessly intensified in various parts of the country, while smaller and medium-size operations were also continued in other guerrilla fronts. Enemy combing, surveillance and holding operations were intensified and accelerated in as many localities as could be covered for the purpose of identifying, taking by terror or by force the leaders and activists of the organs of political power and mass organizations, intimidating them to turn traitor or else kill them and, thus, destroy the mass base of the armed revolution, allow the AFP with its exceedingly far superior military strength to dictate the type and the pace of the battles, and finally corner and crush the units of the people's army.

In the cities, there was an intensification of counter-partisan operations, campaigns of suppression and intimidation of legal progressive forces and, worst of all, the widespread and long-term surveillance against the leading organs and cadres of the Party. Long- term surveillance was undertaken to identify, track and box in entire Party leading committees and their links and communication lines in the cities. The objective was to cut off the head of the Party.

Simultaneously, a campaign of psychological warfare was undertaken. It consisted of campaigns in the mass media and various forms of counterrevolutionary propaganda for deceiving the people, confusing and dividing the revolutionary forces, destroying the morale and determination of the Party, and encouraging defeatist, pacifist reformist and parliamentarist tendencies.

In the main, the enemy did not achieve his original target of destroying the armed revolution within three years nor even his repeatedly adjusted target of attaining "strategic control", the latest version of which had been to cut the movement's strength by half in 1988. Nevertheless, these campaigns wrought great damage and there was a heavily felt decrease not only in scope and quantity, but also in depth, firmness and quality, especially of the mass base and cadre forces of the Party.

From 1987 to 1990, there was a decline of 15 percent in Party membership, 16 percent in the total number of barrios covered, 28 percent in the total number of Red fighters, and 60 percent in the total organized masses registered in the countryside. The NPA rifle strength continued to increase, but there was a drop in the annual rate of increase to the 1976-1978 level. A large number of cadres at the levels of the province, front and district were lost due to arrest, death or loss of interest.

A large percentage of what had been our consolidated barrios were lost. There was a general slackening of the organized strength of the masses and mass activists even in the remaining barrios as a result also of a weakening of the leadership. Many among the total number of barrios covered were either being recovered by us or sharply being contested by us and by the enemy forces stationed there.

We either lost hold or experienced a drastic narrowing of our mass bases in the plains, alongside highways and seashores, and around town centers (poblaciones). These parts of our mass base were of relatively denser population, important sources of cadres and activists with relatively higher education, important for maintaining supply and communication lines, and staging areas for reaching and influencing the people in the town centers.

Within many of our guerrilla fronts, the enemy forces built a network of regular troop and CAFGU detachments either to drive away or to put our mass work units under constant pressure and limit the areas of maneuver for the big formation of the people's army.

OPLAN LAMBAT BITAG succeeded to a certain extent. But even before the enemy could mount a big offensive, our own internal weaknesses -- such as our failure to sustain the work of consolidating and deepening our mass base, our negligence of ideological work as well as in developing Party cadres and committees in the localities, our own reduction of our political and military capability in the localities, our growing negligence of expansion work and our own error of forcing our mass base into a war situation whose intensity and level were beyond their capability -- had already preceded him.

At the national level, there was a repeat of the basic pattern of the Mindanao experience: the formation of many companies and the premature raising of the level of war. Initially, the enemy was surprised, the tactical offensives were accelerated, and military gains were bigger than before. In the main, our areas and mass organizations continued to expand despite the increasingly serious overextension of our forces, the growing imbalances in deployment of forces and work, and diminishing capability for military and mass work in the localities.

However, after two or three years, the enemy forces were able to adjust, at first, by further strengthening their defenses and, eventually, by concentrating bigger forces and launching massive counterattacks. It did not take long before the weakness of the foundation and the gaping vulnerabilities of our mass base became thoroughly exposed. Our mass base and our local forces in big chunks of the guerrilla fronts collapsed.

And the huge losses in our mass base areas aggravated the problems of our units in maneuvering, maintaining links and coordinating their efforts; and also in knowing and monitoring the movements of the enemy. Full-time armed units, especially the much smaller and weaker teams for mass work in the localities, became even more vulnerable to enemy attacks. The casualties in defensive battles and also the number of weapons recovered by the enemy, rose, while the number of tactical offensives, especially victorious ones, fell. Other problems in logistics and finance, accelerated loss of forces, declining number of new recruits, in supplies, in maintaining troop morale, etc., were also more intensely felt.

