Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines
July 1992
Urban Insurrectionism and Military Adventurism
There is a gross lack of understanding of the theory of people's
war and the strategic line of encircling the cities from the
countryside. This strategic line is not an arbitrary edict for a
permanent condition. It simply means that when the people's army
cannot as yet seize the cities, the revolutionary forces have to
accumulate armed strength first in the countryside where
reactionary power and control is relatively weaker and where
there is a wide area of maneuver for the people's army to launch
tactical offensives, accumulate armed strength and engage in mass
work.
Conditions in the future will arise to allow the people's army
and the people in mass uprisings led by the Party to finally
seize the centers of municipalities, provincial capitals, minor
cities and major cities, in that probable order. But it would be
foolhardy to believe that Metro Manila could fall in an uprising
led by the Party earlier than the time that the backbone of the
enemy forces is broken in the countryside or before they go into
a process of final disintegration.
The EDSA uprising in 1986 involved both a military mutiny and an
anti-Marcos or antifascist uprising but the United States, the
reactionary classes, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Catholic Church were still in a position to determine the outcome
of the uprising. They understood the balance of forces in their
favor. They were out only to change one reactionary ruling clique
with another, notwithstanding the popular uprising.
Building the people's army in stages is ridiculed by certain
elements who have not really studied the theory of people's war
and who obviously do not believe that it is necessary for the NPA
to smash the reactionary armed forces and replace it in the end.
We have seen how the NPA started from scratch in 1969 and grew.
The people's war will certainly have to go through a middle stage
of development before it can totally and finally defeat the enemy
forces and replace them.
The initial, middle and final stages of the people's war cannot
be dismissed as useless concepts by those who hold the
opportunist notion that urban armed insurrection and imported
heavy weapons can replace the full development of people's war.
When the term probability (closer to realization than the term
possibility) instead of certainty is used to refer to the stages
of people's war, it is to give allowance for nonrealization or
defeat due to deviations and errors like those committed by the
Mindanao Commission against the line of people's war or due to a
forced retreat in the face of foreign aggression.
The expression Left opportunism is apt when it refers to
demagogically taking advantage of the natural desire for quick
and easy victory but leading the revolutionary forces to defeat
and self-destruction. Urban insurrectionism and military
adventurism have so far been the gravest form of Left opportunism
in the history of the Party since 1968. These are retrogressions
to the line of urban guerrilla warfare (Carlos Marighela) and the
foco theory (promoted by Regis Debray), which some elements tried
to promote within the Party in the early 1970s but which were
effectively combated by the Party.
Before the Party could be reestablished in 1968, there had been
almost a full decade of mainly urban work among the workers and
the youth undertaken by the new proletarian cadres together with
a few veterans in the revolutionary movement. Upon the
reestablishment of the Party, there were more proletarian cadres
in the cities than in the countryside. They emerged from the
resurgent anti-imperialist and antifeudal mass movement that was
based in Metro Manila. The claim that the Party neglected
revolutionary work in urban areas and overemphasized work in the
rural areas is untrue.
Soon after the Party reestablishment, with
hardly 200 Party members concentrated in Metro Manila, the Party
was able to carry out the First Quarter Storm of 1970 and other
mass actions in the 1970-72 period. From these mass actions would
emerge a few thousands of mass activists who would become Party
members. Among the regions, the highest concentration of Party
members would be in Metro Manila for a considerable period of
time.
It is to the credit of the Party that it has pushed the general
line of new democratic revolution through people's war since its
reestablishment. Thus, the proletarian cadres from Metro Manila
were aroused and motivated to join up with the good remnants of
the old people's army to form the New People's Army in 1969 and
to build the armed revolutionary movement in the countryside on a
nationwide scale. And when martial rule and the fascist
dictatorship were imposed, Party members and activists in the
cities had been ideologically prepared, so that in droves they
went to the countryside in 1972 onward and there subsequently
participated in the painstaking work of laying and building the
revolutionary armed strength and the revolutionary mass movement
that served as the firm basis and backbone of rapid advance of
the revolutionary movement in the 1980s.
