Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines
July 1992
The Problem of Ultrademocracy
Bureaucratism begets ultrademocracy. When there are no venues for
free discussion within the Party outside of administrative
bounds, then Party members tend to speak out outside of those
bounds and also outside the Party. Without comprehensive
ideological, political and organizational life, Party members at
one level of the organization can easily get the sense that their
lives are compartmentalized and are run by command from above.
And thus, they tend to resist by becoming ultrademocratic or
liberal.
Bureaucratism begets ultrademocracy. When there are no venues for
free discussion within the Party outside of administrative
bounds, then Party members tend to speak out outside of those
bounds and also outside the Party. Without comprehensive
ideological, political and organizational life, Party members at
one level of the organization can easily get the sense that their
lives are compartmentalized and are run by command from above.
And thus, they tend to resist by becoming ultrademocratic or
liberal.
Certain central staff organs were acting like centers of
comprehensive political authority. Some elements issued
publications and promoted their own lines, like "critical support
for the 'liberal-democratic' Aquino regime" and the line of armed
urban insurrection cum premature buildup of unsustainable higher
military formations. There was ideological and political osmosis
between ultrademocratic elements in the Party and populists,
liberals, "social democrats" and other petty bourgeois elements
outside the Party who collaborated in denouncing the boycott
error of 1986.
Under conditions of ultrademocracy, some elements responsible for
the incomparably far bigger error and disaster in Mindanao were
able to ride on the campaign against the boycott error of 1986.
They kept their silence on or obscured and minimized the problems
and disaster whose impact was already fully being felt in
Mindanao. Some of them even had the gumption to claim that had it
not been for the boycott error of 1986 the people would have been
able to seize political power or share it with other forces. What
the Politburo saw and took to account was only the boycott error
of the Executive Committee.
There are certainly plenty of free discussions and debates prior
to consensus or voting in leading as well as staff organs in the
Party. In the leading organs, the range of subject matter is
naturally wider than in staff organs. In the staff organs, there
is an element of specialization but it is always related to the
general framework of the revolutionary struggle.
There has been the prevalent notion that the Party leader
presiding over the meeting is no more than a mere moderator whose
main role is nothing more than to let everyone have a more or
less equal share of the discussion. In fact, participants in
meetings repeat the same point several times and sometimes talk
their heads off. Even patently wrong ideas get more time than
correct ones. Thus, the phenomenon of overly long meetings has
arisen, costing those attending and the Party much time, energy
and resources.
Another reason for the overly long meetings is the failure to
distinguish between work and study meetings, to evaluate the
items put into the agenda and set the direction of the meeting. A
discussion on the national situation or certain national issues
is often the best kind of discussion available in these meetings.
Too much time is spent on the discussion of administrative and
procedural matters. And when personal relations like marital
problems and allegations of sexual offense are taken up, there
are not only a few overly long meetings but a protracted series
of such. There should be a more efficient way of handling these
and avoiding disruption of the normal flow of work.
Another
factor for overly long meetings is the deterioration of the
Party's system of reports which to a large extent is also due to
neglect on the part of leading Party organs. In the absence of a
system of regular and special reports, plenary meetings at
different levels are used to deliver, gather and synthesize the
reports by lower units. The result, besides the excessive length
of meetings, is widespread haphazardness in the study and
verification of reports, susceptibility to one-sidedness in
assessing and programming the work of the Party and a tendency to
gloss over or conceal problems before they pile up and worsen.
So much time is taken away from political and organizational
work. Party cadres are aware of this kind of loss and complain
about it. But even far worse is lack of time for attending to
theoretical and political education. The most active Party
members are absorbed by political and administrative meetings and
paper work and the level of theoretical and political knowledge
has gone down.