The rush to achieve an acceleration of the offensives and the growth of our forces through premature "regularization" and verticalization finally led to a serious loss of initiative, weakening of tactical offensives, and general decline.

The massive enemy attacks were not seriously and promptly confronted by the city-based central leadership which had preoccupied itself with the issues in the urban movement. The regions and the guerrilla fronts where the enemy forces concentrated their attacks were overwhelmed by the size, intensity and duration of the enemy campaigns. In many guerrilla fronts, huge chunks of territory and mass base were lost without any serious fight and resistance because, first, the forces in the localities were extremely weak; second, guidance and support from the higher Party committees were lacking; and third, political support from the people in town centers and cities was not mobilized. However, in some places the Party and army organizations put up serious resistance but were nevertheless forced to leave because of the overwhelmingly large concentration of enemy forces and attacks.

At the height of the enemy's general offensive in 1988 and 1989, the formation of additional companies and one more batallion of the people's army continued, a bigger number of cadres, personnel and rifles were further concentrated in a few big formations, and more localities were deprived of arms and forces. The view emerged that it was necessary to continue the enlargement of the formations not only to sustain the intensification of the offensives but also to fight the bigger enemy military formation attacking our territories. So did the idea of proceeding with efforts to "upgrade" the army and only eventually "catch up" with efforts to build and strengthen the mass base and the Party.

Since the end of 1988, the central leadership has seen more clearly and comprehensively the extent and depth of problems confronting the movement in the countryside and the armed struggle. These problems were identified as the narrowing and weakening of the mass base and the work in the localities and the imbalances in the overall deployment of our forces and efforts proceeding from the premature verticalization of the army and raising of the level of the war.

The 1989 Politburo meeting indicated that to solve the problems, there was the need to totally change the priorities, the entire balance and deployment of forces and efforts, and the system of planning and leadership of leading Party committees. A decision was taken to stop the verticalization of the army and emphasize attention on and strengthen the horizontal forces. While maintaining the appropriate number of companies at the level of region and big fronts, higher priority was given to strengthening the forces engaged in mass work and deploying the forces for extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare. It was clarified that all guerrilla units, including the companies, must actively participate in mass work -- in expansion, recovery and consolidation -- aside from fighting and production work.

In the 20th anniversary statement of the Party in 1988, the basic principles of the revolution were again clarified and the following were given emphasis:

• a. Comprehensive establishment of the political, military, economic and cultural requirements for advancing towards a more developed level of warfare and total victory.
• b. Guerrilla warfare that persistently expands and consolidates the organized participation and support of the people.
• c. Limitations on the building of bigger formations by strictly basing these on the extent and depth of the guerrilla forces, strength of the mass base, capability of Party cadres and leadership, and adequacy of reserves and logistics.

The statement emphasized the requirements for advancing the people's war, but at the same time pointed to the possibility of victory within 10 years premised on the "militant all-sided participation and support of the broad masses of the people" and the fulfillment of all political, economic and cultural requirements for victory. That projection was based on the data of 1987 and early 1988, which failed to make an accounting of the gravity of the weaknesses and the imbalances in the deployment of forces and efforts, which were further revealed in the succeeding months.

The 1989 and 1990 Party anniversary statements, more clearly identified and criticized the errors of premature "regularization" and verticalization, and even more clearly emphasized the need for extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare and building the mass base in the countryside. But internal contradictions over this issue intensified. The NPA General Command and a handful of its leading cadres went against the criticism and peddled their own views through communication with the regions.

In 1990 the Politburo formally took a decision to put a stop to the implementation of the SCO program and clarified that at the advanced substage of the strategic defensive, the overall stress would be on extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare and on the mass movement while at the same time maintaining and developing some elements of the regular mobile warfare.

However, the Politburo also approved the results, without discussing the particular contents, of the Command Conference in 1989, which -- contrary to the Politburo decisions -- pushed for continued and further verticalization and "regularization". Such contradictory signals from the central leadership indicated a lack of firm unity on and understanding of the issue. This hindered a more vigorous and more widespread impulse for rectification in the regions.

