2. FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE PARTY AND RECTIFY OUR ERRORS!

We must further strengthen the Party ideologically, politically and organizationally. We have made some modest achievements on the basis of which we can advance further. But we have also had certain errors and weaknesses which we must rectify so that we will not be weighed down and dragged down by these and so that we will win more and greater victories.

The reestablishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines on the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought constitutes a victory of profound and far-reaching significance in the Philippine revolution. We have set down and clarified the correct ideological and political line of the Party.

To set the Philippine revolution on the correct course, we have studied and researched into the history and circumstances of the Filipino people and the Party and put out the necessary documents and writings for the edification of all Filipino revolutionaries. In the process, we have successfully criticized and repudiated the long-standing revisionist lines of the Lavas and Tarucs which polluted and suffocated the old merger party.

We have disseminated the works and propagated the scientific revolutionary teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao and we have successfully criticized and repudiated Soviet modern revisionism and social-imperialism. Chairman Mao's works have been widely circulated because they not only deal correctly and elaborately with problems of a people's democratic revolution in a semicolonial and semifeudal country but also because they contain the latest and most comprehensive summing-up of the experience of the world proletariat and people.

To propagate the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method, we have undertaken study courses, put out analyses of current national and international events, promoted further researches of national and regional scopes and required social investigations and criticism and self-criticism as methods for raising our ideological level and improving our practical work.

In our ideological rebuilding, we have had to lay stress on studying basic Marxist-Leninist principles and combating the modern revisionism of the Soviet and local renegades. We have had to rely considerably on books dealing with successful revolutions led by fraternal parties abroad. We ourselves have had to go through more revolutionary experience than what we started with in order to deepen our grasp of Marxism-Leninism. And quite a number of our Party cadres are of petty-bourgeois background who definitely have more book learning than experience.

Under these circumstances, the dogmatist tendency more than the empiricist has been most prominent among those ideologically in error. Instead of making concrete investigations and analyses in linking with the masses, there are some of us who would rather rest content with parallelisms, analogies, quotations and phrasemongering. There is even the notion that we do not deserve to be called revolutionaries if we cannot copy a successful revolution abroad.

There are also those who seem to grasp the basic principles and lessons derived from our criticism and repudiation of the Lavas and Tarucs but fail to grasp our own course of development and the different concrete circumstances that we are in. They fail to understand that we can advance only step by step and that we cannot apply on ourselves completely the same course of thinking and action demanded of the Lavas and Tarucs on the basis of forces available to them and circumstances obtaining at the end of World War II.

While the dogmatist tendency prevails among those in error, there are also those who remain immersed in their own narrow and limited experience either because they are given no chance of developing ideologically or are merely browbeaten or they systematically react to the dogmatist tendency with their own avoidance of theoretical study.

After more than seven years, our reestablished Party has gained enough experience to be in a new stage of knowing clearly the specific characteristics and specific requirements of our revolutionary struggle in the whole country and in the various localities. It is in this spirit that we call for rectification of ideological errors.

Those who have an advantage in book learning must link themselves closely to and learn from the toiling masses of workers and peasants and from our comrades who have an advantages in experience. At the same time, comrades who are of worker and peasant status must not shirk the responsibility of relating their experience to theory and asking that theory must be disclosed in a language easy to understand.

There is paucity of exchanges of worthwhile experiences within the Party, especially between our several regional Party organizations. To promote these, the Central Committee is putting out Rebolusyon as an internal and theoretical bulletin, exclusively for Party members. We intend to publish here, apart from statements and directives from the Central Committee, mainly documents emanating from regional Party conferences and articles that are the result of the application of Marxist theory in the course of concrete revolutionary practice, social investigations, study courses and criticism and self-criticism sessions.

We also intend to undertake conferences among representatives of various regional Party organizations and encourage the attendance in regional Party conferences of representatives of other regional Party organizations. In this way, the most detailed yet discreet exchanges of experience are made possible.