So much time is taken away from political and organizational
work. Party cadres are aware of this kind of loss and complain
about it. But even far worse is lack of time for attending to
theoretical and political education. The most active Party
members are absorbed by political and administrative meetings and
paper work and the level of theoretical and political knowledge
has gone down. In the relationship between higher leading organs or
organizations and lower organs or organizations, there is a
one-way vertical from-top-to-bottom kind of bureaucratism. In
major instances, as in the promulgation and implementation of the
EC decision for a boycott of the 1986 elections, there is such a
type of bureaucratism. For a long period already, the
representatives of central staff organs appear like big bosses
and moneybags when they show up in meetings of the
representatives of mass organizations to push mass actions.
But there are more cases of ultrademocracy in which mere staff
organs and lower leading organs take major decisions even against
the Party's line, without bothering to consult the higher leading
organ. The Mindanao Commission drew up and implemented the "Red
area - White area" scheme and some lower Party committees and
cadres under it went into local ceasefires without seeking
consultations and getting the approval from the central
leadership. The UFC could proceed with a "peace process
framework" that degrades the NDF and is detrimental to the
interests of the revolutionary movement. It also proceeded with
the NDF Congress without the EC or the PB being able to go over
the draft documents and plans. Upon the initiative of a single
individual leading cadre, grandiose plans anchored on the line of
armed urban insurrection could be drawn up and implemented for
the mass movement, for military actions and for the united front
in 1990 without the knowledge of the central leadership. Ang
Bayan could publish articles against the decisions of the central
leadership and against the antirevisionist line of the Party.
There are certain elements who keep on writing "strategy",
"orientation" and "policy" papers which deviate from and attack
the Party's line. They even manage to use some central staff
organs to promote the wrong line on a national and international
scale. Notwithstanding the disastrous results of their line, they
continue to tout it.
For refusing to implement the boycott
decision of the central leadership with regard to the 1978
elections and for distributing their position paper to other
regions, the members of the Manila-Rizal Party committee were
meted out disciplinary measures. For failing to convene the
Political Bureau on the subject of the 1986 elections boycott,
the Party chairman then found it necessary to resign from his
position in 1986.
But there are privileged elements who consider
themselves as Party members and yet write and publish articles
preponderantly against the Party's line in certain publications
(from Praktika to Debate). They use the personnel, the relations
and facilities of the Party to attack the Party's line and they
have not yet been called to account for their anti-Party actions.
Under the guise of reacting to bureaucratism, there are certain
elements who whip up ultra-democracy in order to question and
oppose the basic principles, line and policies of the Party; to
disinform the Party membership; to misrepresent, provoke and turn
the Party inside out. Ultra-democracy or liberalism is as bad as
bureaucratism. It can confuse, degrade, endanger and even
disintegrate a revolutionary party that allows it.
There is a seepage of the influences of liberalism, populism, social
democracy and other petty bourgeois trends and even of
imperialist and modern revisionist (especially Gorbachovite)
propaganda into the Party. There are ultrademocratic elements who
attack the leading role of the working class, the socialist
perspective of the Philippine revolution, democratic centralism
and other basic principles of the Party. Some of them go to the
extreme of demanding that the Party adopt an "alternative
framework and program", abandon the framework of Marxism-Leninism
or discard its basic Marxist- Leninist principles (because these
are supposed to constitute fundamentalism) and that the leading
organs of the Party give up their responsibilities.
Just as they simplistically hold Stalin responsible for
everything that has gone wrong under the anti-Stalinist
revisionist regimes long after the death of Stalin, they wish to
put the stigma of their specious definition of Stalinism on the
Party. The Party will not allow itself to be wrecked from within
by those stereotyping it by any epithet and by those trying to
damn it by some false analogies. We know exactly how Gorbachov
pushed the line of negating the entire course of Soviet history,
Leninism and socialism by totally negating Stalin.
Among those who are whipping up ultrademocracy are elements who
are responsible for the gross violation of the civil rights and
brutal victimization of a large number of Party members and
non-Party people. The Party is determined to hold such elements
to account for their deeds no matter how many issues they drum up
to sidetrack their responsibility and no matter how much
anti-Party "conjuncture" they find with other promoters of
ultrademocracy.