Since 1989, adjustments and the practice of putting more emphasis on mass work, the mass base and the localities have become widespread in the regions. Conferences on mass work at the regional and interregional level were held and a bigger part of our forces, including the companies, were redeployed to mass work, expansion and recovery. In 1990 and 1991 the accelerated narrowing of many guerrilla fronts was stopped and we started to be able to recover in these areas because the leading committees gave emphasis to local work, strengthened the forces deployed there, and mobilized the companies for mass work. These positive currents were further encouraged by the national conference on the political work of the army.

In areas where the enemy continued to concentrate, the combination of widespread small-scale attritive and annihilative actions, a few concentrated and large-scale thrusts, mass protests and actions, and various forms of legal and illegal organizations were used in resisting the enemy and in making him pay a high price.

However, there was widespread and insistent demand among leading committees and cadres in the regions for a comprehensive summing up of our experiences and a clarification of the direction and the principles for advancing the war, in accordance with revolutionary theory and principles, lessons from history and, above all, lessons from our own rich experience. Although there was extensive unity on the changes made by the Politburo in 1990, the struggle with regard to the analysis and judgment of past practice continued, especially with regard to the program of "regularization". There were still differences over the understanding of the lessons to be learned; and this meant that a lot of effort still had to be exerted in uniting not only on the level of practice, but also on the level of theory and principles of the strategy and tactics.

But in 1990, following the attempted coup of December 1989, there was a renewed gust of insurrectionist illusions and attempts on the part of some organs and leading cadres, when apprehensions among the ranks of reactionaries were further fueled by the crisis in the balance of payments, the devastation caused by the earthquake and greater disorder threatened by the impending Gulf war. There was a flood of insurrectionist speculations, but much worse than this were the organizational maneuvers led by one member of the Politburo to force through the implementation of an insurrectionist plan.

The "national conference on mass campaign" held in April 1990, without consultations with the Executive Committee or the Politburo, united on the view that the situation was "leading to a renewed big confrontation". Three crisis points were identified: the issue of the military bases ("society is being polarized on a national issue"), the issue of land and agrarian revolution ("the battle line has been drawn" on this issue) and the intense economic crisis ("an explosion will also be created by the intense economic crisis"). Each of these points was assumed to be a ground for "major tactical battles that must be won by the revolutionary forces" and the interaction or conjuncture of all three points would produce a big explosion.

Plans based on dreams of an uprising surpassing the EDSA-type -- "a people's uprising, far more extensive and of deeper strategic significance for the revolution" -- were formulated and implemented. It was supposed that in the anticipated uprising, the people could benefit in accordance with "the strength wielded by the revolutionary forces", or even more if we could correctly "ally ourselves with other progressive forces and even with some conservative or reactionary factions that would subscribe to some major interests of the people."

Thus, we were supposed to "prepare and lead the possible explosion of an insurrection in the cities and wide plains". The call was made to use "the entire strength and the maximum combination of the mass movement, the united front, military action and solidarity work abroad". To make the situation explode, the following tasks were set:

• a. Expansion and intensification of the anti-U.S. bases struggle and once the treaty had been brought to the Senate, struggles up to political strikes and people's strikes were to be intensified. During the negotiations, "confrontational and assertive actions like barricades" were to be pushed. Also to be pushed were "sabotage actions inside parliament until a parliamentary crisis is reached".
• b. "Widespread, continuous and aggressive launching of direct revolutionary actions by the peasant masses", whose "principal line and direction ... are the direct revolutionary assertion by the peasants of their right to own and control the land and other instruments of production".
• c. Building the "broadest anti-imperialist and democratic front (AIDF) and proper positioning of the NDF and the revolutionary alternative at its center".
• d. "Widespread campaign to win the hearts and minds of the soldiers and low-ranking officials of the reactionary army".
• e. "More active efforts to hasten the disintegration of the reactionary camp".

[Such an opposing line was drawn and implemented without the knowledge of the Executive Committee and the majority of the Politburo members. The document resulting from the "conference on mass campaigns" which covered even other principal lines of work and attempted to sabotage the general flow of the struggle in the countryside and the cities was distributed to different organs and areas. But this reached the Executive Committee only in February 1991 after many months of persistent demand for a report from the instigator of the "conference" and, even then, the copy that reached the Executive Committee did not come from him.]