The pattern has been for the cadres produced by the urban-based
mass movement to go from the cities to the countryside. Without
such a pattern inspired and directed by the Party, there would be
no or so few cadres to build the people's army, the mass
organizations and the organs of political power in the
countryside. This pattern has promoted the people's war. Without
the theory and strategic line of people's war, Party members
would have preferred to stay in the urban areas. It is so much
easier to stick to the relative comfort and convenience of the
city than to break new ground in the countryside.
But since the early 1980s, there had been an increasing movement
away from such a pattern. This was initiated by the central
leadership under the concept of 60-40 balance between countryside
work and urban work and of giving stress on a comprehensive
political movement and broad alliance work based in the cities,
on the basis of the tactical priority set on making urban work
and broad alliance work catch up with the more advanced work in
the countryside and on the basic alliance, as well as on some
views that such is the appropriate balance at the given level of
urbanization in the country. From 1981 onward, there had been a
stop to the deployment of significant numbers of cadres and
activists from the cities to the countryside. The trend towards
city-basing involving the central leadership and national organs
and, subsequently, even many regional leading committees and
staff organs, also started and worsened. The concept of the
"strategic counteroffensive" within the strategic defensive that
was adopted by the central leadership (PB) in 1981, affirmed by
the 9th CC Plenum in 1985 and formally withdrawn in 1990 promoted
the "three strategic coordinations", the nationally coordinated
political and military offensives, regular mobile warfare as the
main form of warfare to advance the people's war from the
strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate, and the
possibility of such offensives leading directly to the
realization of the decisive victory of the revolution. As such,
it tended to encourage urban insurrectionism and had an even
bigger and more direct role in fostering "regularization" and
military adventurism.
Leading Party committees and cadres became drawn increasingly to
urban-centered questions and tasks and farther and farther away
from urgent questions and tasks in the all-rounded development of
the people's army, mass base and Party organization in the
countryside, which to begin with were no longer being adequately
taken care of. The cadres were encouraged to stay in leading and
staff organs of the urban-based Party organization, legal mass
organizations and institutions or join the armed city partisans
rather than go to the countryside. They failed to recognize that
the peasant masses do not by themselves produce the kind of
cadres and other personnel that the urban areas produce and which
the rural areas need.
Under the guidance of the so-called "three strategic
coordinations" (which had been converted into the "three
strategic combinations") and the mechanical 60-40 balance between
countryside and urban work, key cadres of the Mindanao
Commission, positioned themselves in the small cities of Mindanao
(urban centers and adjacent rural areas), pursued a line of
intensifying "political-military" struggle in the white areas and
developed this into a full-blown line of armed urban insurrection
under the influence of the Sandinista victory. They combined this
line with the adventurist line of building many company
formations and intensifying company-size operations in the
countryside, reminiscent of the adventurist line of the Jose Lava
leadership in forming companies and battalions in 1949 and 1950,
without giving due attention to Party and mass base building,
i.e., the organs of political power and the mass organizations,
when the overall task was shifted from expanding the guerrilla
warfare to "intensifying" it and later to "raising" its level.
The erroneous line would eventually result in the exact opposite
of what it sought to accomplish.
Inherent to the line of seeking to seize power through urban
uprisings, with the aid of a few prematurely enlarged NPA units
that lacked extensive and deepgoing mass base, was the
undermining and lessening of the interest of Party members and
mass activists in going to the countryside to do revolutionary
work. In the long run, especially from 1983 to the fall of
Marcos, the deployment of cadres to the countryside did not only
stop but was reversed when large numbers of cadres deployed in
the countryside were drawn towards the cities.