We urge all Party members to contribute to the general effort of giving Marxism a national form. We should disabuse ourselves of the idea that only a few theoreticians know theory and know how to apply it. We can triumph only if the entire Party consistently applies Marxist-Leninist theory on the concrete conditions of the Philippine revolution.

The Party has established its political leadership of the proletariat in the revolution by laying down, clarifying and carrying out the general line of people's democratic revolution. This is a great victory. We have made clear the character, the motive forces, targets and perspective of this revolution.

The character of the revolution is determined by its essential task, which is to liberate the people from foreign and feudal domination and establish an independent and democratic Philippines. Such a task can be accomplished only by waging armed struggle as the main form among the motive forces to isolate and destroy the target or enemy.

At the helm of the motive forces is the proletariat. It takes as its main ally, the peasantry whose demand for land is the main content of the people's democratic revolution and from which the main contingents of the people's army can be drawn. The basic alliance of the toiling masses of workers and peasants is the solid foundation for the united front which must win over the urban petty bourgeoisie firstly and the national bourgeoisie secondly.

The targets of the revolution are the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class. Our current revolutionary struggle against the Marcos fascist dictatorship is more than a struggle against the ruling clique. In the course of fighting this clique, we must develop the strength to weaken the entire ruling system and then topple it in the end.

The perspective of the people's democratic revolution is socialism. The socialist revolution must begin upon the completion of the people's democratic revolution. Though we are ready to give concessions to the petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie in a period of transition, we shall no longer pass through a full stage of capitalist development as in the case of the old democratic revolutions before the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution.

In line with the people's democratic revolution, we have established the New People's Army and launched the revolutionary armed struggle. Our strategic line is to encircle the cities from the countryside and through a protracted period of time develop rural bases from which to advance to seize political power.

Like the Party, the people's army started from scratch and immediately launched revolutionary armed struggle. The people's army has grown in strength step by step, won military victories against powerful odds and won the hearts and minds of millions by its heroic deeds.

The people's army has been the main instrument of the Party in organizing the peasant masses. Hundreds of thousands of people in the barrios have come directly under the barrio organizing committees organized by our guerrilla squads and armed propaganda teams. We have established small guerrilla bases and far more extensive guerrilla zones, carried out mass movements and initiated land reform.

In the face of the fascist enemy, we have continued to organize and lead large masses of people. Even when our barrio organizing committees collapse in one area due to a massive and prolonged enemy campaign, those in other areas increase to more than make up for the losses and even these losses are temporary, still open to recovery.

In support of the mass movement and armed struggle in the countryside, great mass movements have also been raised by the Party in the cities. The first quarter storm of 1970 and succeeding mass actions in Manila-Rizal and other urban areas have broadcast our revolutionary propaganda all over the country and have yielded to us a considerable number of Party and non-Party activists who have been shifted to the countryside or who continue to develop the revolutionary mass movement in the cities.

It is a matter of necessity in the countryside to expand at a rate fast enough to have a wide area for maneuver for our guerrilla forces. For the purpose, we have been setting up the barrio organizing committees. While we have required the organization of these committees to follow the policy of the antifeudal united front, many of these are so haphazardly organized that unreliable elements creep in, prevail over the poor and middle peasants and flaunt their functions while the enemy is not yet around.

The error of haphazard organizing oftentimes characterized by lack or insufficiency of social investigation and by yielding membership in the barrio organizing committee to whomever are the initial contacts in a barrio, leads on to another error. The work of consolidation is not attended to. The basic mass organizations for peasants, workers, women, youth, children and cultural activists are not organized and mobilized to ensure sustained all round mass support for the revolution. Thus, the surrounding waters may be wide but shallow.

When we cannot apply the principle of combining a few cadres from the outside with many local activists, it is even very likely that the scope of our political work is narrow. Thus, we must handle well the relationship of expansion and consolidation, of making the guerrilla zone and the guerrilla base a good fighting front for us.