The "conference" contradicted the 1990 analysis of the Politburo that the eruption of an uprising was a mere possibility and if ever it would occur, the highest form that it could take, based on the existing strategic balance of forces, would be that of the EDSA uprising. In other words, it would be an uprising brought about by the conjuncture of the violent battles among the reactionaries and the widespread struggle of the people and would bring about a government still controlled by the reactionaries with but minor participation of some elements of the legal revolutionary movement.

The "politico-military struggle" advanced by the Manila-Rizal Regional Committee came within the general framework of that 1990 plan. Essentially, it meant the direct combination of partisan operations with mass struggles, especially with general "paralyzing actions". Partisan warfare was assumed to hasten "revolutionary organizing" of the people in the cities, "fill in" the deficiencies of the political factors for launching people's strikes, and "directly prepare" the broad masses for insurrection.

With regard to the peasant movement, the Peasant Movement Secretariat promoted the shift of general emphasis to preparing for insurrection, and accordingly, to open and legal struggle in the plains, intensification of open peasant struggles highlighted by "direct revolutionary actions" (like land occupation and confiscation of grains, fertilizers, etc), "combining military factors with open mass struggles" and "making the armed struggle serve the mass movement and the preparation for insurrection". The target was peasant uprisings to spark or to occur simultaneously with the eruption of the people's general uprising.

In Central Luzon, the regional leadership subordinated all other efforts to the wish for an insurrection. In Bulacan, instead of organizing groups or committees and peasant associations, insurrectionary forces were formed as forces for anticipating the "opportune moment". The Regional Committee plenum in early 1991 approved the "play to win, victory in one year" program through insurrection.

In accordance with the insurrectionist plan, preparations for the building of an anti-imperialist and democratic front (AIDF) were undertaken. The intention was to develop the AIDF as a broad coalition to serve as the political center and unified command for the anticipated uprising. This was supposed to be of extreme importance not only for positioning at the center of the political struggle, but also for maximizing the gains to be derived by the people from the uprising. This explains why so much emphasis was given to coalition tactics, why tendency to kowtow to the middle forces' position and consciousness is so strong, why there is so much predisposition to encourage the spontaneous pacifism of the urban petty bourgeoisie, and why the tendency to be overwhelmed by the schemes of the bourgeois mass media is so strong.

The AIDF was not only intended to be an alliance of a wide array of legal democratic forces and oppositionists united by a minimum common program. The NDF was to directly link, join and put itself within the framework of the program and activities of that front. That was why in 1990, a number of leading cadres used their positions in the NDF to draw up and finalize the "Proposal for a People's Agenda" laid down by a legal meeting of a wide array of legal progressive, democratic and opposition forces. The proposal was supposed to constitute the NDF's medium-term program. It downgraded the stand and status of the NDF to that of a legal opposition, attempted to subordinate the NDF to the processes and rules of the reactionary government, and worst of all, made a public promise binding the Party, the people's army and the entire movement to whatever common program -- no matter how much more diluted -- would be approved by the legal progressive, democratic and opposition forces. There is nothing wrong for legal progressive forces to enter a broad alliance on the basis of a common minimum program or medium-term program. But to attempt or to seek to include the NDF under that front is to distort the status and political position of the NDF and to derail the revolutionary forces.

In the rush to form the AIDF and position the NDF at its center, the holding of the first NDF congress was also rushed and in the process even the Party's central leadership and its role in the process of finalizing the documents and the arrangements for the congress were disregarded.

Subsequently, there was the attempt to push the NDF to embark on a campaign for multilateral peace negotiations between the NDF, GRP, MNLF- BMA, RAM-YOU, various legal opposition groups, businessmen, etc. The newly formed NDF units were maneuvered into a scheme of confining the peace process within the tactical plans of building the AIDF, contrary to the line of a just, lasting and liberating peace, and contrary to the policy of bilateral negotiations between the NDF and GRP abroad.

The "politico-military struggle" was put to a test in the failed "people's strike" in October 1990. Because of the obsession with achieving a "general paralyzation", there was the attempt to force such a "paralyzation" through partisan operations. As a result, a struggle on a very popular issue which initially enjoyed very wide support from the people became a target of condemnation and put the legal progressive forces into the danger of violent enemy repression. Because of overreaching, a very favorable opportunity to propel the mass actions towards a powerful current of protests and to advance considerably and firmly was wasted.

