Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines
July 1992
Reasserting the Absolute Leadership of the Party over the Army
The Party must exercise its absolute leadership over the people's
army by deploying Party cadres properly. The Party leadership in
the army command must not be allowed to pay lip service to the
comprehensive Party leadership and yet proceed to take all
initiative in building a "separate" structure by grabbing all
Party cadres within its reach for staffing. The Party should not
thus be "left behind" only to be told to catch up in building and
consolidating the mass base when its limbs have been cut off
precisely because the army has preempted the personnel and
resources. The Party has to take the initiative in deploying
cadres and resources properly and take full command of the
people's army.
The premature concentration of army command and coordination at
higher levels (national and interregional) must be corrected and,
relative to this, the direct leadership of the Party territorial
committee over the organization and units of the army within
their respective scopes must be strengthened. The premature
centralization of army command, which is one of the factors of
"regularization" and verticalization deprived the guerrilla units
of flexibility, encouraged disregard for political considerations
and local conditions and resulted more often in incorrect
judgments not only politically but also militarily. The practice
of some higher army commands to bypass the regional Party
committee and directly order the deployment and mission of the
main "regular" formations must be stopped. The policy of
declaring as war zones all the areas within the guerrilla fronts,
thus giving the army command and the main army units the license
to bypass the local Party committees and disregard political
conditions, considerations and plans in launching military
actions must also be stopped.
Within army units, the role and leadership of both the military
commander and the political officer should be strengthened; their
cooperation must be continuously strengthened for the all-round
development of the army unit. What is appropriately the authority
of the military commander, especially in military situations,
must be ensured while the collective leadership of the Party over
the army unit must be developed and strengthened. The tendency to
overstress the authority of the commander at the expense of the
role of the Party committee, branch or group over the army unit
must be avoided.
There have been cases of overstressing the
army's line of authority and command almost to the point of
liquidating collective life and depriving the Party members in
the army of their right to participate in collective discussions
about policies and ideological, political, organizational and
military matters. There have also been cases at upper command
levels of important decisions taken and implemented and
operations launched without being referred to or, worse, hidden
from the knowledge of the concerned Party committee and reported
only after the fact.
Such violations of the absolute leadership of the Party over the
army should be corrected. We must ensure that at all times the
army operates according to the line of the Party and to the
comprehensive policies, plans and priorities and the correct
balance between military and political work set by the leading
Party committees at different levels. Ideological, political and
organizational work to ensure and strengthen Party leadership
over the army must be constantly attended to.
It is wrong to maintain big formations in absolute concentration
when these are not on tactical offensives or training exercises.
The people's army should be like a net which is drawn in when it
is to engage an enemy force that it is capable of defeating; and
is cast out widely to attend to mass work and other noncombat
tasks when not on a fighting mode.
It is wrong to maintain big formations in absolute concentration
when these are not on tactical offensives or training exercises.
The people's army should be like a net which is drawn in when it
is to engage an enemy force that it is capable of defeating; and
is cast out widely to attend to mass work and other noncombat
tasks when not on a fighting mode. Considering the amount of weapons that the NPA has, it is wiser
to have the regional command lead a company as rallying point for
the entire region. When not fighting, such a company should be in
relative concentration with the headquarters platoon within the
radius of a few barrios and the squads in the other platoons can
be deployed within a wider radius of more barrios per squad. Such
a company can do fighting and other tasks, move from one
guerrilla front to another to launch an offensive or to perform
other tasks, with the augmentation or coordination of the more
numerous and widespread front and local guerrilla units.
It is wiser to multiply the number of guerrilla fronts, with
platoons as the rallying point and squads and half-squads spread
out within a wider radius for mass work. The objective should be
to attain extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare throughout
the country. We should be able to make the monster bleed from
thousands upon thousands of wounds.
It is wrong to say that the number of guerrilla fronts is already
enough and that the point is to verticalize the armed strength
into a few big formations. This is the self- constriction which
falls into line with the kind of war that the enemy wants us to
fight because it allows him to beat us in his war of quick
decision and gradual constriction, which is based on his superior
military forces. Painstaking mass work and guerrilla warfare are
still our winning line at this stage of our people's war. These
lay the horizontal foundation for the vertical growth of the
people's army in due course.
Confronted by the brigades and
battalions deployed by the enemy, let us apply the law of
contradiction in our warfare. The enemy is not always in solid
large formation. The rough countryside and the archipelago
objectively divide the enemy forces. There is no large enemy
formation that does not divide itself according to several
functions and that does not make its parts vulnerable to our
attack. Instead of going into the path of certain defeat by
trying to match the enemy's large formations, we must use
guerrilla tactics to induce the enemy force to divide itself and
unwittingly provide us with part after part that we can wipe out.