In cases of errors with disastrous results, the principal tendency has been adventurism or "Left" opportunism. With mass support wide or narrow but shallow there are those who engage in military actions against enemy troops and then when enemy reaction rises, they do not know where to go or the enemy catches up with them. They fail to recognize that to support and ensure the success of any important action, military or otherwise, requires painstaking mass work.

There are petty-bourgeois elements who are still unremolded and who think that it suffices to beat the drum -- make sweeping propaganda but forget to do solid organizational work among the masses -- and who also think that the military action of a few courageous men must precede solid organizational work among the masses.

Relying on a mere committee dominated by unreliable but prestigious personalities has also spawned commandism. The chairman and the chief of defense of the barrio organizing committee often neglect to have any collective life within the committee. And in the absence of militant mass organizations, the trend is to order people around and make them do what is beyond their level of consciousness and organization.

While we oppose "Left" opportunism as the principal tendency among those of us in error, we must also be on guard against Right opportunism. Our insistence on taking the mass line, establishing the basic mass organizations and laying the foundation for a truly people's war should not be twisted to mean the indefinite postponement of tactical military offensives even when conditions for them are already ripe.

There have been manifestations of the Right opportunist tendency in the countryside. To consciously let in unreliable elements in barrio organizing committees and relax with the transitory advantages that they provide is one. To enjoy the conveniences of one barrio and fail to venture out and do mass work in another barrio is another. To remain fixed on going after local bad elements and fail to push forward the land reform and the armed struggle is still another.

In the cities, there is the "Left" opportunist notion prevalent among those of us in error that there can be no revolutionary struggle when there are no strikes, demonstrations and other conspicuous mass protest actions. They fail to recognize that it is perfectly revolutionary struggle to lay down the foundation for these higher forms of political action by doing solid organizational work among the masses.

There is also the notion among those of us in error that sweeping propaganda work suffices to mobilize the people. There is still another notion that the economic struggle of the workers can be slurred over, whereas we must grasp it at its own level and steadily raise it to the level of the political struggle.

There have also been instances of Right opportunism in a certain region. One is the proposal to superimpose the slogan demanding general election in the country on other slogans asserting the democratic rights and interests of the basic masses. Another is making flimsy demands to avoid even only basic trade union demands and the necessary preparations for pushing them forward.

While we have pointed out that sweeping propaganda does not suffice by itself in revolutionary work, we recognize that it is of great importance and that without it mass organizing is without an advance notice and also without direction. We need to step up our propaganda work if we are to enhance our all-round revolutionary work. Our capacity for propaganda and agitation will certainly rise as the basic masses are well organized and activists from their ranks increase.

The corrective measures that we need to undertake in our political work will be dealt with more thoroughly in succeeding sections of this statement.

The membership of the Party is drawn generally from the ranks of activists of the revolutionary mass organizations and Red fighters of the New People's Army. It is clear that our membership is closely linked with the masses and embedded in the revolutionary mass movement. But up to now, our Party is mainly a cadre party. We have thus remained a small party.

The Party started with less than a score of Party members coming from the old merger party and 75 prospective members in late 1968. The membership increased to several scores in 1969, to a few hundreds in 1970 and close to a thousand in 1971. Since 1972, we have had a few thousand members. But since 1973, we have had a slower rate of growth.

Our Party has become nationwide. Directly under the Central Committee, there were groups of Party members in Manila-Rizal, Central Luzon, Cagayan Valley and Southern Luzon in 1969 and 1970 with most members in the first two regions mentioned. Following the Second Plenum of the Central Committee in 1971, we started to build the regional Party committees and organizations. Now, we have nine regional Party organizations covering the whole country.

The majority of Party members are now under the regional Party organizations outside Manila-Rizal. In turn, the majority of these are in the countryside developing the revolutionary armed struggle. But the Manila-Rizal Party organization still remains the single largest Party organization. Though this regional Party organization has been giving cadres to the other regions, it has continued to grow.