The obsession for "people's strikes" and "general paralyzations" that overstretch the mass movement is dangerous for the urban struggle. The danger is even greater if partisan operations are combined with it because there is the increased temptation to force the struggle, rush to confrontations beyond the capacity of the masses, and recklessly disregard the level of consciousness and practice of the masses and the allies. Worse, the struggle in the cities prematurely assumes a military character and the legal organizations are made vulnerable to violent counteractions by the police and military.

But even if partisan operations are not combined with the general strikes and people's strikes, such strikes, if not carefully handled, have the potential of exhausting the forces and drawing them towards premature offensives. These are higher forms of struggles with distinct political characteristics. Every general strike should be carefully planned based on the existing general political situation, relations of forces and general status and aims of the movement. Otherwise, the movement would be drawn prematurely into large encounters, the forces and mass movement, exhausted and isolated from the masses.

By itself and unattended by premature partisan actions, the revolutionary movement, based on its organized strength among the workers and other segments of the populations, does not yet have the capacity to launch general paralyzing actions in Manila-Rizal. In some victorious people's strikes and general workers' strikes that were staged in Manila-Rizal, the strength of the progressive forces had been further augmented by the participation of a wide range of organized forces on issues that are specially hot and attract wide spontaneous participation or sympathy from the people. Nonetheless, the longest ever achieved had been two or three days.

However, because of insurrectionist illusions and the tendency to excessively bet on the spontaneous participation of the masses, there was the strong tendency to frequently and suddenly raise calls for general paralyzations and to recklessly launch these actions. These calls were made despite the almost complete cessation of expansion among the ranks of the workers since 1988, the inability of the youth and student movement to recover from its decline since 1984, and narrow work in the urban poor communities that had been adversely affected by sweeps of antipartisan operations conducted by the police in 1987 and 1988.

In July 1991 a broad front was again achieved against the oil price hike. Even the Iglesia ni Kristo took a posture of joining the struggle and rumors were rife about a new coup d'etat. Again, there was an overflowing urge to rush into a gigantic confrontation with the enemy. And a people's strike was pushed. Contrary to what was wished for, the broad front became divided; the support gained for the people's strike was narrow. This allowed the U.S.- Aquino regime to gain the advantage and to easily maneuver to force its wishes on the people.

Paralyzation was set as the target and was given the highest priority instead of the more important task of further cementing the links among various forces that were mobilized by the issue, strengthening their commitment to fight, gradually raising the level of their consciousness and action, and taking advantage of the opportunity to further expand and accelerate solid and comprehensive organizing among masses. By overreaching, another great opportunity to achieve significant and solid political and organizational gains was once again wasted.

Despite the failure and the problems spawned by the 1990 plans, the same Politburo member responsible for them continued to spread his insurrectionist line and illusions. After the Senate's rejection of the military bases treaty in 1991, he peddled the view that a trend to be "more autonomous" had developed within the ranks of the local reactionaries and, supposedly as a result of it, "the strategy of encircling the cities had further been rendered ineffective". Supposedly, "the strategy of war and uprisings aiming for the best combination of political and military struggles" and with the option of shifting to an insurrectional strategy was more appropriate.

Towards the end of 1990 and in 1991, the Manila-Rizal Party organization undertook extra efforts to increase the number of mass activists and expand the Party membership. There were also efforts to expand mass work at the basic level.

But as a result of putting too much weight on "stretching the limits of legality" and overanticipating an explosion that would lead to an insurrectionary situation, the Manila-Rizal Party Executive Committee (MREC) pushed a proposal for an upsurge in the first quarter of 1992. They pushed their plans even as these were clearly contrary to the decisions and directives of the Executive Committee and despite the objections of other Party organs that had to do with the campaigns and mass struggles at the national level.

The targets to be achieved from accelerated and prolonged street actions were overblown, given the still limited organized forces. Worse, there was the insistence on an upsurge characterized by "open revolutionary actions". In the attempt to achieve these, the MREC usurped authority for themselves and bypassed other concerned Party organs and even the legal structures, changed the orientation of one legal alliance within their area and geared it for "open revolutionary action".