Where we cannot as yet raid a camp successfully, we must find
success in ambushing the part of the enemy that we can wipe out
on the road. Where we cannot as yet wipe out regular enemy
troops, we can find success in repeatedly seizing arms from
police and paramilitary units through appropriate operations.
It is wrong to say that luring the enemy in deep, letting him
move around blind and deaf, and letting him punch the air when we
cannot fight to win are outmoded tactics just because our
people's war has grown increasingly more intensive as we advance.
These are useful at any stage of the people's war. The winning
line is to fight only the battles that we can win. The losing
line is to stick out big heads or to overreach. Another losing
line is not to fight even the battles that we can win. All the
way we assume that we expand and consolidate the mass base.
We cannot induce our advance to the stage of regular mobile
warfare because it would mean feeding our army and our mass base
to senseless attrition or to self-destruction by prematurely
rushing into strategically decisive battles or campaigns.
Advancing to regular mobile warfare is a strategic advance that
necessitates fulfilling the requirements in stages, building up
the strength and capability of the Party, the mass base, the
reserves and logistics at a higher level and also a greater
degree of the enemy's weakening and disintegration, with due
consideration of other important factors inside and outside the
country. Even the guerrilla warfare for developing the requisites
and laying the conditions for regular mobile warfare in the
future will have to go through stages, progressively from simple
and lower levels to more complex and higher.
The rectification of the line of "regularization" and premature
vertical buildup of the people's army should result in the
reinvigoration and improvement of the quality of mass work and
mass base building in the countryside. It is urgent that we
attend to the work of expanding the guerrilla fronts and
recovering lost areas as well as of solving the problems of
consolidation that have been relegated to secondary position
since we started to undertake "regularization" and "to raise the
level of our warfare". It is necessary for us to understand and
implement the line of solid organizing, correct balancing of
expansion and consolidation, antifeudal struggle, consistent
education and propaganda, and developing various types of mass
campaigns.
We must take advantage of the enemy's loosening hold over wider
parts of the countryside as he concentrates the majority of his
forces and resources for offensives on the few priority targets
of Lambat-Bitag II. But we must also learn to adjust to and
persevere in developing our mass work even under conditions and
within areas of more intense contention with the enemy. We cannot
just leave and abandon the areas that are more populated, along
lines of transportation, communications and supply, and important
in linking up with the movement in the cities simply because
these areas are more easily accessible to or more closely watched
by the enemy. We must therefore be good at combining _ according
to the changing military conditions and particularities of the
areas (remote and mountainous, foothills and plains, adjacent to
urban centers and along highways) _ forms of organizations and
struggles that are open and secret, legal, semilegal and illegal,
traditional and nontraditional, as well as forms of struggles
that are armed and nonarmed in order to maintain as far as
possible our link with, guidance over and development of the
movement and the mass base.
One long running problem in our mass work is the smallness of the
membership of our mass organizations; in many localities, the
only existing people's organizations are the organs of political
power or a semblance of it. We must solve this problem by
organizing as fully as possible the workers, peasants, youth,
women, children and cultural activists. And we must develop the
organs of political power, supported by working committees for
mass organization, education, defense, land reform, production,
finance, health, arbitration, cultural affairs and so on. These
can be drawn from mass organizations.
In organizing the masses,
we must also avoid premature verticalization and give priority to
horizontal spread and consolidation at the barrio and municipal
levels. In the last several years, there has been a tendency to
push the building of the structure of the organs of political
power and the mass organizations upward to the level of the
district and higher even as the scope and strength of the mass
organizations at the basic levels have diminished, thus absorbing
the already limited number of cadres at the lower levels in order
to preoccupy them with the tasks of administration, coordination
and formal processes of organization at upper levels.
It is of urgent necessity to organize the masses. But getting
organized is not enough. Mass campaigns must be launched. Through
these, the masses can develop their own power, effect changes for
their social and economic wellbeing and resist and frustrate
enemy attacks by unarmed and armed, open and secret means.
The key campaign to benefit the peasant masses is the campaign
for the realization of the minimum program of our land reform and
increased production. There are some elements who _ without
having much in carrying out the minimum program of rent reduction
_ already wish to carry out the maximum program of land
confiscation. We have had more than enough negative experiences
of this kind of overreaching _ of trying to achieve what we
cannot as yet achieve.
Elements of the maximum program (such as land confiscation and
redistribution or restitution) may be carried out only against
despotic landlords (those who harm the peasant masses and farm
workers and refuse to negotiate with them) and landgrabbers so
that we can still take advantage of the split between the
despotic and enlightened landlords, prevent the landlords (big,
medium and small) from uniting against us and allow us to further
develop our strength among the peasant masses not only in the
current guerrilla fronts but also in the more extensive areas to
which we must expand.