We realize that the growth of the Party is quite slow if we relate it to the large numbers of masses being led by the Party. At first it looks flattering that so few could lead so many and that strict standards are being applied on recruitment. But there are unflattering reasons for the slow growth.

Sectarianism, poor tasking and check-ups, irregular and ponderous study courses and lack of recruitment planning are problems both in the cities and in the countryside which have restricted the organizational growth of the Party. We must solve these.

The outstanding reason for the failure of regional Party organizations outside Manila-Rizal to outstrip the membership of the Manila-Rizal Party organization is the failure to build the mass organizations and the mass movement in the localities. Without these, there can be no sound basis for establishing local Party branches. The mass organizations, aside from the people's army, should be the vast reservoir of revolutionary activists and Party members.

The Manila-Rizal Party organization should not be flattered and should not remain complacent about being the biggest single regional Party organization. In the last two years, there has been a tendency here for the membership to stagnate and even decrease. Just as we demand that local Party branches be set up among the peasants in the countryside, we demand that local Party branches be set up among the workers.

The fascist martial rule cannot be used as the main reason for the slow growth of the Party. The strictures of this tyrannical rule has been more than compensated for by the deep-going hatred and growing resistance of the broad masses of the people. In no year has the enemy struck down more than five percent of the membership of the Party. The Party should be able to achieve a high rate of growth because it is small but composed mostly of cadres, if only we grasp the necessity and importance of mass members of the Party from the ranks of the workers and peasants.

The Manila-Rizal based national bureaus served positively from 1971 to 1973 not only as administrators of the city-based national mass organizations but also as schools for a considerable number of new Party recruits. In the first year of martial rule, it also served positively to direct the orderly retreat of the mass organizations suddenly forced to go underground. But in 1974, it became very clear that the national bureaus had outlived their purposes.

It is admitted that the period of one year after the first year of martial rule and before their dissolution in July 1974 constituted a big delay which unduly restricted the disposition of good cadres for various regional Party organizations eager and ready to get them.

It remains our policy to expand the Party boldly on the basis of the revolutionary movement and without letting in a single undesirable. We must follow the reasonable standards set by the Party constitution and we must increase the number of Party members who are of worker and peasant status. In this regard, we must keep in mind that we do not wish to be an exclusively cadre party.

We want a large mass of Party members who are of worker and peasant status because this is a measure of the effectiveness of our revolutionary work, because we want to accomplish gigantic tasks that mainly concern and involve them and because we want to counteract and dilute the negative influences that Party members coming from other classes are liable to bring into the Party.

The Party upholds democratic centralism as its basic organizational principle. This is centralized leadership based on democracy and democracy guided by centralized leadership. By this principle, we can stand and act united and well informed on any important matter. We must apply this principle consistently.

The committee system at every level of leadership, from the Central Committee down to the branch executive committee, is the most important tool of the principle of democratic centralism. The leading committee at a certain level is the point of concentration for an entire Party organization on that level and for lower organs and lower organizations; and within the collectivity of the committee democracy, is carried over from the lower ranks.

With so few Party members taking on large tasks, there is a tendency for a far fewer Party leaders to take on large tasks. When the Party leaders are often attending to large tasks in different places and have difficulties in often coming together, there is always the danger that single Party leaders decide matters that should be taken up in a committee.

Thus, there are conditions for the phenomenon of one-man monopoly of affairs to arise. Indeed it has arisen in the Party and we have been combating this for a long time. Until now, it persists because the conditions for it to keep on arising persist.

The standard organizational solution to this problem is to have a smaller standing committee more easily convened than the full and large committee to act and decide on matters under the guidance of standing policies. For instance, there is the Political Bureau of our Central Committee, then there is the Executive Committee and still there is the General Secretariat. There is the executive committee of the regional committee and then there is the secretariat.