The MREC's insistence on their own type of upsurge did not only limit mass participation in the mobilizations and gain a broad range of condemnation from various sectors. It also created a lot of confusion and disruption within the organization, especially because the existing relations and processes of the Party were abused to the point of causing disruptions not only within the Party but also within the legal movement.

In 1991 the Executive Committee came up with the analysis that there was a revolutionary flow in the political situation and called for offensives in the form of big demonstrations in the cities and intensified tactical offensives in the countryside. The use of the term revolutionary flow became controversial because of the differing interpretations of its context and the correctness of its application to the people's war in the Philippines. Moreover, there were those who twisted it according to their own insurrectionist point of view. What the Executive Committee had emphasized was the exceedingly favorable situation for broadly arousing, mobilizing and organizing the people and for further advancing the people's war.

Nevertheless, the Politburo meeting of 1991 approved the call to launch offensives in the form of big demonstrations in the cities and tactical offensives within our capability in the countryside. It affirmed the analysis that there were conditions for the creation of a new upsurge of mass struggles. It also approved the tactical slogan calling for the overthrow of the U.S.-Aquino regime.

The document on the world situation and our international line issued by the Executive Committee in 1988 was reviewed and adopted by the Politburo in 1989. The document upholds the Leninist line of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialism. At the same time, it accepts at face value Gorbachov's claim that perestroika and glasnost were being undertaken to revitalize socialism.

In 1990, following the collapse of parties and governments in Eastern Europe, there was a debate during the Politburo meeting whether the events were a "revitalization" or a failure of socialism. The draft for the Party's 21st anniversary statement with an analysis of the event was discussed and a decision was taken to deepen the study of the theoretical issues involved and to know the history and circumstances of the Eastern European countries. Nonetheless, it was emphasized in the meeting that the Leninist line should be used in analyzing the events and in formulating the stand of the Party.

But due to the longstanding neglect of theoretical study and the earlier loosening of the grip on the line against modern revisionism, some elements in the Party had become very vulnerable to the flood of anticommunist and anti-Leninist propaganda and gloating of the bourgeoisie. There was profuse praise for Gorbachov, ahistorical and relentless attacks against Stalin, and a strong current of populism, liberalism, reformism and social-democracy.

In 1990 Ang Bayan praised the 28th Congress of the CPSU, despite the decisions and stand of that congress to openly call for the dismantling of socialism, the conversion of the CPSU into a social-democratic party, and the rejection of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialism. The pages of Ang Bayan echoed the Gorbachovite line that the collapse of revisionist parties in Eastern Europe meant the revitalization of socialism.

Because of the depth of the disorientation over the line against modern revisionism and the seriousness of the skepticism about Marxism- Leninism, Ang Bayan continued to praise Gorbachov, glasnost and perestroika even after the attempted coup d'etat in August 1991, the victory of Yeltsin's counter-coup, the dismantling of the Soviet Union, and the existence, beyond any doubt, of a bourgeois dictatorship in Eastern Europe and in countries formerly controlled by the Soviet Union. The AB editor's outpourings of ecstasy over these events, which according to him was the "strong march of democracy and civil society in the world", continued.

Since 1988 there had been repeated serious damage inflicted on city- based leading organs and cadres of the Party and army, especially in Manila-Rizal. More than a hundred national and regional level cadres, including a big bulk of CC members, were arrested by the enemy, mostly in the cities. The Visayas Commission, the army general command, Central Luzon Committee, the National United Front Commission, the Commission on Organization, the Mindanao Commission and the Executive Committee itself, including the units attached to them were repeatedly and seriously hit in Metro Manila and other cities by raids conducted by enemy intelligence units. These raids resulted in repeated seizures of diskettes and documents containing sensitive information about the Party and its work.

The existence of a grave security problem besetting the urban-based central and other organs was clear. But the analysis of the circumstances and causes of every arrest were utterly particularistic. Lessons drawn remained at the level of individual mistakes, while serious basic violations of the rules of underground movement and security, such as the urban basing of the central organs and of leading cadres identified or hunted by the enemy; and wanted cadres meeting with their relatives, allies and legal forces in the cities were ignored or dismissed.