In conjunction with the line of urban insurrection, the line of
intensifying and raising the level of warfare virtually became a
line of quick military victory. Layers of army commands and staff
were increased and companies built without minding the necessary
balance and interaction of military formation and the mass base
and vice versa. The larger military formations and increased
layers of staff were formed and took cadres and material
resources away from the already thinly-spread, undermanned,
ill-trained and ill-armed units in charge of the various forms of
mass work, military work and Party work in the localities.
In 1984 and 1985, when the full-scale building of company
formations and the intensification of company-size operations
were being undertaken, only then were there efforts to catch up
in building the Party section committees from among the fresh
recruits of Party cadres and members who were extremely lacking
in political and military knowledge and capability. On top of
this was the insistence of some leading cadres in the Mindanao
Commission to reduce attention on antifeudal education,
propaganda and struggles in favor of the expansion of the mass
movement in the countryside along an almost purely antifascist
line. The quality of the mass base, Party work and military work
in many localities either stagnated at a very low level or even
deteriorated.
For a very short period, from 1983 to 1984, the military
offensives of companies, oversized companies and coordinated
companies were effective in Mindanao. Fighters were recruited
rapidly and hundreds of high-powered rifles were confiscated from
the enemy. But when the enemy military forces increased and
paramilitary forces and anti- communist fanatic sects were formed
in ever widening areas, the mass work units and local guerrilla
units could no longer sustain mass work and military work in
increasing numbers of barrios. The mass base dwindled and
deteriorated. Also in that period, the mass bases, which were
either still new, had stopped to develop or had started to
decline as a result of the shortcomings, were further forced into
a more intense military situation and thus declined and
deteriorated at an even faster rate. From 1985 to 1987 large
chunks of the mass base and the guerrilla fronts were entirely
lost in the face of the repeated onslaughts of the large-scale
enemy military offensives, the damage and demoralization as a
result of Ahos Campaign, the disorientation in the immediate
post- Marcos situation, and the lack of guidance and support from
higher Party committees.
The enemy objective was clear: to
destroy the revolutionary mass base, force the companies and
oversized companies of the people's army into a purely military
situation where the enemy forces could use to their advantage
their militarily superior forces. A people's army can use most
effectively the principle of concentration in offensives if it
has extensive and deepgoing mass base. But in a purely military
situation, it is, of course, the truly larger military force that
gains the upper hand and wins.
Because of the extensive loss of mass base resulting from the
wrong line and the destruction wrought by Ahos Campaign, as well
as from the impact of the enemy offensives, many of the small and
weak units deployed to do mass work and guerrilla units in the
localities became extremely vulnerable and were destroyed by the
enemy. Eventually, the companies in Mindanao were pushed into
passive and vulnerable positions and could no longer launch nor
win tactical offensives. Problems in recruitment, morale,
maneuver, coordination, intelligence-gathering and supply
increased. As a result of these problems and in response to the
glaring need to attend first to the mass base in many areas, the
regional Party committees either took the initiative to reduce
the companies or simply allowed these to dwindle into platoon or
over-sized platoon formations. By 1987, the number of companies
in the island stood at five.
In the small and easily surveilled cities of Mindanao (Davao City
for one is not really the biggest city in the world; beyond its
commercial core of a square kilometer, it is rural), cadres who
were on the manhunt list of the enemy were carried away by their
"insurrectionary" mentality and displayed themselves in public
places during mass actions and became preoccupied with contact
work among allies and coordination of mass actions rather than
attending to and guiding solid organizational work. "Broadness",
fast confrontational actions and rapid intensification became the
rule and norm above all else.
The welgang bayans were regarded as "a process of building up
towards popular uprisings" serving to hasten political
polarization, to expose government ineffectuality, to train the
masses and to make the entire situation explode. In practice,
these were more of transport paralysis rather than mammoth
rallies of the people. On such occasions, armed units set up
"checkpoints" to block the highway and at assembly points a few
hundreds to a few thousands of people converged. At the same
time, the armed city partisans heated up these small cities
beyond the capacity of the "wanted" cadres to conceal themselves.