It takes good judgment based on experience and full grasp of policies for a Party leader to make a prompt decision on an urgent matter. He could be like an army commander in an emergency military situation. But always as soon as possible he must submit his decision or action to a collective body.

Any Party leader can initiate or propose a draft or anything, though it is the chairman or the secretary who is expected to perform this leading role. But there must be some preparatory meeting in a smaller committee before presentation of matters before the plenary meeting of a larger committee. In this way, there is thoroughness in preparation and in the entire process of decision-making.

Bureaucratism is also an error contravening the spirit of democratic centralism. Our cadres should not limit themselves to merely receiving reports but they should go down for worthwhile periods of time to lower levels and to the grassroots to investigate for themselves the basis for policies, verify reports and study the correctness or incorrectness of policies.

Going down to the grassroots is good for the remolding of high and middle level Party cadres. We do not mean to say that they abandon their functions in the leading organs but for them to perform these better. And we do not mean that they dissipate their efforts in going around to many places. But they must go down to investigate typical or critical situations (whatever is the main problem that needs close attention) and link themselves closely with the masses.

The central leadership no less has undertaken certain special projects requiring special detachment of personnel, heavy fixed investments and special methods of work that are not assured of effective or sufficient support by the masses in the vicinity of operation. These should no longer be undertaken because these easily meet failure and unduly preoccupy the leadership with matters of secondary importance to a self-reliant revolutionary movement.

At lower levels of the Party, there have also been instances of business and other projects that tend to distract Party leaders from their fundamental tasks. If these projects are beneficial to the revolution, they should be undertaken by trustworthy personnel without wasting the time of Party leaders and without risking the resources of the Party which are much needed for other purposes.

All leaders and members of the Party must be diligent and thrifty. Every moment must be seized to advance the revolution. Every centavo must be spent wisely. Upon our diligence and thrift, we can fruitfully carry out the policy of self-reliance.

In this period of fascist martial rule, the Party must not only be vigilant but extra-vigilant. We must have contempt for the enemy strategically but we must take serious, meticulous account of him tactically. The fact that the Party has always been underground and involved in armed struggle since the very beginning shows that it has always been prepared and equipped to face the worst of eventualities. But there are vulnerabilities that we must be aware of so that we can guard against them.

In the cities, we must be aware that the open activists of legal progressive organizations before fascist martial rule have been used by the enemy as unwitting tracers of the Party underground. Many of these activists have been apprehended and some of them are proven or merely suspected Party members. We must apply the policy of shifting or reassigning those Party members who can no longer effectively work in their present urban assignment.

In the countryside, the Party members on the manhunt list of the enemy should adapt to the fluidity of our guerrilla activity. The risks are also high in the countryside because we have mere guerrilla squads and at the most guerrilla platoons. But certainly, here we can rely on mass support that is bigger over wider contiguous areas than in the cities. Party members who cannot work freely in the cities can work here far more freely.

In both cities and countryside, a number of comrades have sacrificed their lives and limbs or have fallen into the hands of the enemy and have suffered the most excruciating torture and the torment of incarceration. These include some members of the Central Committee and various regional Party committees.

We honor and emulate our martyrs and heroes. And we convey to our comrades in prison to steel themselves further while in prison and turn the prison into a school. We should learn from their experience. So long as our regional Party organizations keep on growing through revolutionary struggle, there is always a basis for cadres to come forward and replenish as well as reinforce the Central Committee and the regional Party committees.

Only so few among those who have fallen into the hands of the enemy have become traitors or betrayers. There are also those few who cannot stand the difficulties of the struggle and drop out or surrender themselves to the enemy. All these renegades are only a handful and do not make even two percent of those who have fallen into the hands of the enemy. We should learn from their negative examples.

The Party reflects the iniquitous society outside. Thus, there are errors and weaknesses. And there are the few who go overboard completely and become traitors. It is clear that within the Party the law of contradiction and the law of class struggle operate. But our Party members in general are certainly good. The Party stands united to further strengthen itself.