During the 1990 Politburo meeting the widespread and persistent enemy surveillance operation and the security problems were extensively studied from the point of view of comprehensively reorganizing and strengthening the underground movement. The policy of countryside basing for the central leadership, national organs and territorial commissions based in Manila-Rizal, among others, was adopted. A decision was taken to redeploy cadres identified and wanted by the enemy. The system of guidance and coordination in the mass campaigns was also changed.

But despite the policies that were firmed up and implemented by the Politburo, the repeated arrests of leading Party cadres in the cities continued. Many leading units and cadres (that should not have) persisted in basing themselves in the urban centers until they were captured by the enemy. Many highly wanted cadres persisted in basing themselves and moving around the cities in pursuit of special projects, in anticipation of "extraordinary opportunities" and because of their one-sided emphasis on the speed and facility of communication in the cities, reluctance to change old habits, avoidance of the difficulties of life in the countryside, and others. Even members of the Politburo and the Central Committee violated security rules. The decision to change the system of guidance and coordination in the mass campaigns was disregarded in the pursuit in 1990 of an explosion in the situation.

The loss of cadres increased not only because of enemy arrests. Scores of cadres at the national and regional levels lost interest or were killed. Hundreds of cadres at the district and section levels were arrested, killed or lost interest. The disorientation over the line, the repeated errors, the repeated arrests of leading cadres, and the long-standing neglect of ideological work are some of the principalreasons for the loss of courage and interest among the rank and file.

In 1988 the impact of intense enemy attacks was aggravated by the destruction wrought by the anti-infiltration hysteria -- especially among cadres at the district and section levels -- in Southern Tagalog, Manila-Rizal, a number of national organs and regions. The Politburo meeting's acceptance in 1988 of what were then the Mindanao Commission's conclusion that there had indeed been a widespread enemy infiltration network frustrated by the Ahos Campaign fueled renewed fears of infiltration in other areas and organs.

In Southern Tagalog, the anti-infiltration campaign was pushed by the wish to discover the cause of capture and "salvagings" of many members of the Southern Tagalog Regional Committee in 1977; the arrests of suspected infiltrators had started even before the Politburo warning was received.

In Manila-Rizal, the arrests of suspected infiltrators began after an investigation of the enemy's arrest and "salvaging" of an ABB (urban partisan) cadre. The National Organization Commission implemented a 1987 decision to arrest a cadre who had been implicated as a result of investigations made during Ahos Campaign and proceeded to investigate other suspects. The United Front Commission and General Command were overwhelmed by the results of the arrests and interrogations undertaken by the Manila-Rizal Party Committee.

After some months and the first wave of arrests, the Executive Committee directly involved itself in assessing the "whole design of the enemy infiltration" by putting together patches of information drawn from the interrogations, which had not been carefully analyzed and examined. To prevent the campaign from getting out of hand, a set of rules on deciding and undertaking the arrest, interrogation and investigation was drawn up. The system of communication and coordination among concerned Party organs was also firmed up. All these were made within the framework of what was believed to have been a wide enemy infiltration network and a gradually creeping sense of panic. Selected territorial cadres were alerted about what had been "discovered" as an infiltration network.

The Executive Committee came to its senses when it entered Southern Tagalog in November 1990 and directly witnessed the gross errors in the judgment, interrogation and treatment of those arrested. It immediately ordered a stop to the entire campaign and led the review of the cases, the summing up of the event and the formulation of clear guidelines based on the bitter experience.

Along with its self-criticism, the Executive Committee also immediately ordered a stop to the campaign in Manila-Rizal, directly reviewed the key cases and set the steps for a continuation of the review and for rectification. However, before these campaigns could be halted, these had already created serious damage and disorder in the organization and in our relations with the masses and allies in some areas and sectors.

In the Politburo meeting of 1989 the two anti-infiltration campaigns were reviewed. The serious error was traced to panic, a siege mentality, grave subjectivism and unbridled suspicion, violation of the rights of the suspects, wrong views and methods of investigation and prosecution, and carelessness in the investigation and weighing of facts and circumstances. A clearer and stricter set of rules on investigation and prosecution of suspected infiltrators was adopted.

In the rectification, the task to review all anti-infiltration campaigns and the correction of past wrong judgments and excesses was set. Also set were the need to review the general conduct of investigation, prosecution and judgment of informers and criminals and the continued refinement of the guide and rules for the revolutionary system of justice. The importance of widespread education among the ranks of cadres and members regarding the principles of humane treatment of captives, respect for the rights of individuals and the revolutionary system of justice was emphasized.