In 1984, the principal leaders of the Mindanao Commission
obviously had extreme difficulties staying in Mindanao and were
forced to shift to Cebu City, which was beyond the commission's
jurisdiction. As the enemy saturated the identified partisan
bases and fronts, intensified intelligence operations against the
urban underground, tightened the checkpoints, carried out
frequent zoning raids and militarized the target communities and
cities, the casualties among the white area forces began to mount
and work could no longer be pursued in an increasing number of
these areas.
Sa kalagayang may mga kabiguan sa mga puting purok at lumalaki
ang kahirapan sa mga larangang gerilya bunga ng tumitinding atake ng
kaaway, at mayroong paabot mula sa sentral na pamunuan tungkol sa
pag-aalerto sa impiltrasyon ng kaaway, ang mga namumunong kadre sa
antas ng larangan, rehiyon at teritoryo ng Mindanaw ay madaling
kinapitan at natangay ng labis na pagdududa at pagkasindak sa
posibilidad na maraming ahente ng kaaway sa kanilang hanay na
nagkakanulo sa kanila. Naging madali ang pagkiling sa mga panlabas na
dahilang tulad ng impiltrasyon at pananalakay ng kaaway para ipaliwanag
ang mga pinsalang natamo, sa kalagayang akala nila'y tumpak at
matagumpay ang kanilang linya at hindi nila nakikita ang kamalian at
mga tunay na epekto nito.
Based on the report of a former political
detainee and some unverified confessions _ extracted through
torture _ of some suspected infiltrators who had been initially
arrested in one guerrilla front during the early part of 1985,
these leading cadres easily believed that there were enemy deep
penetration agents (DPAs) who had infiltrated the Party, the
people's army, the mass organizations and the legal institutions.
They began arresting suspected saboteurs and infiltrators and
subjected them to torture to extract self-incriminating
confessions about their alleged crimes and co-conspirators. They
became convinced that large numbers of enemy deep penetration
agents had infiltrated the Party over a long period of time
through the white area organizations and were already being
mobilized to bring down and destroy the revolutionary movement in
late 1985 or early 1986. The Party organizations which had
overexpanded and neglected ideological, political and
organizational consolidation proved to be extremely susceptible
to mutual suspicion among its cadres and members. Thus, from
mid-1985 onward, the anti-infiltrator hysteria started and raged
in Mindanao.
The resultant devastation was unprecedented in the entire history
of the Philippine revolution. Never has the enemy inflicted as
much damage as this to the revolutionary forces in so short a
period of time. The wrong political line resulted in setbacks and
problems that started to be felt in 1984. Under such a situation,
the anti-infiltration hysteria easily took effect and resulted in
self-destruction from 1985 onward. On the basis of mere
suspicion, close to a thousand people (including Party cadres and
members and mass activists) became victims of civil rights
violations and severe punishment. Due process was completely
disregarded as panic and hysteria took over. The Party membership
fell abruptly from 9000 to 3000. The mass base which was shallow
shrank by 50 percent. The 15 companies and 30 platoons were
reduced to 2 companies and 17 platoons.
The leading cadres of the Mindanao Commission refer to a "first
draft of Bicol" ("unang borador ng Bikol") as their guide and for
some time declared a revolutionary success in eliminating enemy
agents at the expense of so many times more innocent comrades and
individuals in the Party and the revolutionary movement. In terms
of rate and absolute numbers, the destruction wrought had never
before been achieved by the enemy frontally in so short a time.
Basic civil rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the Guide
for Establishing the People's Democratic Government issued in
1972 and by the Party Constitution and the Rules of the New
People's Army were grossly violated.
Many of those responsible
for the devastation and the victimization of comrades and the
people in Mindanao have expressed remorse for the hysteria and
tried to account for their part. But at the most the accounting
had been merely partial. Some of those who have not accounted for
nor been taken to account for their political and criminal
responsibility have even been promoted to national positions in
the Party and allowed to spread their wrong line at the further
and bigger expense of the Party and the revolutionary movement.