Since 1989 the extent of the disorientation and the deviation from the basic principles, line and strategy; the weakening of the central leadership and the unity of the Party; and the big decline in the ideological, political and organizational level of the vanguard Party came to be more clearly discerned.

For a long time a number of basic tasks and rules in establishing the Party have been neglected, the problems have accumulated and worsened, and the determination and vigilance of the Party cadres and members have been eroded.

The wanton disregard for theory and the basic principles had been allowed to spread and worsen. Among the leading cadres themselves, there are those who do not have a clear understanding of the Party's basic principles. And in 1991 the AB editor presented to the Politburo meeting a view that totally rejects Marxism-Leninism. Even before this, the Party's central publication had published the same view on its pages although with some flimsy camouflage.

The peddling of all sorts of denunciations of the line and strategy of the Party and propositions to dismantle them without any footing on an earnest study of theory, history, revolutionary practice and the concrete conditions became commonplace. The line and strategy of the Party was allowed to become the target of all kinds of irresponsible speculations.

Worst of all, views deviating from the line of protracted people's war strongly influenced the very policies and program of the Party, a matter that spawned worsening problems, such as the loss of initiative, repeated miscalculations, overreaching, exhaustion of the forces and political support for the revolution, and serious setbacks.

The weaknesses and shortcoming in Party building were clearly manifested even in matters of organization. The central leadership has been weakened by the repeated arrests of leading cadres based in the cities. When the central organs which had been hit by grave security problems, transferred to the countryside and passed through a difficult process of readjusting their entire system of basing and linking with the different parts of the organization, a handful of elements took advantage of this to undertake various ultrademocratic actions; to go ahead with putting into practice their views and line opposed to the official line, policies and decisions of the Party; and to maneuver and spread intrigues against the central leadership in a bid to reject and block the criticisms and rectification started by it.

In 1990, the Politburo decided to concentrate itself continuously so as to be able to directly attend to the task of deciding on important issues. The continued existence of the Executive Committee did not become an issue; there were plans and structures that were created and directly assigned to the Executive Committee.

But that Politburo decision was misrepresented by a Politburo member as a decision to dissolve the Executive Committee and at the same time he arrogated unto himself the authority to make decisions regarding big projects and strategic and tactical issues, including the 1990 insurrectionist plan and change of AB's orientation. While strongly attacking the supposed overcentralism of the Executive Committee, he made himself the center in initiating and implementing major policy changes and big political projects by keeping the central leadership ignorant of them and through sheer lies and maneuvers.

The ultrademocratic acts that had worsened in 1986 and 1987 went on, further spread and since 1990 have become even more aggressive. When more pointed and direct criticisms of the gross errors and deviations were made, the reaction of some those who were responsible for these became even more adverse and they refused to accept criticism, their gossips and intrigues became more malicious, and their maneuvers to insist upon their deviations and oppose the rectification became more adamant.

The longstanding and serious neglect and shortcomings in Party building has reached the point of undermining even the integrity of the Party organization, leadership and processes.

Nevertheless, even with the serious damage and internal problems, the Party firmly upheld the national democratic struggle. It persevered in exposing, attacking, isolating and weakening U.S. imperialism and the local reactionaries.

The revolutionary movement remains outstandingly the strongest and firmest force fighting for the rights of the working masses and for national liberation. On major issues and political battles, like the struggle against the military bases, the Party-led forces were the principal force upholding the progressive position and the interest of the people.

The identification and criticism of our major errors and deviations had already started in 1989. In most of the regions, the clarifications and changes in the policies and program were readily accepted. By then, rectification had actually begun.

But there is still the need to thoroughly identify, criticize and repudiate the errors and deviations. Their ideological, political and organizational roots should be identified so that the return to the correct line for advancing would be strong and firm. The old issues and problems should be resolved at the level of theory and principles for the strong ideological, political and organizational consolidation of the Party.

As long as we persevere in upholding the basic principles of the Party and in applying these on our concrete practice, we shall definitely overcome our weaknesses and problems and the Party and revolution can be brought back on the path for correctly, firmly and continuously advancing. ###

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